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When people are forced by conflict or other circumstances to leave their homes, they usually also leave behind their means of economic activity and 
subsistence. In their new location, they may not be able, or permitted, to work 
to support themselves. This has wide-ranging implications not only for people’s 
immediate earning capacity and well-being but also for community relations, 
economic development and the capacity of future generations to lead fulfilling 
lives. In our main feature on Economies, authors explore the complex interactions 
of the constraints and opportunities involved, drawing on case-studies from 
around the world and highlighting the roles of new actors, new technologies and 
new – or renewed – approaches.
We are also pleased to include two ‘mini-features’ in this FMR, one on Refugee-
led social protection and one on Humans and animals in refugee camps. (See 
the back cover if you are interested in collaborating with FMR on a mini-feature 
– or a full feature.)
We would like to thank Karen Jacobsen (Tufts University) and Khalid Koser 
(Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund) for their assistance  
as advisors to the Economies feature theme. We are also grateful to the following 
donors for their support of this issue: ESRC-AHRC (Economic and Social Research 
Council and Arts and Humanities Research Council) Global Challenges Research 
Fund, the Global Program on Forced Displacement of the World Bank Group, 
Mercy Corps, UNHCR Division of Resilience and Solutions (Livelihoods Unit) and 
the Wellcome Trust. 
See www.fmreview.org/economies to access the magazine, its accompanying 
‘digest’ and all individual articles. A podcast of each article is also available.  
FMR 58 will be available in English, Arabic, Spanish and French. For printed 
copies, please email us at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk. 
Forthcoming issues (see www.fmreview.org/forthcoming)  
• FMR 59:  Twentieth anniversary of the Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (October 2018)
• FMR 60: Education (February 2019)
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www.fmreview.org/request/alerts. 
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photo but one that shows personal initiative in difficult circumstances.
Lina Abirafeh
Lebanese American University
Nina M Birkeland
Norwegian Refugee Council
Jeff Crisp
Independent consultant
Mark Cutts
OCHA
Eva Espinar
University of Alicante
Matthew Gibney
Refugee Studies Centre
Rachel Hastie
Oxfam
Lucy W Kiama
HIAS Kenya 
Khalid Koser 
GCERF
Erin Mooney
UN Protection  
Capacity/ProCap
Steven Muncy
Community and Family  
Services International
Kathrine Starup
Danish Refugee Council
Emilie Wiinblad Mathez
UNHCR
Richard Williams
Independent consultant
FMR International Advisors 
Advisors serve in an individual capacity and do not necessarily represent their institutions.
Forced Migration Review issue 58 • www.fmreview.org/economies
Economies
4 Refugees’ right to work and access to labour 
markets: constraints, challenges and ways 
forward  
Roger Zetter and Héloïse Ruaudel
8 Supporting recently resettled refugees in the UK
Marwa Belghazi
10 Integrating refugees into the Turkish labour 
market
Ximena V Del Carpio, Sirma Demir Seker and Ahmet 
Levent Yener
14 From refugee to employee: work integration in 
rural Denmark
Martin Ledstrup and Marie Larsen
16 Integrating refugee doctors into host health-care 
systems
Shahla Namak, Fatin Sahhar, Sarah Kureshi, Fadya El 
Rayess and Ranit Mishori  
19 Refugees’ engagement with host economies in 
Uganda
Naohiko Omata
22 Refugees and host communities in the Rwandan 
labour market
Özge Bilgili and Craig Loschmann 
24 The role of rural grocery stores in refugee 
reception
Zachary Whyte, Birgitte Romme Larsen and Mona 
Schaldemose
26 Collaboration with criminal organisations in 
Colombia: an obstacle to economic recovery
Christopher M Hays
29 Syrian economies: a temporary boom? 
Ahmad Al Ajlan 
30 Obstacles to refugees’ self-reliance in Germany
Elizabeth Ekren 
32 The new world of work and the need for digital 
empowerment
Miguel Peromingo and Willem Pieterson
34 Investing in refugees: building human capital 
Lili Mottaghi
36 Towards greater visibility and recruitment of 
skilled refugees
Leah Nichles and Sayre Nyce
37 Validating highly educated refugees’ 
qualifications
Katarina Mozetič
39 Refugee livelihoods: new actors, new models
Ziad Ayoubi and Regina Saavedra
42 The macro-economic impacts of Syrian  
refugee aid
Tobias Schillings
45 Quality of work for Syrian refugees in Jordan
Maha Kattaa and Meredith Byrne
47 The gig economy in complex refugee situations
Abigail Hunt, Emma Samman, Dina Mansour-Ille and 
Henrieke Max
50 The power of markets: lessons from Uganda
Alison Hemberger, Sasha Muench and Chelsea Purvis
51	 Livelihoods	programming	and	its	influence	on	
secondary migration
Richard Mallett, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Clare Cummings 
and Nassim Majidi
54 The shortcomings of employment as a durable 
solution 
Nora Bardelli 
Refugee-led social protection
56 Refugee-led social protection: reconceiving 
refugee assistance
Evan Easton-Calabria and Kate Pincock
59 Refugee paralegals
Musenga Tshimankinda Christian  
60 Kobciye: empowering Somali refugees in Nairobi
Afrah Hassan
62 Syrian refugee-led organisations in Berlin
Jennifer Wood, Evan Easton-Calabria and Yahya Alaous 
64 Refugee-led education in Indonesia 
Thomas Brown
67 Lessons from LGBTIQ refugee-led community-
based organisations
Hester K V Moore
Humans and animals in refugee camps
70 Humans and animals in refugee camps
Benjamin Thomas White
71 The role of livestock in refugee-host community 
relations 
Charles Hoots
75 Working equids in refugee camps 
Patrick J Pollock 
76 Sheltering animals in refugee camps
Lara Alshawawreh
78 Understanding risk in human–animal interactions 
Sara Owczarczak-Garstecka 
80 Animal and human health in the Sahrawi refugee 
camps 
Giorgia Angeloni and Jennifer Carr 
83	 A	field	study	of	migration	and	adversity
Derek Robertson  
ADRA International • Better Shelter • CAMMINA (Central 
America and Mexico Migration Alliance) • Catholic Relief 
Services-USCCB • Danish Refugee Council • Entreculturas 
• ESRC-AHRC • Global Program on Forced Displacement of 
the World Bank Group • Government of the Principality of 
Liechtenstein • Happold Foundation • Hunter & Stephanie 
Hunt • IOM • Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
• Mercy Corps • Mohammed Abu-Risha • Norwegian 
Thank you to all FMR’s donors
We are grateful to the following current and recent 
donors for their support. 
Refugee Council • Open Society Foundations • Oxfam • 
Platform on Disaster Displacement (PDD) • RefugePoint 
• Regional Development and Protection Programme for 
the Middle East • Suricatta Systems • Swiss Federal 
Department of Foreign Affairs • UN-Habitat • UNHCR 
• Wellcome Trust • Women’s Refugee Commission 
We would also like to thank those who have made 
individual donations. Even small donations help 
to keep FMR going, so please consider making a 
donation: www.fmreview.org/online-giving. 
4FM
R
 5
8
June 2018www.fmreview.org/economies
Economies
Refugees’ right to work and access to labour 
markets: constraints, challenges and ways forward  
Roger Zetter and Héloïse Ruaudel
For refugees, the right to work and access to labour markets are key for becoming self-
reliant, building their lives and securing dignity, and allowing them to contribute to their host 
communities. Host countries need to assess the potential for opening their labour markets 
to refugees, and enhancing access to decent work.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees accords refugees the right to 
work1 but many host countries are reluctant 
to allow this right. This reluctance reflects 
varying concerns about labour market 
distortion and limited capacity to absorb 
new labour, the crowding of certain sectors, 
availability of jobs for citizens, reduction in 
wages and decline in working conditions. 
Host governments may also be swayed by 
popular opposition to refugee rights to work 
and by security concerns about large-scale 
refugee populations settling and working. 
Of the 145 States Parties to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, almost half declare reservations, 
and even States that grant the right to 
work usually impose conditions on access 
to labour markets. The same limitations 
apply to many of the 48 States that are not 
States Parties to the Refugee Convention. 
For refugees, however, the right to 
work and access to labour markets are 
prerequisites for allowing them to secure 
sustainable livelihoods, thereby reducing 
vulnerability, enhancing resilience and 
enabling a dignified life. Acknowledging 
this, intergovernmental organisations such 
as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) now promote 
access to labour markets and the right to work 
as core elements of development-oriented, 
sustainable refugee programming, especially 
for those living in protracted displacement. 
A desk study and comparative analysis 
undertaken in 20162 investigated the role 
and impact of international legal provisions 
– specifically Articles 17-19 of the 1951 
Refugee Convention – that provide and 
protect refugees’ right to work and access 
to labour markets. The study covered 20 
countries, including low- and middle-
income countries that together host the 
majority of the world’s refugees but also 
upper-income countries. Both signatory 
and non-signatory States were included. 
Frameworks, policies and other factors 
affecting labour market access
A restrictive approach to the right to work 
prevails in most countries, even upper-income 
economies such as the United Kingdom. In 
many countries that have received greater 
numbers of refugees, the barriers can be 
tougher, such as for Colombian refugees in 
Venezuela, while a formal prohibition exists 
in many countries, such as Bangladesh (for 
Rohingya refugees) and Sudan (for Eritrean 
refugees because of their lack of legal status 
in the country). These constraints force 
refugees to use irregular pathways both to 
enter and to work in the country. Even in 
countries that adhere to the relevant articles 
of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the legal 
entitlement to work for refugees is rarely 
unconditional. In Iran, for example, refugees 
can only work in 16 professional categories. 
In general, these protectionist policies 
characterise countries with limited labour 
market capacity, more narrowly based and 
weaker economies, and less resilience to 
economic shocks – such as Chad, Zambia and 
Pakistan. While in some sense an obvious 
point, this has a bearing on how international 
donors should support wider strategic 
objectives for sustainable development-led 
responses in countries where the presence 
of refugees has a significant impact.
There is little consistency in implementing 
the right to work, and there are significant 
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variations between signatory States, for 
example Italy, UK, Germany and the 
United States (US), as well as – perhaps 
less surprisingly – between non-signatory 
States, such as Pakistan, Lebanon and 
Jordan. Signatory States do not necessarily 
offer ‘best’ or ‘better’ practice than non-
signatories – demonstrated, for example, 
by the leadership shown by Jordan (a 
non-signatory State) in providing a quota 
of work permits to Syrian refugees as 
part of the donor-supported Compact.  
A key finding of the study is that 
assessing refugees’ right to work based 
simply on a country’s legal and normative 
frameworks and its policies towards 
refugees is rarely sufficient. Certainly, 
providing refugees with a legal right to 
work is insufficient without corresponding 
compliance and enforcement mechanisms. 
Additional constraints and mediating 
factors 
Refugees often need a work permit 
(usually obtained through a costly and 
administratively burdensome process) 
and/or residence permit in addition to 
their refugee status, or need a job offer 
from an employer before they can obtain a 
work permit – as in Lebanon and Zambia, 
for example. In other countries there are 
limitations, albeit indirect, on refugees’ 
entrepreneurship and ability to accumulate 
capital: in Pakistan, refugees cannot hold real 
estate or own a business without a Pakistani 
partner; in Ecuador and Turkey refugees 
have limited access to financial institutions 
to obtain loans; and in Zambia there are 
high fees for refugee business start-ups.
Indirect barriers to the right to work take 
other forms. Backlogs in status determination, 
in a country like South Africa, slows down 
access to formal labour markets, while 
immigration offices in Venezuela are located 
in hard-to-access remote border areas. By 
contrast, the Turkish government now allows 
Syrian refugees who possess temporary 
identity cards and have resided in Turkey 
for six months to apply for work permits.
Restrictions on the right to work force 
the majority of refugees to work informally. 
This is evident in Bangladesh and Pakistan, 
where work outside camps is tacitly accepted 
despite being illegal, and in countries in 
the Middle East hosting large numbers of 
Syrian refugees, where informal economies 
have expanded. In upper-income countries, 
refugees also work in the informal sector, 
although in smaller numbers. Such work 
entails significant disadvantages and risks 
– limited livelihood sustainability, marginal 
wages, lack of decent work, and exploitation. 
Other factors affect access and type of 
work. In Ecuador, Colombian refugees are 
A Congolese refugee feeds tilapia at a fish farm collective run jointly by refugees and locals on Lake Rwamunga, western Uganda.
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treated the same as economic migrants, who 
generally experience limited job opportunities 
and poor working conditions. Negative 
gender stereotypes, gender-based social 
discrimination and violence against women 
are prevalent in labour markets across our 
sample. For instance, female Myanmar 
refugees in India are grossly overworked and 
underpaid; female refugees are harassed in 
the workplace in Ecuador and Colombia; 
 and refugee widows and unmarried women 
in Uganda may be targeted for abuse by 
employers. There is also evidence that the lack 
of formal employment opportunities and right 
to work for adults increases levels of youth 
and child labour, such as in Lebanon, with 
obvious short- and long-term negative effects. 
A significant implication of all these 
limitations – and others beyond those 
mentioned here – is that refugees are rarely 
able to accumulate sufficient capital or 
skills either to finance their own legitimate 
pathway to self-reliance (and possible 
integration) or to support their return and 
reintegration to their home countries.
Tackling the constraints
There is some evidence that governments, 
international organisations and non-
governmental organisations are beginning 
to tackle some of these constraints, albeit 
unsystematically, such as through easing 
processes for obtaining work permits, 
providing incentives for refugees to find 
employment, recognising qualifications 
and improving skills training. 
In Chad and Uganda refugees are 
allowed to settle in host communities and 
some are granted arable land for agricultural 
production. The International Labour 
Organization (ILO), UNHCR and the 
government of Ethiopia are collaborating 
on an ‘out-of-camp’ policy which allows 
some relaxation of restrictions on movement 
and place of residence and eases access to 
employment/self-employment in camps and 
surrounding host communities. Community-
based organisations in Kenya provide 
fellow refugees with practical assistance 
and language lessons and facilitate links to 
labour opportunities. Germany’s National 
Integration Plan, adopted in 2012, covers 
language tuition, education provision 
and social and labour market integration 
for refugees, aiming to maximise the 
contribution of refugees to German society. 
Proactive policies, usually in upper-
income economies, often reflect strict 
government expectations for refugees to 
become economically self-sufficient as 
soon as possible, as in Germany and the 
US. However, this may mean that refugees 
miss out on training opportunities or 
are compelled to take work that does 
not reflect their skills and qualifications. 
Unsurprisingly, accreditation of prior 
skills and qualifications and opportunities 
to access education, language training 
and skills development can significantly 
enhance access to employment for refugees. 
Countries such as Ecuador, Germany, the 
US and Zambia all have procedures to 
recognise foreign professional diplomas. 
The more recent efforts towards enabling 
refugees to contribute to the economy of host 
countries and to achieve greater self-reliance 
have been triggered by the response towards 
the Syrian ‘crisis’. Once the host countries in 
the region and donors realised the protracted 
nature of the displacement they attempted to 
adopt a coherent response with development 
objectives alongside the humanitarian 
response, as illustrated in the Syrian Regional 
Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP). Receiving 
significant support from the international 
community, countries like Jordan shifted 
their policy towards refugees, opening up 
access to employment by providing a quota 
of work permits.3 This model is also being 
tested in other contexts such as Ethiopia 
with the creation of a Jobs Compacts, an 
ambitious endeavour given the poor record of 
industrial parks across Africa on job creation.4 
Positive attitudes among employers can of 
course improve the conditions for decent work 
for refugees and can help reduce xenophobia. 
Many employers, however, may be reluctant 
to employ refugees because of lack of clarity 
over the legal provisions allowing refugees 
to work. In Ecuador, for example, there 
appears to be confusion among employers 
over the varying right to work for refugees 
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and for foreign nationals, while the study 
found that in South Africa refugee documents 
state that they are allowed to work but 
employers do not recognise this entitlement. 
Social capital and ethnic or linguistic 
ties play an important role in access to 
labour markets and type of work. In Uganda 
and Kenya these networks help refugees, 
notably Somali refugees, obtain employment 
from co-national businesses, while there 
is some evidence that Somali refugees in 
South Africa find work with South African 
Muslim businesses. Common language 
and culture or marriage may ease access to 
work; Eritrean refugees from the Tigrinya 
ethnic group now in northern Ethiopia have 
a strong advantage over other Eritreans 
in securing employment opportunities.
Ways forward 
Governments, with the support of donors 
and international actors, should better align 
refugee law and practice with national 
employment policies. Often, these seem to 
work in opposite directions. Better coherence 
would enhance access to labour markets 
and make the right to work a reality for 
many more refugees. To this end, better 
coordination between ministries involved 
with refugee/immigration affairs and 
those responsible for labour rights would 
enhance implementation of refugees’ right 
to work and labour market inclusion, 
removing some of the administrative and 
bureaucratic barriers discussed above.
Labour market policies that lead to more 
sustainable livelihoods and better economic 
conditions for refugees (and their hosts) are 
essential. Too often the lack of the right to 
work or constraints on this right prevent 
refugees from engaging in decent work in the 
formal sector, leaving them more exposed – in 
the informal sector – to precarious incomes, 
the absence of contractual rights, and greater 
risks of exploitative working conditions. 
Employers, employers’ organisations and 
trade unions can also contribute to proactive 
policies that deliver access to labour markets 
and decent employment. They can promote 
good practice among their membership and 
work with governments and local authorities 
to promote effective legislation, regulation 
and compliance. At the same time, national 
governments, employers, trade unions and 
civil society all share the responsibility to 
promote equality of rights and to counter 
negative discourse or stereotypes of 
refugees which limit their participation and 
integration. These initiatives should also 
include developing a better awareness, among 
refugees as well as among judiciary and 
regulatory agencies, of refugees’ workplace 
rights; too often refugees are unaware of 
or frightened to exercise their rights and 
are poorly protected by the authorities.
Improved training, education and 
language/skills development are critical 
elements for enhancing refugees’ access to 
labour markets, and employers and training 
providers need to design innovative ways 
of promoting and delivering these.
Donors and international and 
intergovernmental organisations should 
play a more significant role in addressing 
crises of forced displacement through 
introducing policies providing for refugees’ 
right to work and access to labour markets, 
especially in poorer countries hosting large 
numbers of refugees where labour markets 
are most constrained. Here the international 
funding and underwriting of labour market 
developments and job promotion should 
be buttressed by support for legislation, 
policies and standards for decent work. 
Roger Zetter roger.zetter@qeh.ox.ac.uk 
Professor Emeritus of Refugee Studies, University 
of Oxford www.oxford.ac.uk 
Héloïse Ruaudel heloise.ruaudel@gmail.com 
Independent consultant and researcher 
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2. Zetter R and Ruaudel H (2016) Refugees’ Right to Work and 
Access to Labor Markets – An Assessment, Part 1, World Bank 
Global Program on Forced Displacement (GPFD) and the 
Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development 
(KNOMAD) Thematic Working Group on Forced Migration  
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3. See articles on the Jordan Compact in FMR 57  
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4. Ruaudel H and Morrison-Métois S (2017) ‘Responding to 
Refugee Crises in Developing Countries, What Can We Learn 
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Supporting recently resettled refugees in the UK
Marwa Belghazi
Organisations supporting recently resettled refugees to find employment should focus on 
providing them with the tools to navigate the employment market in a sustainable way that 
leads to their personal development.
Our organisation supports refugee families 
who have recently been resettled in the UK. 
We help them navigate the welfare system, 
claim relevant benefits and we also set 
up a support plan that takes into account 
their objectives in terms of professional 
development. We accompany adults to their 
first appointment at the job centre, where the 
discussion with the centre’s work coaches 
is about employability and being job-ready. 
The question for our organisation is always 
about expectations – do we encourage the 
people we support to dream big or to lower 
their expectations and look for a source 
of steady income? In the first weeks and 
months following resettlement they are 
eager to find a job, to reconnect with that 
part of their identity as providers for their 
families. The initial excitement, however, is 
slowly replaced by bitterness and a feeling 
of failure as obstacles emerge. From our 
experience of supporting refugees in their 
search for employment we present some 
lessons relating to the following areas:
Continuous support to navigate a new 
system: We run weekly outreach surgeries 
where we discuss the frustrations that 
families encounter in their daily life in the 
UK. We discuss the importance of work 
contracts, national insurance and tax systems, 
minimum wage and living wage, expectations 
versus reality, and personal development. 
We respond to doubts and anxieties in a 
group conversation environment and also 
offer individual conversations with the help 
of bilingual support workers as we have 
found that addressing issues and working 
on personal development plans in refugees’ 
first languages helps them better assimilate 
information. In the group environment, 
people share their strategies for looking for 
work. For example, making door-to-door 
calls to potential employers is the main 
tactic used by our group of adults (initially 
in the local diaspora, although promised 
jobs often do not materialise); as this is their 
preferred approach, it seemed unrealistic to 
suddenly change their approach so we instead 
helped them prepare CVs and print enough 
copies to take on their door-to-door visits.
Language as an asset, not an obstacle: When 
discussing work opportunities for recently 
arrived refugees, we tend to focus on their low 
level of English. But what if the combination 
of two languages compensates for lack of 
fluency in English? A refugee’s first language 
could well be an asset in bilingual positions, 
for example as teaching assistants in schools 
where there is a need for professionals 
to liaise with parents and to support the 
pupils who speak that same language. 
Professional mentoring: We try to find 
mentors who have a similar background. This 
allows the refugees to have conversations 
about their interests and to tell their stories of 
past work to someone who can relate to them. 
Through this relationship they can adapt their 
expectations to the reality of what that job 
entails in the UK (for example, working as a 
lawyer in a country in the Middle East is not 
the same as in a city such as London in terms 
of earnings, working hours and laws). Where 
possible, it makes an even greater impact to 
foster peer mentorship between members 
of different families who arrive through the 
same resettlement scheme. When there is a 
success story within the community, people 
are able to feel more inspired by it. And 
it’s a win-win situation: the peer mentors 
feel empowered by their positive impact on 
newcomers and can tangibly measure how 
they have progressed since they themselves 
arrived. For their part, the newly settled 
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refugees can project themselves into the 
future through their interactions with 
their mentors and aim to reach a similar 
level of independence and initiative.
Universal vulnerability: For adults who have 
spent their lives being independent, providing 
for their families and taking on different 
roles in their societies, it is difficult to find 
themselves suddenly reliant on other people 
to provide them with support and on agencies 
to provide them with means of subsistence. 
In this context, it is important to embed the 
support provided to refugee families within 
a framework of universal vulnerability. We 
are all vulnerable to differing degrees and 
our vulnerability is situational. Although 
we as practitioners act as role models and 
respond to the questions and requests of the 
families we support, we should find ways 
to share reflections with them on our own 
vulnerabilities. Doubt and self-consciousness 
are an inherent part of entering the job 
market, no matter what our background.
Time to heal: It is important to acknowledge 
that, sometimes, although a person presents 
all the skills necessary to find employment, 
they might not be ready to enter the labour 
market. Traumas endured and the upheaval 
of displacement can require long processes 
of healing. Mental health provision is an 
essential aspect of support that goes hand-
in-hand with restoring the ability to provide 
for the family. Therefore we should be able 
to encourage those individuals who require 
respite, and create support plans that take 
into consideration their mental and physical 
health needs. This might mean focusing on 
restoring confidence and building resilience 
through different activities, all of which 
contributes in the long run to preparing the 
person to re-join the search for employment. 
Challenging perceived failure: Having an 
application rejected can be very distressing 
and discouraging. It is good to encourage 
feedback from employers or partner 
organisations so the person understands the 
reason for it. For example, the application of 
a client whom we had referred to a business 
incubator to help him develop his idea and 
build skills in business administration was 
unsuccessful, and the client considered 
the rejection email from the organisers as 
a failure. On contacting the organisation 
for feedback, however, they explained 
that the person’s business plan was not 
clear and his level of English insufficient 
for the project but that they were keen to 
offer him other options of training within 
their structure. We then discussed those 
programmes with the client, and how their 
requirements fitted with his ambitions. 
Motivating employers: Many of our clients 
seem to be ready to enter the labour market but 
the market is not ready for them. Taking time 
and employing creativity to attract employers’ 
attention therefore becomes essential. By 
building on the current momentum around 
citizens and organisations interested in 
helping refugees we can harness the interest 
of institutions, agencies and individuals 
and potentially turn them into employers. 
Exploring new opportunities: In their 
attempts to reconstruct their lives, sometimes 
refugees remain attached to the positions they 
occupied in their home countries and hope 
to be able to do the same thing again. This 
is completely understandable but it can also 
pose an obstacle in terms of forming realistic 
plans. The process of obtaining equivalent 
professional status in the host country can be 
very complicated and difficult, and refugees 
should be encouraged to consider what skills 
they have that could be used in other roles. For 
example, many people we support show great 
initiative in terms of supporting other families, 
offering peer mentoring and guidance 
that improves the quality of life of many 
others, although they have no experience of 
working in a charity or in the community 
care sector. It is important to explain to these 
community champions that their initiative 
and sense of empathy are great skills that 
could be used in a professional setting. 
One example of our organisation’s work 
illustrates these recommendations. A child 
resettled with their family needed a one-to-
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one assistant at the nursery but the nursery 
struggled to meet this child’s specific needs. 
We saw that if this support were provided 
in the mother tongue of the family, it would 
allow the assistant to be of greater use to 
the child and enable greater communication 
with its parents. Furthermore, having 
an understanding of displacement and 
resettlement would also be beneficial. 
We identified a candidate among the 
group of people we work with who had a 
lot of experience in teaching and early years 
work. The obstacles to this person filling the 
position were several: lack of work experience 
in the UK, insufficient level of English and 
lack of appropriate training. However, we 
acted as facilitators, working with the child’s 
parents, with health professionals and with 
the nursery to agree on the core skills needed 
for the position. We demonstrated that our 
candidate had them and then worked on a 
plan to address the missing elements. We 
contacted partner agencies to help with the 
required training and arranged suitable 
ESOL classes around the working hours. We 
provided support throughout the induction 
and stayed in close contact with the employer, 
providing, for example, a character reference. 
Ultimately, it was the promise of on-
going support to both the employer and the 
candidate that reassured them. The creation 
of the position of nursery assistant was 
also made possible through a Home Office 
provision specifically for the educational 
needs of children resettled within this refugee 
scheme. In this way, a refugee was offered 
a paid position to support another refugee 
and the local authority facilitated this by 
applying for the appropriate funds allocated 
to the project. The results changed the life 
of the child’s family, the nursery improved 
the service it was offering, and the person 
employed secured a stable and stimulating 
job matching their skills and aspirations. 
Marwa Belghazi marwa.belghazi@gmail.com 
Team manager, Refugee resettlement support, 
Single Homeless Project  
www.shp.org.uk/welcoming-refugees    
Integrating refugees into the Turkish labour market
Ximena V Del Carpio, Sirma Demir Seker and Ahmet Levent Yener
The granting to Syrian refugees in Turkey of the right to access formal work was a first step 
towards their economic integration but a number of challenges remain. With support from the 
international community, the Turkish government is taking action to overcome some of these. 
Turkey hosts nearly 3.3 million registered 
refugees, mostly from Syria. The country 
has shown exemplary openness, and 
has made considerable efforts to support 
Syrians despite the strain on social 
services. It has facilitated their access to 
critical public services including health, 
housing, education and social assistance. 
Recognising that refugees cannot rely 
solely on social assistance, however, the 
government of Turkey passed a regulation 
in January 2016 to allow Syrian refugees1 to 
obtain formal work permits. The goal was 
to help Syrian refugees be economically 
independent, graduate from social assistance, 
and contribute to the Turkish economy. 
Economic development varies 
widely across Turkey and in some cases 
divergence between regions has increased 
over the last few years. Rising general 
unemployment (peaking at 13% in early 
2017) and persistent youth unemployment 
(with a national average of around 19%)2 
highlight that the number of jobs available 
is insufficient to absorb all job seekers. 
Ominously, many of the provinces with 
a large population of Syrians relative to 
the local population and to the total Syrian 
refugee population in Turkey are among the 
most disadvantaged, having significantly 
lower density of formal businesses, low 
net formal job creation, a less educated 
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population, lower labour force participation 
and higher unemployment rates than the 
national average. Statistics compiled by 
Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management 
Agency, the Ministry of Health and the World 
Health Organization suggest that at least half 
of the over two million working-age Syrians 
work informally. Of these, most are men; 
the percentage of women working is low, 
peaking at 7% among women aged 30 to 44. 
Barriers to formal economic integration of 
refugees
Refugees currently receiving cash support 
from the EU-financed cash transfer (social 
assistance) programme risk losing benefits if 
they work formally. There are also location-
related disincentives since the place in which a 
refugee is registered determines where they can 
seek formal work. Therefore, many Syrians who 
have moved to more dynamic labour markets 
such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir cannot seek 
formal employment there unless they change 
their registration location – a cumbersome 
and costly administrative procedure.   
Low education levels and limited data 
on the types of skills and experiences of 
Syrians living in Turkey are further barriers to 
facilitating their employment. Data from before 
the war show that in the provinces near the 
Turkish border, Syrians’ educational attainment 
was low compared with that of Turkish people. 
Around 20% (from Aleppo and Idleb) were 
educated to secondary- or post-secondary 
levels. Estimated figures are lower (15%) for 
people from Raqqa and higher (40%) for those 
from Lattakia. In Turkey, on average around 
45% of people have completed secondary or 
post-secondary education. Syrian refugees’ 
lower levels of education and lack of recognised 
or formally documented skills are associated 
with the low issuance of formal work permits. 
The Ministry of Labour (MoLSS), Turkish 
Public Employment Services (ISKUR), the World 
Bank and the European Union are collaborating 
on two joint programmes to adapt services 
that are already available to Turkish citizens in 
order to support Syrians. These programmes, 
Employment Support for Syrians under 
Temporary Protection and Host Communities, 
and Strengthening Economic Opportunities 
for Syrians under Temporary Protection and 
Host Communities in Turkey, were designed 
in 2017. Their activities are aimed, respectively, 
at addressing supply-side challenges 
(relating to employability) and demand-side 
challenges (relating to employment and 
economic activity) and will be implemented 
from 2018 to 2021. During the current pilot 
phase of each project the aim is for services 
– and, where possible, jobs – to be provided 
to 15,700 people; the systems now being set 
up will later provide for thousands more.
Labour supply-side activities
‘Supply-side’ activities in the case of Syrian 
refugees in Turkey address challenges 
which hinder their access to formal work 
(namely, access to a work permit), as well 
as employability challenges that hinder 
job placement. Activities include language 
training, setting up systems for assessing 
skills, counselling and job search assistance 
in Arabic, and a variety of financial 
incentives and support. Beneficiaries 
can also be referred to the Vocational 
Qualification Authority for validation of their 
foreign credentials or assessment of their 
educational level and work experience. 
There is a need for better information 
to be provided to job seekers about how to 
obtain a work permit, and for improvements 
to the still largely manual application and 
issuance processes. 15,022 work permits were 
issued by MoLSS to Syrian refugees between 
January 2016 and November 2017, which was 
fewer than expected and is indicative both 
of information barriers faced by refugees 
and employers and of IT system-related 
issues hindering the processing of permits. 
The Employment Support for Syrians under 
Temporary Protection and Host Communities 
programme focuses on conducting outreach 
campaigns via multiple channels and 
languages to improve knowledge of the 
process, and on improving the IT system.  
Many efforts to provide language and 
vocational skills for Syrian refugees have 
been made by various humanitarian and 
development actors from the first years of 
their arrival. Some of these efforts were 
effective in imparting valuable skills that 
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helped many refugees enter the economy, 
albeit mostly informally. However, many 
of the programmes offered were limited in 
scale, designed largely outside government 
institutions, almost fully dependent on 
external funds, and not built on the existing 
system of labour integration used for the local 
population. As a result, many training courses 
delivered were not formally recognised by the 
Turkish national education system, making 
it difficult for refugees to secure relevant 
credentials or formal credit for such training. 
As part of the programme, ISKUR has been 
mandated to help refugees enter the formal 
labour market, building on its experience of 
providing employment support services for over 
three million Turkish citizens annually.3 It is 
designing a tool to assess refugees’ language, 
cognitive and technical skills; with this 
information, ISKUR can help Syrian refugees 
find jobs, and identify those who require 
additional training prior to being integrated into 
the workplace. As with the local population, the 
training programmes to be offered to refugees 
will be delivered by public training providers 
or private training providers certified by the 
Ministry of National Education, accompanied 
by a financial stipend for participants. 
ISKUR’s active labour market programmes 
for Turkish citizens – such as on-the-job 
training, entrepreneurship training and cash-
for-work programmes – are also being modified 
in order to be provided to Syrians. During on-
the-job training, the participant is employed, 
with the programme financing the net minimum 
wage and covering insurance premiums for 
accidents at work, occupational diseases and 
health insurance. Receiving on-the-job training 
and obtaining Turkish work experience 
can help beneficiaries remain employed or 
facilitate their transition to another job. 
For those who are the least employable, 
cash-for-work programming is more suitable, 
although it is the last resort because it does 
not, alone, lead to permanent employment. 
The target populations are women and young 
people aged 15–29, residing in selected localities. 
ISKUR finances the gross minimum wage and 
work permit costs for these workers. Those 
taking part in cash-for-work programmes are 
given extensive support to develop familiarity 
with the workplace, increase motivation and 
build their networks. Refugee job seekers will 
be provided with continual support through 
counselling, job-search assistance, and 
support when starting a new job, delivered 
by trained counsellors from ISKUR, and 
supported by interpreters when needed. 
Labour demand-side activities
An important challenge faced by all 
stakeholders investing in skills training is 
the gap in knowledge of the occupations and 
skills most in-demand by employers, especially 
in locations where most Syrians reside. The 
limited availability of reliable information has 
hindered training providers from designing 
and imparting appropriate skills programmes 
to encourage sustainable employment. The first 
activity as part of the Strengthening Economic 
Opportunities for Syrians under Temporary 
Protection and Host Communities in Turkey 
programme is the creation of a data-based 
system that assesses employers’ demand for 
occupations and skills, with a special focus on 
provinces with the greatest numbers of refugees. 
The information gleaned from this exercise 
can guide training providers, with changing 
demands being continuously monitored. 
Promoting economic activity and 
entrepreneurship is also at the core of the 
demand-side activities. Such activities are 
being designed jointly by the World Bank 
and the Government of Turkey to promote 
entrepreneurship, business start-ups and formal 
job creation among Syrian refugees and Turkish 
citizens residing in selected local communities.
Syrian women, particularly those coming 
from border provinces where very low levels of 
The Boukah book café/lending library in Istanbul set up by a Syrian refugee who received a UNHCR/Habitat Association development grant.
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education are common, are unlikely to become 
economically active in standard private 
sector wage employment. Thus, the social 
entrepreneurship support project within the 
wider demand-side interventions includes an 
activity targeting women who are bound to 
a specific location (either within their home 
or their city) for cultural or family reasons. 
It promotes the creation of social enterprises 
to produce goods for sale. Activities include 
technical assistance to support the government 
and local authorities to develop and implement 
a sustainable business model for social 
enterprises engaging self-employed females, 
financial support for the creation of the social 
enterprise, business-related support, and 
support to document the experiences of social 
enterprises for scaling-up similar initiatives. 
The model will prioritise sustainability to 
ensure that more women become economically 
active after the initial investment.
About 6,000 formal businesses were 
established by Syrians in Turkey as of 2017, 
a figure rising to 20,000 when informal 
businesses are included.4 As part of the 
programme, and with the support of 
development partners, a micro-grants scheme 
is being designed jointly with the government 
to encourage Syrian entrepreneurs to set up 
and register new businesses or to formally 
register currently operating informal 
businesses. A second micro-grant scheme is 
being designed to target existing Syrian- or 
Turkish-owned formal businesses located in 
areas where large numbers of Syrians reside 
to enlarge their production capacity in order 
to hire new workers. The pilot phase of the 
programme will enable the effect on new 
business and job creation to be measured. 
Evidence and monitoring
During the preparation of the various 
programmes, expert teams relied on the 
evidence available from Turkey and around 
the world. However, the lack of assessments 
and impact evaluations of labour-related 
programmes targeting refugees limited the 
team’s ability to build on previous experience, 
either in Turkey or in similar contexts. 
Fortunately, all stakeholders agreed on the 
importance of learning from this experience 
to guide future work in Turkey and elsewhere. 
The teams have therefore designed a strong 
monitoring and evaluation framework 
and will undertake periodic assessments. 
Two lessons have emerged to date.
First, it is critical to identify contextual 
barriers to employment and employability 
from the outset in order to address them 
early on. There is a clear advantage to having 
knowledge early on about the disincentives for 
institutions to promote formal employment, 
for employers to offer formal employment, 
and for workers to seek formal employment, 
in order to set out realistic expectations of 
regulatory changes and investments, and to 
preempt unexpected (negative) behaviours. 
Second, investments to serve people 
should be made in such a way that they are 
sustainable and increase the efficiency of 
spending and effective use of resources. As 
early as possible, actors should seek to ensure 
the strengthening of national systems rather 
than create separate structures that depend 
on external financial and technical support. 
In so doing, development practitioners can 
support governments in strengthening their 
institutional systems for the provision of 
critical services, ensuring the sustainability of 
investments, and better supporting refugees 
in their transition to self-reliance and to 
becoming contributors to the economy. 
Ximena V Del Carpio xdelcarpio@worldbank.org 
Program Leader, Social Inclusion
Sirma Demir Seker sdemirseker@worldbank.org 
Economist, Social Protection and Jobs
Ahmet Levent Yener alyener@worldbank.org 
Senior Specialist, Health Nutrition and Population 
World Bank www.worldbank.org   
1. Officially referred to by Turkey as ‘under temporary protection’ 
but for ease of reading referred to here as ‘refugees’. Law No. 6458 
on Foreigners and International Protection, adopted in 2013, and 
Regulation No. 29153 on Temporary Protection of Syrians, which 
entered into force in 2014, regulate their protection. Syrians who 
entered the country after 27 April 2011 were retroactively placed 
under temporary protection.
2. www.turkstat.gov.tr
3. ISKUR (2017) Annual Report http://bit.ly/ISKUR2017
4. Karasapan O (2017) ‘Syrian businesses in Turkey: The pathway 
to refugee integration?’, Brookings Institution 
http://bit.ly/Syrian-businesses-Turkey-2017 
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From refugee to employee: work integration in rural 
Denmark
Martin Ledstrup and Marie Larsen
The launch of Red Cross Denmark’s Fast Track programme, which focuses on early refugee 
employment, offers an opportunity to explore the relationship between local employment of 
refugees and the sustainability of rural life. 
Since 2015 Denmark has turned the 
employment of refugees into a national 
strategy. Through a tripartite agreement with 
the Confederation of Danish Employers and 
Local Government Denmark (the union of 
municipalities) this reconfiguration of thinking 
about integration has reverberated throughout 
municipal and corporate Denmark. 
For example, a major initiative was set  
up by the eight municipalities of Copenhagen 
to establish refugee internships, for which 
promotional posters have been distributed 
around the capital. Employment initiatives 
aimed at refugees have also been established in 
larger companies such as IBM, Microsoft, 
Danfoss, Grundfoss, Arriva and NCC. In 
addition, in order to facilitate quicker 
assessment of refugees’ work competence,  
the government has sponsored a phone  
hotline to provide assistance to municipal 
authorities, in particular to help employees – 
for example, by providing translation of a 
refugee’s documentation into Danish – to 
understand the educational background of  
a particular refugee. 
Many of these initiatives are tied together 
by a newly launched, practice-oriented and 
state-initiated programme of employment 
education, the ‘Integrationsgrund-
suddannelse’ (IGU), or ‘basic integration 
education’, which – through a combination of 
formal schooling and practical internships – is 
aimed specifically at aligning competencies of 
refugees with demand in the Danish labour 
market. But while the IGU is oriented towards 
recognised refugees, the new Red Cross 
initiative begins in the asylum phase.  
The Fast Track programme
The Fast Track programme is an effort to 
facilitate early access to the local labour 
market for refugees while they are still in 
the asylum phase, and it has been tested and 
implemented in five Danish municipalities 
between 2015 and 2017. Normally refugees 
in Denmark are distributed across its 98 
municipalities, in effect detaching the locality 
of where they claimed asylum from the 
locality where they come to live as refugees. 
With Fast Track, however, the asylum seeker 
signs up for the programme at a Danish Red 
Cross-run asylum centre and the immigration 
authority places the participant, if granted 
refugee status, in the local community in 
which they have claimed asylum. When the 
asylum seeker is not someone in transit but 
has the potential to remain as a refugee, it 
naturally motivates both local people and 
refugees to invest in their mutual relations.
Asylum seekers prepare for Fast Track by 
undertaking a skills assessment. The eight-
week Fast Track programme then provides 
The ‘Me and My Friendly Neighbour’ photographic exhibition on 
World Refugee Day in Copenhagen, Denmark, telling stories of 
refugees and Danes who have become close friends.
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participants with a hands-on introduction to 
Danish culture, language skills, vocational 
training and potential local internships, 
techniques for job search, information about 
local work culture, network building and 
sustaining motivation. Taken together, these 
represent a holistic effort to link employment 
integration and local belonging. Throughout 
the months of waiting in asylum centres, this 
facilitates a crucial sense of purpose. The 
new resident might have a job or internship 
to continue when moving into the local 
community, thus making the transition from 
asylum seeker to refugee more a continuous 
process than a series of new beginnings. 
Previously, municipalities often reported 
that refugees arrived with unrealistic 
expectations about housing and employment 
opportunities. But according to feedback 
from both municipalities and refugees, we 
have found that refugees who have been 
through the Fast Track programme are 
less disappointed and more realistic, as 
well as, generally speaking, less confused, 
more motivated and altogether more 
confident in beginning their life in a locality 
that is already well known to them. 
Of the 70 participants over these two 
years who were granted refugee status, 
61% are now self-supporting, 9% have 
moved to other municipalities for various 
reasons, 4% are on maternity leave, and 
26% have continued internships that are 
preparing them for mainstream jobs. 
Implementation in rural and island 
communities
In 2015 a team of anthropologists from the 
University of Copenhagen concluded research 
on the encounters between asylum centres 
and rural societies.1 They found anxieties 
about crime and declining house prices, but 
at the same time these familiar concerns 
were entangled with a surprising local 
optimism. In rural areas where asylum centres 
successfully form part of the social fabric, 
alongside nurseries, schools, supermarkets 
and local associations, they were seen as a 
much-needed boost to local sustainability. 
Changes in Denmark’s approach to refugee 
employment are taking place as part of a 
growing conversation about the depopulation 
of rural Denmark, including its island 
communities. The island of Bornholm, for 
instance, has lost nearly 20% of its population 
since 1965. The islands of Samsø, Ærø, Læsø 
and the Association of Danish Small Islands 
have therefore actively been promoting 
themselves as locations that are particularly 
suitable for asylum seekers and refugees. 
In March 2018 the Fast Track programme 
began on Bornholm, a socio-economically 
vulnerable island of 40,000 inhabitants, located 
far away from urban Denmark, in the Baltic 
Sea. Bornholm’s vulnerability is due not least 
to depopulation and lack of skilled labour. 
Our interviews on the islands of Bornholm 
and Samsø, conducted in 2016 and 2017, 
presented three main findings that identify the 
challenges that lie ahead. While the interviews 
were conducted in light of the Fast Track 
initiative, they concentrated more generally on 
asking about the encounter between refugees, 
integration, and the local labour market.
The first and most often repeated 
challenge, perhaps unsurprisingly, is 
language; although having sufficient 
Danish to function in the workplace is 
key to stable employment for refugees, 
continuous language development is needed 
for career advancement as well as to extend 
interactions beyond the context of work. 
The second challenge relates to the 
uncertainty around whether refugees 
will stay in the local community after the 
mandatory three-year placement period. For 
the local municipality, there is an important 
difference between asylum seekers and 
refugees. While the state is responsible for 
all expenses connected with asylum seekers, 
those expenses connected with refugees are 
the responsibility of local municipalities. 
In interviews with representatives from the 
municipality of Samsø, the most important 
question raised was rooted in deeper 
concerns about how local investment in 
refugee employment can at the same time be 
part of the struggle against depopulation. 
Thirdly, the type and size of workplaces 
are significant in terms of facilitating 
integration. Typically, larger workplaces are 
able to assign refugee employment to certain 
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employees, often on a voluntary basis, as 
a specialised task within the organisation. 
Smaller workplaces obviously do not have 
the same organisational means to work with 
refugees. In addition, there is an acute demand 
for skilled labour but not for unskilled labour. 
This means that when refugees come as 
skilled workers, they play a crucial role in 
local sustainability, but when refugees search 
for unskilled jobs they compete with local 
Danes. More research is needed, however, in 
order to understand more fully the resulting 
perspectives of locals and refugees. 
A municipality that performs statistically 
better in terms of including refugees in the 
labour market is also seen as a success with 
regard to integration. But because rural 
refugee populations are often too small for 
statistical research, they are often not included 
in surveys. For instance, while the island 
municipalities of Samsø and Ærø have been 
deeply engaged with and affected by refugees, 
they are not included on comparative maps of 
refugee employment in Denmark. This means 
that the islands and what we can learn from 
them do not form part of discussions around 
the question of integration. In addition, stable 
employment and successful integration are 
often assumed in statistics to be mutually 
dependent but we know nearly nothing about 
whether and how this connection unfolds 
in daily life. The Fast Track programme 
offers an opportunity to explore just that.
Martin Ledstrup ledstrup@sdu.dk 
Postdoctoral researcher, Centre for Contemporary 
Middle East Studies, University of Southern 
Denmark www.sdu.dk/en/
Marie Larsen marl@redcross.dk 
Developmental consultant, Danish Red Cross 
http://bit.ly/DanishRedCross-asylum
1. Larsen B R, Whyte Z and Fog Olwig K (2015) Den nye 
landbefolkning: Asylcentrenes betydning og konsekvens for lokale 
fællesskaber i danske landdistrikter, Institut for Antropologi, 
Københavns Universitet  
http://bit.ly/Larsen-Whyte-Olwig-2015 
Integrating refugee doctors into host health-care 
systems
Shahla Namak, Fatin Sahhar, Sarah Kureshi, Fadya El Rayess and Ranit Mishori  
Refugee doctors face a number of barriers to practising medicine, despite the significant 
contributions that they can make. 
Despite being highly motivated to 
practise medicine, refugee doctors1 in the 
United States (US) and elsewhere often 
find themselves working in low-skilled 
jobs while waiting to get into residency 
programmes.2 They may face difficulties in 
communication, providing documentation 
and verifying previous training. This 
may represent a missed opportunity not 
only for the refugee doctors themselves 
but for the host country’s own health-care 
system, especially in countries or areas with 
doctor shortages and/or a high proportion 
of immigrant or refugee populations.    
The authors of this article are themselves 
former refugees or asylum seekers, 
immigrants to the US and/or have immigrant 
or refugee backgrounds. This issue is close 
to our hearts as medical professionals 
and we would like to explore how we can 
empower and assist refugee doctors to join 
the workforce, resuming their professional 
lives and identities and helping to fill gaps.
Lessons from other countries
Integrating refugee doctors into a host 
country’s health-care system requires 
the involvement of different stakeholders 
including medical associations, regional 
and national health services, private 
organisations and universities. The UK, 
for example, recognised that overcoming 
barriers such as recognition of equivalency of 
qualifications and training, and employment 
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regulations, would require specific national 
and local policy changes to enable refugee 
doctors and dentists to practise in the UK.3 
UK-wide policy initiatives included the 
creation of the Refugee Health Professionals 
Steering Group which supervised the 
development of programmes to help retrain 
refugee doctors to National Health Service 
standards, cover examination costs and 
relocate doctors to under-served areas. 
Many local programmes assisted refugee 
doctors to register with the General Medical 
Council and pass the Professional Linguistic 
Assessment Board exam. Although 
subsequent immigration laws have since 
made it more difficult for refugee doctors 
to enter the workforce rapidly and remain 
in the UK permanently, most of the refugee 
doctors participating in these projects 
have remained in the UK to practise. 
In 2015, the Swedish government 
‘fast-tracked’ refugee doctors into their 
health-care system by rapidly verifying 
their credentials and providing individual 
training, mentoring and Swedish language 
lessons. And in Turkey, Gaziantep University 
and the World Health Organization teamed 
up to train and employ 500 Syrian refugee 
doctors to help care for the Syrian refugee 
population, with local clinics providing 
opportunities for the doctors to familiarise 
themselves with the Turkish health system.4 
The current situation in the US  
To practice medicine in the US, refugee 
doctors must undergo a process that is 
very intensive in terms of time, labour and 
finances, involving certification, examination, 
residency periods and licensing. While 
advocates of this system point to the need to 
ensure the best and most consistent quality 
of care for patients, other experts argue that 
foreign-trained doctors have more advanced 
bedside clinical skills than domestically 
trained doctors, having generally practised 
medicine in settings with less technology. 
A recent study, for example, showed that 
older patients in US hospitals treated by 
International Medical Graduates (IMGs) were 
less likely to die within 30 days of treatment 
than those treated by US-trained graduates.5  
A number of private, public and non-
profit programmes have been established 
to support refugee doctors in the US:
The Welcome Back Initiative (WBI), 
founded in 2001, used the untapped pool 
of IMGs living in California to provide 
linguistically and culturally competent 
care to local populations.6 The WBI has 
since expanded to a national network of 
11 centres in nine states, serving almost 
15,000 individuals from 167 countries. 
These centres provide free services to 
refugee doctors, including orientation, 
career counselling, support in obtaining 
credentials and licences, assistance in 
exploring educational programmes, job and 
volunteer opportunities, and alternative 
career options. Success has been modest: 
23% of participants obtained employment 
in the health sector for the first time, 21% 
passed licensing exams, and 87 doctors 
were accepted into training programmes.7
The Minnesota Department of Health’s 
International Medical Graduate Assistance 
Program aims to increase access to primary 
care in rural and under-served areas by 
providing clinical readiness assessment of 
IMGs and funding non-profit organisations 
to provide career guidance, additional 
clinical experience and primary-care 
residency positions for IMGs willing 
to practise in under-served areas.
In 2014, Missouri was the first State to 
pass legislation creating a new category of 
licensed ‘assistant doctors’ who can provide 
primary care under the direct supervision 
of a doctor in a health-care shortage area for 
the first 30 days, and thereafter with indirect 
supervision from a doctor who practises 
within a 50-mile radius. Although there 
has been criticism of the law,8 as of May 
2017 127 doctors had applied for the licence 
with 23 being issued a licence, 55 deemed 
ineligible, and the others under review.
Several US academic institutions, 
such as University of California San 
Diego and University of California Los 
Angeles, have created programmes to 
place multi-lingual, culturally competent 
family doctors in areas with large 
immigrant and refugee communities. 
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Recommendations
Despite the creativity and early successes 
of some of these US programmes, what 
almost all of them have in common is their 
small scale. Compared with other refugee-
hosting countries, the US lags behind in 
making concerted efforts to recognise the 
training of refugee doctors and to find 
more streamlined ways of harnessing their 
knowledge, talents, language and lifesaving 
skills to benefit our communities. We propose: 
  A task-force consisting of stakeholders 
from federal and State governmental, 
private and public organisations, medical 
boards and professional associations, as 
well as refugee doctors themselves, to 
collect basic statistics on the number of 
refugee doctors, their demographics and 
current specialisms and to study other 
countries’ approaches, review certification 
requirements and explore the integration of 
refugee doctors into different clinical roles. 
  Training incentives for residency 
programmes that are geographically 
or specialism-focused, based on local 
population needs; this may also include 
the restructuring of observerships 
(shadowing), internships and fellowships 
specifically tailored to refugee doctors.
  Easing re-training requirements as a 
temporary or permanent solution for some, 
alongside other measures to strengthen job 
opportunities that recruit refugee doctors 
in other roles initially (to gain exposure to 
the US system).
  A more centralised scholarship and needs-
based grant or stipend system to help 
with the significant financial burden of re-
certification and licensing exams.
  Robust, accessible programmes to provide 
supervision and guidance through the 
complex certification and licensing process 
in the US, as well as instruction on the US 
health-care system. 
  Free, easily accessible toolkits including 
national and State-based resources, 
communication modules, test-taking 
strategies and information about the 
application process. 
Finally and critically, refugee doctors 
themselves should help drive new initiatives. 
Professional development efforts may help 
identify leaders who would run IMG-support 
programmes, seek partnerships in strategic 
planning, and organise – and perhaps partner 
with – existing IMG advocacy organisations. 
Shahla Namak snamak@wakehealth.edu 
Department of Family and Community Medicine, 
Wake Forest School of Medicine
Fatin Sahhar fsahhar@med.wayne.edu 
Department of Family Medicine and Public 
Health Sciences, Wayne State University School 
of Medicine
Sarah Kureshi sk795@georgetown.edu 
Department of Family Medicine, Georgetown 
University School of Medicine
Fadya El Rayess fadya_el_rayess@brown.edu  
Department of Family Medicine, Alpert School of 
Medicine at Brown University
Ranit Mishori mishorir@georgetown.edu   
Department of Family Medicine, Georgetown 
University School of Medicine
1. In this article, we use ‘refugee doctors’ to include both refugee 
and asylum-seeker doctors.
2. A formal period of supervised training for medical school 
graduates, usually three to five years in length, during which a 
doctor specialises in a field of medicine.
3. Steward E (2007) ‘Addressing the Challenges Facing Refugee 
Doctors in the UK’, Local Economy Vol 22 (4)  
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02690940701736868
4. Özdemir V, Kickbusch I and Coşkun Y (2017) ‘Rethinking the 
right to work for refugee Syrian healthcare professionals: a call for 
innovation in global governance’, British Medical Journal 357  
www.bmj.com/content/bmj/357/bmj.j2710.full.pdf
5. Tsugawa Y J, Anupam B J, Orav E J and Ashish K J (2017) 
‘Quality of care delivered by general internists in US hospitals 
who graduated from foreign versus US medical schools: 
observational study’, British Medical Journal 356  
www.bmj.com/content/356/bmj.j273 
6. Fernández-Peña J R (2012) ‘Integrating Immigrant Health 
Professionals into the US Health Care Workforce: A Report from 
the Field’, Journal of Immigrant and Minority Health Vol 14 (3) 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10903-011-9496-z
7. This figure relates to the 10,700 individuals in the programme 
in 2012.
8. For example, Freeman B D (2016) ‘The Implications of 
Missouri’s First-in-the-Nation Assistant Doctor Legislation’, 
Journal of Graduate Medical Education Vol 8 (1)  
www.jgme.org/doi/10.4300/JGME-D-15-00341.1 
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Refugees’ engagement with host economies in 
Uganda
Naohiko Omata
Multi-sited fieldwork in Uganda allows for an exploration of the complex patterns of 
engagement between refugees’ economic activities and local economies, in urban, 
emergency and protracted settings. 
The Government of Uganda has made self-
reliance central to the country’s approach 
towards hosting refugees. Currently, Uganda 
hosts more than one million refugees of 
diverse nationalities, including from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
Somalia, South Sudan and Rwanda, who live 
in both rural camps and urban areas. Refugees 
in Uganda generally enjoy the right to work, 
freedom of movement within the country, 
and access to basic services. Such policies 
have an important role in facilitating refugees 
to engage in business activities and enable 
them to become embedded within local and 
national markets and industries in Uganda. 
Between 2013 and 2015, my colleagues 
and I conducted a study on refugees’ 
economic lives, looking at their interaction 
with local host communities across 
four sites with three different contexts: 
Kampala – the capital city; Kyangwali and 
Nakivale – long-established camps; and 
Rwamwanja – a newly established camp.1 
This multi-sited research offers an interesting 
comparison of economic relationships 
between refugees and hosts over time and 
in different geographical environments. 
Kyangwali and Nakivale: ‘import and 
export’ economies 
Nakivale settlement has existed since 1959 
and Kyangwali settlement since 1989. They 
are formally designated as ‘settlements’ rather 
than ‘camps’ because of their relatively open 
layout and the economic freedoms afforded to 
refugees. Both are located in the rural south-
west of the country but though geographically 
remote they are far from economically 
isolated. Not only is there diverse economic 
activity within the settlements but also 
their economies are embedded in wider 
economic structures that extend beyond their 
geographical boundaries. Goods and services 
are imported and exported, with refugees 
playing an active role in these supply chains. 
Upon arrival, refugees in both settlements 
have historically been given access to a plot of 
land to cultivate; not surprisingly, therefore, 
commercial farming is the most common 
economic activity. Kyangwali settlement 
is known widely among Ugandan crop 
traders for its good-quality maize. During 
the harvest season Ugandan trucks and 
minivans regularly travel out of Kyangwali, 
loaded high with sacks of maize purchased 
from refugee farmers and destined for sale 
in local markets, in Kampala and other 
Ugandan cities, and even in neighbouring 
countries such as Tanzania and South Sudan. 
While agricultural activities dominate 
both settlements, over time an array of 
vibrant businesses has emerged and become 
deeply embedded within both national 
and regional commercial networks. In fact, 
many of the well-established shops in both 
Kyangwali and Nakivale buy goods from 
existing supply chains run by Ugandan 
wholesalers who regularly come to the 
settlements and sell goods to satellite shops.
“Kyangwali settlement is one of our important 
selling points. In Kyangwali, we have seven refugee 
shops that we sell our items to.” (sales manager 
for local Ugandan brewery)
In Nakivale, we observed similar 
commercial interactions between refugees 
and Ugandan wholesalers. Many Somali 
business owners in particular would 
regularly import products including milk, 
pasta, camel meat, clothing, cosmetics and 
medicines to the settlement from their 
Somali-Ugandan counterparts in Kampala.  
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Rwamwanja: an emerging economy 
Rwamwanja settlement opened in April 
2012 in a rural village in Western Uganda 
in response to the emergency influx of 
Congolese refugees. By late 2013, when we 
did our initial research, people were still 
arriving. New arrivals are provided with 
food rations and relief supplies, including 
cooking items, a hoe, blankets, jerry cans 
and machetes. Similar to Kyangwali and 
Nakivale, the refugees are allocated a plot 
of land for their residence and cultivation. 
According to refugees who came to 
Rwamwanja when it was first established, 
economic activity inside the settlement 
emerged almost immediately, with the first 
visible commercial transactions based around 
the exchange of food and non-food aid items 
between refugees. Soon Ugandans from 
neighbouring villages joined in the bartering, 
despite the refugee and host populations 
having very little pre-existing ethnic or 
cultural affinity or shared language. Refugees 
exchanged bags of maize or cooking oils for 
Ugandan crops such as bananas and cassava, 
and sold non-food items. These initial trading 
activities have since transformed into more 
organised refugee markets. For instance, the 
market in Kaihura village, one of 36 villages in 
the settlement, currently attracts about 2,000 
sellers and customers, including both refugees 
and Ugandan nationals, every market day.
The arrival of refugees and aid 
workers into this scarcely populated rural 
village has stimulated local economies 
in the surrounding areas. According to 
Ugandan villagers who live nearby, many 
new businesses began to appear after the 
influx of refugees, including restaurants, 
bars, guesthouses and shops. Henry, the 
Ugandan owner of a popular restaurant 
located at the entrance of the settlement, 
established his business in January 2014: 
 
“I used to run a small restaurant in Kampala. 
I came and checked the area and found no 
good restaurants so I decided to move here. 
Currently, I receive about 200 customers per 
day. Many of them are working for the aid 
agencies but some of them are refugees and 
Ugandan business people visiting the camp.”   
Owners of pre-existing businesses 
in the host area have also benefited 
significantly from the presence of refugees 
and humanitarian workers. One local 
family renovated their bar to target the 
growing population; the business grew 
rapidly and in 2014 the family expanded 
it to create a lodge with a restaurant just 
outside the entrance of the settlement.
Compared with Nakivale and Kyangwali, 
refugees’ economic activities in Rwamwanja 
were still embryonic and less extensively 
connected with national and transnational 
economies. Nevertheless, Rwamwanja 
reveals the dynamic process through which 
a new ‘refugee-induced economy’ emerges 
following a mass influx of refugees even 
in an underdeveloped host region. 
Kampala 
With an estimated population of more than 1.5 
million, Kampala is the largest city in Uganda. 
Here refugees live and work side by side with 
both Ugandan nationals and migrants from 
across the continent. Most Somali refugees 
live alongside Somali-Ugandans and Somali 
economic migrants in Kisenyi in Kampala, 
taking advantage of their ethnic ties with 
the vibrant Somali-Ugandan economies and 
filling gaps in labour demand in sectors 
where most non-Somali Ugandans would 
not seek employment. Several large-scale 
Somali-Ugandan enterprises in the oil, petrol 
and retail industries hire a large number of 
Somali refugees. A Somali-Ugandan manager 
from one of these companies explained that 
hiring Somali refugees is a simple decision:
“We feel more comfortable working with Somali 
people because we have a lot in common such as 
language, religion and cultural habits.” 
In contrast, Congolese refugees live 
scattered in several areas in Kampala 
such as Nsambya and Katwe, and live 
alongside Ugandan communities. While 
they are associated with a range of economic 
activities, the selling of bitenge (traditional 
Congolese fabric) is the most common, for 
two main reasons – firstly, the up-front 
investment needed is relatively small and, 
secondly, positive stereotyping of Congolese 
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craftsmanship among Ugandans provides a 
helpful market opportunity. These Congolese 
refugees find mutually beneficial economic 
links with Ugandan merchants; these 
Ugandans have come to rely heavily on 
Congolese refugees, who act as the primary 
distributors and retailers for their products. 
Countering prevailing perceptions 
Among policymakers, there is a prevailing 
perception that the presence of refugees 
intensifies competition for employment 
with national populations in a host country. 
Contrary to this perception, however, in 
Kampala, Congolese and Somali refugees 
have sought their own economic space in the 
wider host economy, not necessarily in conflict 
with nationals. And in each of our study sites, 
the presence of refugees’ economic activities 
has resulted in interdependence between 
refugees and host communities, rather than 
a zero-sum game of economic rivalry. 
In the protracted refugee contexts of 
Nakivale and Kyangawali, refugee settlements 
have become embedded in regional commerce 
through ‘import and export’ of items and 
have become active trade hubs in their 
remote, rural locations. Even in recently 
established Rwamwanja, refugees’ business 
activities are being gradually linked with 
surrounding economies and appear to play 
a role in revitalising host communities. 
While the ways in which refugees position 
themselves in host economies differ in 
each setting, refugees clearly play an 
important, perhaps indispensable, role in 
wider commercial sectors in Uganda. 
Some implications for policy and practice 
follow from this analysis. Often, attempts 
to support refugees’ income-generating 
activities are conceived in abstraction 
rather than with an understanding of wider 
market contexts. Actors working to enhance 
economic opportunities for refugee and 
host populations need a clear and better 
understanding of the relevant economic 
systems and structures. Furthermore, 
interventions should aim either to build 
upon existing markets and businesses or 
help refugees to more effectively engage 
with those markets. And, finally, external 
actors need to help create an enabling 
environment. Refugees can be market creators 
if certain conditions and rights are granted, 
enabling them to identify and employ unique 
livelihood assets while avoiding intensifying 
competition with host populations. 
Naohiko Omata naohiko.omata@qeh.ox.ac.uk  
Senior Research Officer, Refugee Economies 
Programme, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford 
Department of International Development, 
University of Oxford www.rsc.ox.ac.uk 
1. See Betts A, Bloom L, Kaplan J and Omata N (2016) Refugee 
Economies: Forced Displacement and Development  
www.bit.ly/RefugeeEconomies2016 
Fresh produce exporters load the chilli peppers they have bought from Congolese refugee farmers at Rwamwanja settlement in Uganda.
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Refugees and host communities in the Rwandan 
labour market
Özge Bilgili and Craig Loschmann 
In Rwanda, Congolese refugees have the same freedom of movement and right to work as 
Rwandans but the experiences and economic activities of these two populations are very 
different.
Of the approximately 164,500 officially 
registered refugees residing in Rwanda 
today, 45% are from the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC). The Rwandan government 
has adopted a relatively progressive policy 
approach to support the integration of refugees, 
and refugees have the freedom to move 
outside their designated camps and the right 
to engage in wage-earning or self-employed 
activities. This enabling environment helps 
increase the economic and social interaction 
between refugees and local populations, 
and as a result one might expect the areas 
around the camps to have a labour market 
freely accessible to locals and refugees alike. 
Analysis of the experiences of refugees and 
locals, however, brings to light the varying 
dynamics, opportunities and challenges for 
both groups. As part of a project examining 
the impact of Congolese refugees on host 
communities in Rwanda,1 in May 2016 we 
conducted household surveys with refugees 
in three of the largest camps – Gihembe, 
Kiziba and Kigeme – and with locals living 
nearby. For the latter we differentiated our 
sample between those living within 10km 
of the camps, and those living more than 
20km away, in order to identify the highly 
localised effect of being in contact with the 
refugee population on a daily basis. We also 
organised a number of separate focus group 
discussions among refugees from each camp as 
well as with host community members living 
at various distances from the camps. A key 
finding is that although Congolese refugees 
officially have the right to work, in reality their 
experiences in the local labour market differ 
considerably from that of local Rwandans.
Congolese refugees are significantly more 
likely to be unemployed than locals, and a 
major reason for this, given by the refugees 
themselves, relates to local employers’ lack 
of knowledge of the refugees’ right to work. 
According to the focus group participants, 
finding a job outside the camp is rare due to 
the fact that they do not have the appropriate 
identity papers requested by potential 
employers. As one participant from Kiziba 
camp said, “They mostly ask if you have 
an identity card to prove that you are a 
Rwandan citizen. So, if you do not have an 
identity card then you can’t have a job”. 
It is not sufficient simply to provide the 
right to work; there needs to be practical 
follow-through. This may mean issuing 
specific identity documents to refugees 
that local employers recognise and 
accept and/or an information campaign 
targeting employers to help make sure the 
refugees’ legal rights are clear to all.
Focus group participants also mentioned 
that most work opportunities were in local 
commercial hubs far from the camps, and that 
the considerable travel costs involved and low 
earnings often deterred them from taking these 
jobs. Providing cheaper transportation can make 
it more viable for refugees to find employment 
well beyond the immediate camp areas.
Jobs and skills in camps
Job opportunities for refugees are quite limited 
outside the camps but within the camps 
themselves non-governmental and international 
organisations employ a significant number 
of refugees. It is clear, however, that these 
organisations cannot address the employment 
needs of all refugees. This situation also 
raises the question of refugees’ dependency 
on humanitarian organisations beyond basic 
protection and needs. It seems evident that 
the more refugees are able to integrate in the 
wider Rwandan economy and not remain 
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within the confines of the camp-based setting, 
the better off they will be in the long term.
Unsurprisingly, we found that the work-
related experiences of refugees differ also by 
skill level. Those refugees with professions and 
who have diplomas are in a more advantageous 
position than others with fewer skills. As 
a participant from Kiziba said, “There are 
[refugee] teachers and even health providers 
but … ordinary people have nothing to do.” 
Keeping this heterogeneity in mind is key 
when designing policies to facilitate greater 
participation in the local labour market.
Locals in the labour market 
Our research finds evidence of a shift away 
from subsistence agricultural activities 
among locals in the host communities. More 
specifically, working-age individuals within 
10km of a camp are more likely to be engaged 
in wage employment (that is, working for an 
employer with steady pay) than in farming 
or livestock production. In addition, we 
observed that females living near a camp 
are more likely to be self-employed than 
those residing further away, illustrating 
an important gender-specific dynamic to 
this adjustment in the local labour market.2 
Focus group discussions again uncovered 
more nuanced findings. For instance, it was 
often stated that refugees from Gihembe 
have small shops or hairdressing salons 
outside the camp that employ local people, 
while locals are also hired in the camps for 
construction projects. As one participant from 
Gihembe said, “Since [the refugees] arrived 
here, economic activities have increased. 
Many houses were built and selling activities 
multiplied. There are different market centres 
which were created because of the camp.”
Finally, the discussions also shed light on 
some distributional effects among the local 
population with regard to who benefits from 
the presence of refugees. Participants who 
live near Kigeme, for example, emphasised 
differences in economic interaction based on 
personal circumstances, in particular that it 
tends to be the financially better-off from their 
community who engage commercially with 
refugees and who presumably benefit from 
that interaction. Again, this demonstrates the 
need to consider heterogeneity within the host 
community as well, when trying to understand 
how a refugee camp may influence local 
populations.
On a positive note, we found that locals’ 
labour market activities do not seem to be 
negatively affected by refugees; indeed, the 
resulting, more dynamic local economy 
provided increased opportunities for 
wage-earning jobs and self-employment. 
Moreover, we did not find evidence of either 
increased competition in the labour market 
or resentment from local people due to the 
presence of refugees. On the contrary, the 
economic and social interaction between 
groups was given as an explanation for the 
good relations between the two populations. 
For Congolese refugees, however, 
the experiences were more mixed. Being 
granted the right to work and thus to access 
the local labour market is not sufficient to 
promote sustainable self-reliance, and a 
more comprehensive strategy is needed to 
provide opportunities for the wider refugee 
population. This strategy could incorporate 
standardised identity documents for refugees, 
information provision for local employers, 
and better transportation provision outside 
the camps. We hope that these observations 
can guide not only the relevant actors in 
Rwanda but also the governments of other 
refugee-hosting countries in adopting 
effective measures to promote economic 
and social integration for the benefit of 
refugees and host communities alike.
Özge Bilgili o.bilgili@uu.nl 
Assistant Professor, European Research Centre on 
Migration and Ethnic Relations (ERCOMER), 
Utrecht University www.ozgebilgili.com  
Craig Loschmann 
c.loschmann@maastrichtuniversity.nl 
Research Fellow, Maastricht Graduate School of 
Governance / UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University 
www.maastrichtuniversity.nl  
1. Funded by the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR.
2. See also Bilgili Ö, Loschmann C and Siegel M (2017) ‘The 
Gender-Based Effects of Displacement: The Case of Congolese 
Refugees in Rwanda’, KNOMAD working paper 21  
http://bit.ly/KNOMAD-WP21 
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The role of rural grocery stores in refugee reception
Zachary Whyte, Birgitte Romme Larsen and Mona Schaldemose
Our research with rural grocery store managers in Denmark suggests that the integration 
of asylum centres into the local social and economic life in rural areas is a key factor in 
successful refugee reception. 
In Denmark, asylum seekers are required 
to stay in asylum centres while their 
asylum applications are processed. During 
this time they are not allowed to work or 
pursue education but are provided with 
accommodation and a small stipend to buy 
food and other essentials. Waiting times 
range from around six months to more than 
ten years in some extreme cases, and the 
number of asylum centres fluctuates with 
the number of asylum applicants and the 
length of processing times: in 2007 there 
were only seven asylum centres in Denmark; 
in 2016 the number exceeded 100, and it is 
currently 22. While the Danish Immigration 
Service is responsible for asylum seekers 
in Denmark, they subcontract the work 
to asylum centre operators, either the 
Danish Red Cross or one of several rural 
municipalities. Rural municipalities now 
administer more than half of the centres. 
Rural communities in Denmark, as across 
the Global North, are characterised by an 
ageing and reducing population, declining 
job opportunities, and the closure of local 
businesses as well as welfare institutions 
such as schools and retirement homes. There 
are therefore good economic arguments for 
rural municipalities to host asylum centres. 
First, the closure of many welfare 
institutions in rural areas means that there 
are unoccupied buildings – often municipally 
owned and relatively cheap to rent – that 
can be quickly refitted. Second, rural 
municipalities are particularly interested in 
the jobs and secondary economic benefits 
derived from the asylum centres, such as 
the creation of demand for other services 
including remodelling and maintenance, 
which means more work for locals in a 
context where the creation of even a small 
number of jobs has a big impact. Third, the 
enrolment of asylum-seeking children in 
local schools can stave off school closures. 
Similarly, asylum seekers of all ages can 
support local associational life, for example 
by participating in local football clubs. 
Finally, because of the relative isolation of 
many rural asylum centres, asylum seekers 
often have little option but to spend their 
money locally, which in particular means 
buying their food at local grocery stores. 
When we asked grocery store managers 
to rate the importance of asylum centres 
to their overall business only one felt 
the centre had no positive effect on their 
business; seven reported a small effect, 
eight a medium effect, and three a powerful 
effect. Three managers told us that their 
stores were dependent on the business 
from the asylum centre for their survival. 
Social hubs and gatekeepers
As well as being merchants, the store owners 
and managers whom we interviewed 
saw themselves as upholders of their 
communities. One said, “We say that we are 
kind of an unofficial mayor. It is important 
that we are present at town events and 
support local initiatives.” Partly as a result 
of the closure of other informal social 
meeting places such as schools, stores were 
increasingly central to local community 
life. They provided locals with a place to 
meet and talk but they also supported local 
associations and institutions in a deeply 
interwoven circuit of economic and social 
exchange. The threat of closure of such 
stores was understood to have real economic 
consequences for the entire community.
In this context, grocery stores could 
function as gatekeepers for asylum centres. 
One store manager on the island of 
Langeland, for example, asked his staff to only 
speak positively of the town’s newly opened 
asylum centre, feeling that so long as there 
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had not yet been any negative experiences it 
was important to support it as he would any 
other new institution in town. This was in 
part due to his appreciation of the custom that 
the asylum centre brought to his store but also 
as a way of bolstering the collective spirit in 
the town and showing that the community 
could make it work. For him this also meant 
working with local voluntary associations 
(particularly the local football club, which 
he sponsored) to create opportunities 
for asylum seekers to participate.
 Another store manager explained 
that she quickly found herself helping 
asylum seekers to navigate her store, the 
local community and in some cases even 
the asylum system, and so had become a 
contact point for interactions between the 
asylum centre and the local community.
For asylum centres, having good 
relations with local communities can open 
opportunities for cooperation with local 
institutions and voluntary associations, 
which can widen the social opportunities 
of asylum seekers and combat the sense 
of isolation and frustration that tends 
to characterise their waiting time.1 
Social and economic incorporation 
While polarised national debates often 
frame asylum seekers as either victims 
in need of saving or threats to the social 
order, local communities tended to be 
more pragmatic through experiencing 
asylum seekers’ participation in local 
community life, for example as consumers, 
football players or school pupils. One of 
our rural respondents said, “Now that 
[the asylum centre] is here, the question 
is ‘How do we make the best of it?’”.
However, local communities sometimes 
complained about the relative seclusion of 
asylum centres from local community life 
– often understood as a lack of involvement 
with local institutions and a certain obscurity 
as to their daily operation – as well as a 
perceived lack of communication from 
authorities and centre operators. The resulting 
disapproval could exacerbate the local 
isolation of asylum centres and those living 
there, as well as put local political pressure 
on the hosting municipalities to limit their 
cooperation with the Danish Immigration 
Service. At best, this would mean a failure 
to capitalise on the opportunities available 
through local cooperation; at worst, this could 
spell the closure of the local asylum centre.
There is thus important work to be 
done in building and expanding relations 
and communication with local associations 
and institutions. Managers and staff at the 
asylum centres may contribute to this shift 
by buying necessities for the centre locally, 
using local venues for events, and hiring 
locals, thereby involving the institution 
in local economic life. These steps in turn 
create dialogue and intersections with local 
associations, who can provide opportunities 
for asylum seekers and voluntary support 
for the asylum centre. This might mean 
developing and sharing a local playground 
rather than building a separate one for the 
asylum centre, or asking local associations 
if they can use unneeded furniture from 
the centre rather than throwing it away.
Local communities prove useful 
partners for asylum centres but this 
relies on actively working to interweave 
asylum centres with local social and 
economic life, rather than operating them 
as isolated – and isolating – institutions.
Zachary Whyte whyte@hum.ku.dk 
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Birgitte Romme Larsen 
birgitte.romme@hum.ku.dk 
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Centre for Advanced Migration Studies (AMIS), 
University of Copenhagen http://amis.ku.dk 
Mona Schaldemose ms@samf.ku.dk 
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Collaboration with criminal organisations in 
Colombia: an obstacle to economic recovery
Christopher M Hays
Those seeking to support economic development for internally displaced people in Colombia 
need to understand how and why many IDPs collaborate with armed groups and criminal 
organisations.
To date, the Colombian government has 
registered over 7,300,000 victims of forced 
displacement as a result of the nation’s 
many years of conflict.1 Given that forced 
displacement is known to result in high 
levels of extreme poverty (affecting 85% 
of those displaced from rural to urban 
environments2), economic development is 
a priority. Among the many factors which 
create challenges for the economic recovery 
of victims of the Colombian conflict, one 
that is often not sufficiently taken into 
consideration is the incidence of collaboration 
by internally displaced persons (IDPs) with 
armed groups and criminal organisations. 
These armed groups – guerrilla 
organisations, paramilitary groups, drug 
cartels, and local mafia and gangs – have 
a dramatic impact on the local economy 
of displaced communities. Furthermore, 
collaboration with armed groups can 
significantly undermine third-party efforts 
to foster economic development through the 
creation of new income-generating activities 
and the pursuit of formal employment. It is 
therefore vital that those involved in economic 
development with Colombian IDPs appreciate 
how and especially why IDPs collaborate with 
armed groups and criminal organisations.
Numerous obstacles impede the study 
of this phenomenon, in particular the risk 
of reprisals facing both the researcher and 
the research population. Additionally, 
displaced people settle in highly diverse 
and sometimes remote locations, and so 
research must be similarly wide-ranging. 
In undertaking this research, the author 
interviewed 15 community leaders and NGO 
workers in three major cities (Medellín, 
Bogotá and Cartagena), two municipalities 
(Tierralta and Puerto Libertador, in 
Córdoba) and two small rural communities 
(in the regions of Córdoba and Cauca).
Forms of collaboration 
Given their isolation and economic 
vulnerability, and the lack of government 
and police presence, IDP settlements are seen 
as conducive to organised crime. IDPs are 
known to collaborate with criminal groups 
both directly and indirectly; some will engage 
directly in the illegal activities of the criminal 
groups, most prominently drug trafficking 
and the extortion of protection money 
(called vacunas, ‘vaccinations’), while others 
will provide the groups with support, for 
example, providing supplies or transporting 
gasoline to those cultivating illicit crops. 
Additionally, armed groups in certain 
communities will control the supply of 
water and the sale of basic foodstuffs such 
as eggs and arepas (a Colombian staple, 
made from maize dough). They also control 
transportation in and out of the community. 
Under such conditions, local vendors, drivers 
and anyone who needs water are all drawn 
into various degrees of complicity with 
or submission to the criminal groups.
Reasons for collaboration 
It is essential to understand why IDPs 
collaborate. Without such understanding, 
economic development efforts can founder, 
and agencies may put themselves and 
those they seek to help in danger, should 
their activities be perceived to threaten 
illegal actors. The reasons that IDPs are 
complicit with or directly participate in 
the activities of armed groups are far 
more complex than many appreciate. 
One reason given is the perceived lack 
of economic opportunities. Interviewees 
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report that, at least for some IDPs, 
having an alternative way to support 
one’s family would dissuade them from 
engaging in criminal productive activities. 
Interviewees also highlight the inducement 
of ‘easy money’. María Esperanza3 (a social 
worker with a community development 
faith-based organisation in Bogotá) 
summarises the dynamics as follows:
“Marginalised, excluded, segregated communities 
are an excellent environment for hiding organised 
crime. The trafficking and the fact that these 
communities have such needs, especially economic 
ones, and the culture of easy money make it very 
likely that they [the IDPs] will resort to illicit 
businesses.”
The culture of ‘easy money’ is no doubt 
the result of a combination of factors, chief 
among which are probably the influence 
of drug cartels and the dependency 
dynamics created by government and non-
governmental aid.4 But when one combines 
that culture with the realities of low wages or 
the low profit margins of much agricultural 
production, one begins to see why collusion 
with a criminal organisation becomes 
attractive. As Jorge Miguel (a pastor and 
the leader of a community development 
organisation which works with IDPs) puts it: 
“The justification is that … [since] 2 kg of coca is 
worth around 4,600,000 pesos, then I am going to 
dedicate myself to cultivating coca and not corn. 
They justify it because the price of corn often goes 
through the floor, and the farmers … almost always 
lose.” 
IDPs whose involvement is 
limited to supporting roles, such as 
transportation, may find it easier to justify 
their collaboration since they are not 
producing or selling narcotics directly. 
Fear is unsurprisingly one of the 
most frequently cited reasons why 
IDPs go along with or support the 
work of criminal organisations in their 
communities. This fear is rooted not only 
in the danger that the armed groups 
represent but also in a feeling that IDPs 
have been abandoned by the government 
and the police. In the words of Susanna, 
a social worker leading a development 
project with IDPs outside of Medellín: 
“Many are afraid… They feel like … the best thing 
that they can do is keep quiet. But there are others 
to whom this seems like the easiest life, especially 
Displaced community in Colombia. 
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given the abandonment by the State… they don’t 
have anyone to protect them, they don’t have 
anyone to hear them, or if someone hears them, they 
will be denounced [to the criminal groups].”
The perception of having been abandoned 
by the State is compounded by the fact 
that the local neighbourhood assemblies 
often push people to comply with extortion 
requests by the criminal groups, even 
sometimes directly collecting for them. 
But fear and poverty are not the only 
factors. To a certain degree, criminal 
groups maintain order in many of these 
marginalised communities, functioning – 
in the absence of police and government 
representatives – as local government and 
meting out punishment for violations of 
community norms. Susanna explains:
“People have grown accustomed to [the criminal 
group’s] presence there and have legitimated it in a 
certain way, because, when something happens to 
them, they go and seek out [the group members], so 
that they can solve things, so they can play the role 
of the judges.”
Because local mafia and criminal groups 
fill the governance void, cooperation with 
them can be seen by IDPs as more legitimate 
than an outsider might appreciate.
Finally, IDPs may choose to collaborate 
with or even join an opposing criminal group 
as a reaction against the violence they suffered 
at the hands of a different armed group. In 
this way, they feel a greater sense of security 
and are able to extract a sort of vengeance. 
Angélica Pinilla Mususú elaborates:
“If the paramilitaries expelled me, I become an 
enemy of the paramilitaries and close to the 
guerrillas. [Or] if the guerrillas were the ones 
who expelled me, and I am a displaced person and 
a victim, I end up being part of the paramilitary 
groups, in pursuit of a justice that the State has not 
been able to give, in pursuit of a reparation that the 
State has not been able to provide.” 
Implications for development work 
All of this underscores the reality that 
agencies focusing on the economic 
development of IDPs in Colombia need to 
adopt an alliance mentality, coordinating their 
efforts with complementary organisations. As 
economic motivations are only a small part 
of why IDPs end up working with criminal 
entities, efforts to direct IDPs away from 
criminal groups need to take account of other 
factors; this is likely to be beyond the scope of 
a typical economic development organisation 
and therefore will require cooperation with 
government agencies, non-governmental 
organisations and faith-based organisations.
Since some of the factors discussed 
relate to the absence of the State and the 
weakness of local community leadership, 
attention to economic development should 
also go hand-in-hand with a more robust 
governmental and police presence in the 
communities, along with initiatives to help 
raise the communities’ civic and political self-
awareness. Similarly, insofar as some factors 
relate to ethical and psychological issues, 
they can be best addressed in cooperation 
with local religious communities and 
faith-based organisations, as well as with 
NGOs that provide psychological care. 
While such cooperation would 
undoubtedly be complex, an appreciation 
of the non-economic factors that 
stimulate cooperation with criminal 
groups and impede legitimate economic 
development is vital when working to 
foster the economic recovery of IDPs.
Christopher M Hays cmhays@gmail.com   
Associate Professor, Fundación Universitaria 
Seminario Bíblico de Colombia, Medellín; director 
of the project ‘Integral missiology and the human 
flourishing of internally displaced persons in 
Colombia’.5 
1. Registro Único de Víctimas (2018) Informe General  
http://bit.ly/ColombiaRUV
2. Carrillo A C (2009) ‘Internal displacement in Colombia: 
humanitarian, economic and social consequences in urban settings 
and current challenges,’ International Review of the Red Cross 91,  
no 875 www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc-875-carrillo.pdf 
3. All names have been changed.
4. See Thoumi F E (1999) ‘Relación entre corrupción y narcotráfico: 
un análisis general y algunas referencias a Colombia’, Revista de 
economía de la Universidad del Rosario 2, no 1: 24, 28 
http://bit.ly/Thoumi-corrupcion-narcotrafico-1999 
5. This project was made possible through a grant from the 
Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc. The opinions 
expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of Templeton World Charity Foundation, Inc or 
the author’s institution.
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Syrian economies: a temporary boom? 
Ahmad Al Ajlan 
Some displaced people and their host communities have benefited economically from the 
consequences of conflict in Syria’s Raqqa province. Others need support – and the type of 
support needed will change as circumstances change.
When civil war erupted in 2011, Raqqa in 
northeastern Syria was not directly engaged 
in the conflict, and thus many Syrians from 
other provinces – such as Deir Az Zor, Homs 
and Hama – fled to Raqqa. They mainly settled 
in Raqqa city, where the pre-war population 
of some 220,000 nearly doubled in 2012 with 
the influx of internally displaced people 
(IDPs). This created huge pressures on Raqqa’s 
fragile infrastructure but also created job 
opportunities for many people. When Raqqa 
was captured by the so-called Islamic State 
group – ISIS – in 2014, the city enjoyed a boom 
in commercial activity for a short time, because 
of two main factors: firstly, Raqqa became the 
capital of a very large area of Syria and Iraq 
controlled by ISIS and, secondly, ISIS did not 
enforce a specific price for goods, nor did they 
enforce payment of taxes (except zakat1). 
But the city’s commercial boom was of 
short duration. Because of increasing air raids, 
many civilians were forced to leave the city. 
Some moved to Lebanon or Turkey but many 
travelled to nearby towns and villages to 
stay with relatives. Towns like Al-Mansoura, 
Al-Rashid, Al-Qahtaniyah and Al-Jurnia 
took on the economic roles that Raqqa city 
had previously played. Towns’ populations 
expanded, bazaars proliferated, small shops 
enjoyed increased sales, and new shops were 
built. Some families gained a new source of 
income by renting rooms to displaced people. 
People took advantage not only of the 
new economic opportunities created by the 
presence of those who had been displaced but 
also of the lack of strong authority in the area. 
For decades, people had had to ask permission 
from the central government in Damascus even 
to build a small shop on their own land, and 
getting that permission had been neither easy 
nor cheap. People, particularly those in rural 
areas of Raqqa, took advantage of the removal 
of these obstacles to build homes and shops.
As well as winners, there were of course 
losers. Many people had their sources of 
income cut off by the war, people such as 
those who conducted trade between the 
rural areas and the city and those who were 
dependent on renting land and property, while 
thousands had to flee Raqqa with little more 
than the clothes they were wearing. Little 
assistance gets through. Displaced families 
in Al-Jurnia, as in other towns in Raqqa, have 
received a small amount of financial support 
only twice in one year. As a result, children 
in these families have been forced to sell 
vegetables and bread in the street. Women 
who have lost their husbands are particularly 
affected, since this also usually means the 
loss of the household’s breadwinner, and 
many widows have been obliged to remarry. 
Since the withdrawal of ISIS from Raqqa 
in late 2017, the short-lived boom is over and 
the circumstances have changed once again 
for everyone. The biggest mistake that the 
international community has made concerning 
the humanitarian situation in Raqqa now is 
that the aid provided usually consists of food 
and a small amount of money. This kind of aid 
is rapidly consumed. Support should rather 
concentrate on rebuilding the infrastructure: 
roads, irrigation systems, hospitals and schools 
(and, eventually, clearing the landmines 
planted in Raqqa city by ISIS). Then people 
will be better able to produce what they need 
and once more establish livelihoods, rather 
than be dependent on external assistance. 
Ahmad Al Ajlan ahmad.ajlan@uni-bielefeld.de 
Formerly of Raqqa province, now a researcher at 
the Institute of Interdisciplinary Research on 
Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University 
www.uni-bielefeld.de/ikg/ 
1. Zakat is a form of alms-giving treated in Islam as a religious 
obligation or tax.
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Obstacles to refugees’ self-reliance in Germany
Elizabeth Ekren 
The majority of Germany’s refugees and asylum seekers rely on government welfare and 
face serious obstacles to self-reliance. Integration policies must eliminate these obstacles to 
promote mutual long-term benefits for refugees and their new communities. 
Since the height of the so-called refugee 
crisis in 2015, Germany has accepted around 
830,000 asylum applications.1 Given the 
country’s ageing population, falling birth 
rate and decreasing availability of skilled 
workers, fully utilising refugees’ capacities 
in the labour market has the potential to 
result in wide-scale socio-economic benefits. 
Research suggests that it may take 10–15 
years before refugees produce a positive 
effect on national budgets, but they also 
have the potential to help strengthen fiscal 
sustainability in the long term, providing they 
are well integrated.2 Unfortunately, current 
trends indicate a slow start to such integration 
in Germany, with little more than 100,000 
refugees in full- or part-time employment 
and the vast majority reliant on government 
welfare benefits. In 2016, costs to provide 
these benefits (in the form of housing, health 
care, food, basic daily provisions, language 
training and spending money) were higher 
than planned, reaching over €20 billion. If 
the current trajectory does not change, costs 
will continue to grow exponentially, and 
long-term welfare dependency in refugee 
communities could also drive long-lasting 
cycles of poverty and social discontent.3
Self-reliance and its benefits
In accepting the highest number of asylum 
applications of any European Union (EU) 
country, Germany has embraced a position 
of humanitarian leadership within the bloc. 
It is important, however, that Germany does 
not fall into the trap of viewing refugees 
as a homogenous collective of victims who 
have no capacity (or desire) for self-help. In 
reality, refugees have diverse educational 
backgrounds, professional experiences, 
technical skills, social networks and 
creativity to draw upon in building new 
lives. When policies encourage refugees 
to capitalise on these diverse capabilities, 
refugees have far greater potential to become 
autonomous and self-reliant, driving their 
own positive socio-economic outcomes.4 
The reality is that large numbers of 
refugees will remain in the long term. 
Germany must therefore focus on policies 
that promote refugees’ lasting self-reliance. 
Despite some attempts at this, refugees’ 
access to work opportunities and potential 
self-reliance is still precarious, impeded 
by institutional structures, practical 
constraints and the extreme uncertainty 
that still characterises their daily lives. 
Practical barriers to work
In July 2016, Germany’s Integration Act 
improved labour market access criteria – in 
theory at least – for both asylum seekers 
and those whose applications have been 
accepted. The law shortened work prohibition 
periods, reduced the extent of citizen 
priority checks for job applications and 
guaranteed a right to stay for the duration 
of a job training programme. Despite the 
reforms, finding a job and independently 
meeting material needs remain fraught 
with legal and practical complications. 
Receiving acceptance of an asylum 
application can take upwards of six months, 
and the accompanying employment 
restrictions and benefits vary according to 
the type of status awarded. For those still 
awaiting decisions, their country of origin 
and the likelihood of their application 
being successful determine their access to 
government language courses, employment 
programmes and job offers. Some localities, 
due to their high unemployment rates or 
their concentrations of specific technical 
jobs, can still require citizen priority checks 
when refugees apply for jobs, meaning that 
the employer will first check whether a 
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suitably qualified German or EU candidate is 
available. The local authorities who conduct 
these checks have a high degree of autonomy 
and little obligation to justify the decisions 
they make. State and municipal residency 
requirements for refugees prohibit them from 
moving away from areas in which it is difficult 
to find employment unless they can find 
jobs in advance of moving that meet legally 
defined minimum salary requirements. 
Even lower-skilled jobs tend to require 
a working knowledge of German and, 
given the varying waiting times for access 
to a government language course and the 
time it takes to complete (12–24 months), 
immediate access to even the most basic 
jobs is limited. Furthermore, the official 
government-provided language integration 
course does not provide the specialised 
language training required for higher-skilled 
jobs. With little disposable income, engaging 
in private study to overcome these barriers 
is often financially impossible for refugees.
The rigid structure of the German 
education and employment training systems 
adds additional complexity for refugees 
with foreign qualifications. As a part of 
employment readiness procedures, job 
centres and local guilds assess whether 
or not refugees’ credentials meet German 
standards, for both technical and non-
technical jobs. Even when refugees’ skills are 
evident, there is little possibility of avoiding 
these long bureaucratic review processes or 
taking simple practical skills tests to enter 
directly into work; where alternatives do 
exist, they are offered at the discretion of 
local government authorities and businesses. 
Given the difficulties around qualification 
recognition, entering the job market through 
formal apprenticeships and employer-run 
training courses is often one of the only 
viable routes to access many professions. 
However, job centres are under no obligation 
to find ways for refugees to fill perceived 
skills gaps so they can practise or retrain in 
their previous professions. Even surpassing 
such hurdles to find and complete such an 
apprenticeship or training programme does 
not guarantee any follow-on employment 
or the legal right to remain in Germany.
Due to housing shortages and difficulties 
finding private rentals, refugees tend to 
live in shelters for far longer than policies 
stipulate they should. Crowded living 
conditions can cause constant noise and 
residential conflict that hamper daily routines 
and disrupt bathing, studying, eating and 
sleeping on a schedule that is compatible with 
working hours. Shelters in smaller cities are 
often poorly connected to public transport, 
creating difficulties commuting to jobs in 
metropolitan areas. Further discouraging 
the search for work is the fact that once they 
report income, refugees become responsible 
for paying their own accommodation costs in 
shelters, which are frequently unaffordable. 
Unreliable resources, unpredictable needs
While their asylum applications are being 
assessed, refugees living in shelters receive 
a nominal monthly allowance (€81–145, 
depending on age). Shelters may also provide 
additional in-kind benefits such as catered 
food, hygiene items or clothing. After 15 
months, or once their asylum applications 
are approved, refugees receive a slightly 
higher monthly amount (€237–409). With 
most or all of their material resources having 
been depleted in flight, until they can earn 
income refugees have little else to draw upon, 
making moving beyond subsistence difficult. 
Already complex benefits schemes 
change rapidly at both federal and local 
levels, resulting in implementation delays, 
inconsistent payments and incorrect 
disbursements. Frequent, forced (and 
often unannounced) moves to new shelters 
often mean that either refugees must 
find or purchase new household items or 
furniture when they are not provided, or 
have to abandon what they have already 
accumulated but cannot take with them 
due to differing shelter rules or the 
inability to afford moving services. 
Without other reliable means of 
connectivity, refugees must use large portions 
of their allowances to pay for phones and 
data (vital for contacting family, friends 
and services). They must also pay for other 
expenses related to their asylum claims, 
including translators and legal advisors.
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A shift towards reciprocity 
Germany must commit to a more consolidated 
vision of how it sees the place of refugees 
in its future society. Are refugees merely 
temporary guests whose basic needs should 
be attended to only until they can be sent 
elsewhere? Or are they a new population 
of permanent residents who are expected 
to integrate – to put down roots, build 
independent lives and give back? 
Presuming the goal is the latter, policies 
should find more productive ways to harness 
refugees’ vast socio-economic potential. 
At a minimum, the laws and processes 
regarding asylum applications, shelter 
transfers, residency status renewals, case 
appeals and deportations should be further 
streamlined, shortened and simplified. This 
would reduce the protracted uncertainty 
that decreases refugees’ motivation to 
overcome obstacles to employment, financial 
security and independent living. Policies 
should furthermore continue to expand legal 
rights to work while striving to eliminate 
existing barriers – including greater 
flexibility in job equivalency reviews and 
skills testing, easier entry into lower-skilled 
or in-demand jobs and more opportunities 
for on-the-job learning of both skills and 
language. Most critically, policies must 
stem from the premise that refugees have 
the capability and desire to become self-
reliant; the role of institutional structures 
should be to empower them to achieve this.
Elizabeth Ekren elizabeth.ekren@uni-bonn.de 
PhD candidate, Center for Development Studies, 
University of Bonn 
www.zef.de/staff/Elizabeth_Ekren 
This article is based on ongoing dissertation 
research and fieldwork in four refugee shelters in 
Cologne.
1. In addition to those who have been recognised as refugees, this 
number includes those who have been granted other recognised 
residency statuses – such as ‘ban on deportation’ or ‘subsidiary 
protection’ – which are not legally equivalent to recognised 
refugee status.
2. European Commission (2016) ‘An Economic Take on the 
Refugee Crisis: A Macroeconomic Assessment for the EU’, 
Institutional Paper 033  
http://bit.ly/EC-Economy-Refugees-033-2016 
3. Sources for the figures cited in this paragraph and throughout 
are available (in German) from the author. 
4. See for example UNHCR (2006) Refugee Livelihoods: A Review of 
the Evidence www.unhcr.org/4423fe5d2.pdf  
The new world of work and the need for digital 
empowerment
Miguel Peromingo and Willem Pieterson
References are often made to forced migrants’ digital literacy, including their use of 
smartphones to organise journeys and communicate once at their destinations. Other 
digital skills, however, including those relating to the workplace, are of greater relevance to 
supporting their integration.
The digital divide broadly speaking refers to 
gaps created in society based on access to and 
use of technology.1 It is typically described as 
a twofold concept: a divide based on access 
to technology and a divide based on skills 
and usage. In most developed economies, the 
divide based on access is diminishing as a 
result of general growth in internet access. In 
the European Union, for example, household 
access to the internet is around 85%. However, 
scholars argue that the skills and usage divide 
is much more pertinent than the access gap. 
Digital skills are broken down into 
five types: operational (being able to 
operate a computer), mobile (being able 
to use a mobile device), information 
navigation (being able to find and interpret 
relevant information), social (sharing 
information and curating friendships) 
and creative (creating online content).2
Although traditionally the use of 
technology is associated with operational 
skills, successful participation in society 
depends much more on information 
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navigation skills, social skills and creative 
skills. For example, being able to find 
the most appropriate financial services 
increasingly depends on one’s ability to 
formulate the proper queries and filter and 
sort through online information. Those 
arriving in destination countries, who 
might bring well-developed operational 
skills, and devices, may well lack the more 
crucial digital skills for societal inclusion.
Generally, digital skills are increasingly 
correlated with people’s level of education 
(instead of, for example, with age and 
gender), suggesting that the digital divide 
will persist. In practice this means that 
substantial sections of the population lack the 
skills to successfully use the internet, despite 
having access to it. Forced migrants who 
enter the country with low socio-economic 
status – and therefore a low level of digital 
skills – can therefore end up in a vicious 
circle of poor digital skills and exclusion.
With the workplace evolving quickly, 
having digital skills becomes ever more 
integral to every industry. Furthermore, as the 
workplace is evolving, so are requirements 
for workers to stay up-to-date with relevant 
technological developments. As education 
is also increasingly technology-driven, 
workers are increasingly required to use 
technologies in order to update themselves. 
Users also require increasingly developed 
digital skills in order to benefit from many 
digital service offerings and services tie-ins 
from private parties – relating for example 
to housing, communication services and 
legal services. Such digital skills required 
by citizens in order to participate in such 
societies are also required by forced migrants.
Refugees are by definition greater risk-
takers and more mobile than residents, 
which can make them more adaptable to 
these labour market changes. However, 
those arriving in the country of destination 
need to be able to make their skills visible, 
get them recognised and avoid ending 
up in a digital version of the less-skilled-
low-pay equilibrium that affects many 
developed and emerging economies alike. 
Beyond pushing buttons
It may well be that the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to forced migrants 
and the regulation of the protection system 
will continue to be digitalised. In addition 
to such digital assistance, however, forced 
migrants need digital empowerment. Digital 
tools can improve forced migrants’ lives, 
while changing labour markets are creating 
opportunities for motivated and skilled 
individuals to embed themselves in their 
new societies. Digital skills, however, go 
beyond pushing buttons and knowing how 
to operate a mobile device; in particular, the 
crucial skills required to find, understand 
and utilise online information are often 
neglected. Lower-skilled forced migrants, 
or those whose long journeys have had a 
negative impact on their access to further 
education, are in danger of falling by 
the wayside. Inclusion programmes for 
migrants should therefore consider focusing 
on digital skills training at all levels.
Miguel Peromingo Miguel.peromingo@gmail.com 
Consultant and writer 
Willem Pieterson willem@pieterson.com 
Co-founder, Center for eGovernment Studies  
https://cfes.bms.utwente.nl/ 
1. Van Dijk J A G M (2005) The Deepening Divide: Inequality in the 
information society, SAGE
2. Van Deursen A J A M, Helsper E J and Eynon R (2016) 
‘Development and validation of the internet Skills Scale (ISS)’ 
Information, Communication and Society 19(6) pp804-823 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/64485/ 
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A Congolese refugee, now an IT trainer, teaching at the Women’s 
Centre for urban refugees, Nouakchott, Mauritania.
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Investing in refugees: building human capital 
Lili Mottaghi
Investing in refugees’ well-being is a global public good, and the international community 
should work to reduce malnutrition and increase access to education for refugees in order to 
help build human capital and achieve better economic outcomes for all.
The protracted nature of forced displacement 
worldwide has brought to the fore not 
only refugees’ humanitarian needs but 
also the development challenges they face. 
These daunting challenges emerge in four 
critical and interlinked areas.1 Refugees – in 
particular, refugee children – face tremendous 
hardship in meeting their basic nutritional, 
educational, health and livelihoods needs. 
Recent studies by the UN Refugee Agency, 
UNHCR, have found acute malnutrition in 
many refugee camps in Kenya, Sudan, Sierra 
Leone and Chad where refugees have been 
displaced for protracted periods of time. 
Another study indicates that while acute 
malnutrition is relatively low in the assessed 
Syrian refugee populations in Jordan, Iraq 
and Lebanon, the prevalence of anaemia 
suggests a serious public health problem 
among women and children.2 The economic 
costs of malnutrition are very high, with poor 
nutrition prolonging the cycle of poverty 
and impeding growth in two main ways. 
Firstly, poor physical health leads to 
low productivity and high rates of disease. 
Women, the elderly and children under 
five, in particular, are at higher risk of 
respiratory and communicable diseases due 
to overcrowded shelters, lack of nutritious 
food, safe drinking water and poor hygiene. 
They can also suffer from mental stress after 
displacement, which affects their general 
well-being. Secondly, there is evidence that 
malnutrition contributes to a longer-term 
development problem, especially in education. 
Studies have shown that malnutrition 
causes stunting and wasting in children 
and is linked to a wide range of cognitive 
deficiencies. Poor cognitive development leads 
to missed years of schooling in childhood 
and lost years of employment in adulthood. 
Development challenges worsen for 
refugee children entering the education 
system of the host country where the 
official language taught at school differs 
from their home language. Many students 
who excelled in their home countries 
cannot follow the course materials in host 
countries due to language barriers. The 
challenging environment of learning can 
impede their academic success and increase 
frustration. These negative experiences and 
the trauma they have already experienced 
damage children’s cognitive functioning, 
affecting their educational performance 
throughout adolescence and into adulthood. 
Evidence shows that low levels of education 
reduce productivity and income, which 
makes breaking the cycle of poverty 
more challenging. Cognitive damage to 
children from receiving no or low-quality 
education in crisis-affected settings not 
only has an impact on their well-being 
but also cuts their future earnings.  
Sustainable job opportunities are not 
readily accessible to refugees residing outside 
their home country. Consequently, refugees 
are less likely to be employed, and the longer 
refugees are unemployed, the more their 
chances of finding a job diminish as they lose 
skills and find themselves dependent on State 
support. Many of these refugees work in the 
informal sector due to their lower education 
levels and lack of work permits. Refugees tend 
to accept lower wages than unskilled host/
local workers, and lower incomes not only 
mean poorer nutrition but also weaken an 
individual’s resilience to further shocks. Lack 
of decent jobs and low earnings contribute 
to increased child labour and child marriage 
as families become more indebted and 
struggle to access livelihood options. In other 
words, they are caught in a vicious circle.
Poor educational learning outcomes and 
poor health translate into massive social 
costs not only for the host country but also 
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for the global community. The cost of lack of 
access to quality education,3 lack of decent 
jobs, malnutrition and uncertainty about the 
future is high. The resulting loss in human 
capital formation in terms of the knowledge 
and skills that are crucial for enhancing 
labour productivity has consequences 
for economic growth, regional economic 
development and the long-term processes 
of peace, stability and reconstruction. 
Investing in refugees is a global public 
good and goes beyond the responsibility of 
the hosting country. Therefore, collective 
action is required to address these challenges. 
Investing in health and education for refugees, 
especially women and children, will benefit 
not only the host country and other nearby 
countries but also those further afield. It will 
also help prepare refugees for return, laying 
the foundation for economic development 
and inclusive growth in their homeland. 
The international community and 
policymakers need to do more to provide 
an opportunity for refugees to thrive and 
grow. Increasing access to health care, 
nutrition and safe water and facilitating the 
participation of refugees in the labour market 
(by investing in skills through strengthening 
childhood and adult education and 
vocational training) are equally important. 
The economics literature has found strong 
links between education and human capital, 
and between human capital and long-term 
growth and productivity. These links should 
encourage the international community and 
policymakers to extend quality education 
and job skills training to registered and 
unregistered children and adult refugees, 
regardless of gender or nationality.
Lili Mottaghi lmottaghi@worldbank.org  
Senior Economist, Chief Economist Office, Middle 
East and North Africa Region, The World Bank 
www.worldbank.org 
1. See Devarajan S and Mottaghi L (2017) Refugee Crisis in MENA: 
Meeting the Development Challenge, Middle East and North Africa 
Economic Monitor, World Bank  
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28395 
2. Moazzem Hossain S M, Leidman E, Kingori J, Al Harun A and 
Bilukha O O (2016) ‘Nutritional situation among Syrian refugees 
hosted in Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon: cross sectional surveys’, 
Conflict and Health 10:26  
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5111203/ 
3. The February 2019 issue of FMR will include a major feature on 
Education. Call for articles at:  
www.fmreview.org/education-displacement 
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Girls at Paysannat L school in Mahama refugee camp, eastern Rwanda. Eighty per cent of the students are Burundian refugees and 
20 per cent come from the Rwandan host community.
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Towards greater visibility and recruitment of skilled 
refugees
Leah Nichles and Sayre Nyce
Showcasing refugees’ skills connects refugees to global work opportunities, and also shifts  
the narrative from one of refugees being burdens to host countries to one in which  
refugees are recognised as skilled workers for whom countries should be competing.
Refugees face multiple barriers to gaining 
access to employment. In addition to the 
frequent lack of access to the right to work 
in host countries and the lack of accessible, 
legal and safe economic migration pathways, 
there are added barriers of lack of visibility 
of refugees’ skills and difficulty in verifying 
qualifications. Talent Beyond Boundaries 
(TBB) is conducting a pilot in Jordan and 
Lebanon to determine how labour mobility 
pathways to protection that address 
these obstacles might be opened up. 
Employers need detailed information 
about work histories and skill sets in order 
to make informed recruitment decisions. 
The first step, therefore, to opening up 
international work opportunities to refugees 
is to map and demonstrate the depth and 
breadth of what refugees have to offer. TBB 
has created an accessible electronic platform 
– the Talent Catalog, the first of its kind – 
in which refugees in countries of asylum 
can document their qualifications, skills 
and experience to share with international 
employers who are seeking to fill skills 
gaps. In order to encourage refugees to 
register with and create a profile in the 
Talent Catalog, TBB conducted information 
sessions with refugees across Lebanon and 
Jordan to explain labour mobility pathways 
to protection. Since July 2016, more than 
10,000 refugees in Jordan and Lebanon have 
registered and created profiles in the Talent 
Catalog. Those registered represent some 
180 occupations; more than one third have 
a tertiary qualification; and more than one 
third speak a language other than Arabic.1
Another element of the equation 
is to find employers willing to recruit 
skilled refugees to fill skills gaps. TBB 
identifies potential employers and makes 
the economic and humanitarian case for 
hiring refugees. To date, five companies 
have offered jobs in Australia and Canada 
to 11 candidates currently in Lebanon and 
Jordan, while 60 other candidates are in 
various stages of recruitment processes 
with 20 other Australian and Canadian 
employers. Meanwhile, other employers 
in South America, Europe, the Caribbean 
and North Africa are either already 
exploring the Talent Catalog or have 
committed to do so when vacancies arise. 
TBB works closely with both refugees 
and employers to clarify with employers the 
particular skills and qualifications they are 
looking for, identify qualified candidates 
from the Talent Catalog for hard-to-fill roles, 
and facilitate remote recruitment processes. 
As part of this, TBB assists refugees to 
showcase their skills and expertise by, for 
example, helping them prepare or update 
CVs, providing guidance on recording video 
introductions to employers, providing access 
to interview skills training and facilitating 
access to language classes in anticipation of 
formal language skills assessment. Employers 
may conduct their own tests – effectively 
an informal qualifications recognition 
process – to ensure that candidates meet 
their standards, although such processes 
may be insufficient to meet visa requirements 
for certain regulated professions. The 
opportunities TBB offers are also seen by 
refugees as being of longer-term benefit to 
them. One candidate in Lebanon said, “You 
will gain a lot of benefits even if you cannot 
get the job. Your confidence will increase, 
your skills will improve and you will be ready 
for any challenge in the world of work.”
Draft 2 of the Global Compact on Refugees 
proposes the collection of population and 
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socio-economic data – including on labour 
markets, investment and skills – which 
would, among other benefits, help foster 
inclusive economic growth for both host 
communities and refugees. The Talent 
Catalog is one example of capturing data 
on and demonstrating the range and 
depth of refugee skills – skills which could 
meet employers’ needs and contribute to 
economic growth anywhere in the world.
Engaging States 
Governments have a critical role in creating 
economic opportunities for skilled refugees 
and in recognising qualifications but, to date, 
economic migration pathways have not been 
designed with the circumstances of refugees 
in mind. Those fleeing conflict zones may not 
have access to evidence of their qualifications 
or legal identification documents, and may 
not be able to provide traditional work 
histories, references and evidence of annual 
earnings. Recognising this, the Government 
of Canada is funding a pilot project in Kenya 
to identify barriers to refugees’ access to its 
skilled migration schemes. In both Canada 
and Australia, while working with increasing 
numbers of employers to recruit skilled 
refugees, TBB continues to consult with and 
carry out advocacy 
work targeting both 
governments on how 
existing skilled visa 
systems may take 
account of skilled 
refugees’ unique 
circumstances. It 
is also in similar 
discussions with three 
other States.  
Talent Beyond Boundaries is helping 
to advance an effective framework – one 
that may be replicated by others – for 
refugees to rebuild lives of self-reliance 
with protection and dignity, while 
contributing to the global economy.
Leah Nichles 
lnichles@talentbeyondboundaries.org 
International Advocacy Director
Sayre Nyce snyce@talentbeyondboundaries.org 
Executive Director
Talent Beyond Boundaries 
www.talentbeyondboundaries.org 
1. See Talent Beyond Boundaries (Sept 2017) Mapping Refugee Skills 
and Employability: Data and Analysis from the Talent Catalog  
http://bit.ly/TBB-Sept2017  
Validating highly educated refugees’ qualifications
Katarina Mozetič
Qualification certificates play a central role in the labour market integration of highly 
educated refugees but validating them presents considerable challenges. Sweden and 
Norway have introduced some positive developments to address such difficulties.
Whether doctors, teachers, engineers 
or IT specialists, the highly educated 
refugees I interviewed in Norway, Sweden 
and Germany between 2016 and 2017 
aspired to continue working within their 
occupational fields. In order to do so they 
need to validate their foreign qualifications 
but the validation process for certain 
occupations is extremely lengthy, preventing 
some highly educated refugees from re-
entering their professions for years.
Qualifications recognition and validation 
processes differ substantially between 
different occupational groups, with the 
principal division between occupations 
regulated by law (for instance, medical 
doctors and teachers) and non-regulated ones 
(such as IT engineers). For individuals in 
non-regulated occupations, the qualifications 
validation process is often simple and short. 
For those in legally regulated occupations the 
experience is very different. In order to be able 
to continue working as, for instance, medical 
doctors and teachers, foreign professionals 
have to obtain national licences, usually 
needing to provide proof of destination-
“Attracting and retaining 
global talent is critical to 
Canada’s digital future. 
Refugees should  
absolutely be a part of  
that talent pipeline.” 
(Sandra Saric, Vice President of 
Talent Innovation, Information  
and Communications  
Technology Council, Canada)
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country language skills, pass an exam, 
attend supplementary courses and (often) 
undergo a period of practical training. 
All of the medical doctors and teachers 
who participated in my research project who 
embarked upon these licensing processes in 
Norway, Sweden and Germany described 
numerous difficulties. Some felt that the 
required knowledge tests and supplementary 
training ignored their existing knowledge 
and experience, and some medical specialists 
were sceptical that the destination country 
licence would equal the professional level 
they had achieved in their home country. 
Most of the research participants criticised 
the long duration of the licensing processes. 
In Sweden, for instance, foreign 
teachers require an estimated five to 
eight years to obtain a Swedish teaching 
licence. In order to enable migrants to 
gain faster access to the labour market, 
the Swedish Public Employment Service, 
commissioned by the Swedish government 
and in cooperation with industry partners, 
established fast-track programmes.1 
Designed for occupations that experience 
labour shortages, the first programmes were 
initiated in 2015 and programmes currently 
exist for migrant chefs, social workers 
and those in regulated occupations such 
as teachers. The programme participants 
undergo a qualifications validation process, 
occupation-specific Swedish language 
courses, internships and supplementary 
theoretical courses. Participants take 
part in these activities simultaneously, 
thereby reducing the time it takes to get the 
national licence. Moreover, the programmes 
provide participants with an institutional 
framework that sketches out the steps they 
need to take in order to reach their goal 
and offers them guidance along the way.
One such fast-track programme is a 26-
week programme aimed at foreign teachers 
in Malmö, Sweden. This consists of courses 
in pedagogy and about the Swedish school 
system that are taught in both Swedish 
and Arabic (since it is anticipated that 
most participants are Arabic-speaking), an 
internship at one of the local schools and a 
Swedish language course that is tailored for 
teachers. Practical work experience enables 
the individual to enhance their Swedish 
language skills and establish the professional 
contacts necessary for future job seeking. 
Moreover, the decision about whether an 
individual must undergo a programme of 
supplementary training for foreign teachers 
in order to obtain their teaching licence – a 
decision taken by the Swedish National 
Agency for Education upon a request to 
validate their qualifications – can be re-
evaluated depending on how that individual 
performs in the fast-track programme.  
Physical possession of certificates
In order to be able to validate their 
qualifications, highly educated refugees 
have to be in physical possession of their 
qualification certificates. Many respondents 
recounted, however, how they had lost 
part or all of their certificates in the 
rubble of their bombed homes or on their 
journeys. Obtaining new certificates from 
the educational institutions where they 
studied was often a nearly insurmountable 
obstacle – state institutions were often 
reluctant, unwilling or even legally 
constrained from issuing educational 
certificates to individuals abroad. 
In order to address this problem, and to 
meet the requirements of the Convention on 
the Recognition of Qualifications concerning 
Higher Education in the European Region, 
the Norwegian Agency for Quality Assurance 
in Education (NOKUT) developed a 
Recognition Procedure for Persons without 
Verifiable Documentation (also known as 
the UVD-procedure).2 The UVD-procedure 
is oriented towards individuals with foreign 
higher education for whom the general 
recognition procedure is not appropriate, due 
to either missing, insufficient or unverifiable 
educational and/or identity documentation. 
Thereby, it is directed mainly at refugees 
and persons in a refugee-like situation. The 
UVD-procedure includes input by one or two 
NOKUT employees with knowledge about 
the educational system in the applicant’s 
country of origin and two external experts 
with subject-specific expertise. An applicant’s 
educational background is verified through a 
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questionnaire, an interview and both oral and 
written assignments relating to the applicant’s 
field of expertise. Although Norway is the 
only European country with the UVD-
procedure, a couple of others, including 
Sweden, employ similar procedures.
Due to increasing numbers of refugees, 
the time-consuming and resource-intensive 
nature of the UVD-procedure, and the fact 
that an ever expanding group of refugees 
does not fulfil the requirements for 
evaluation according to the UVD-procedure, 
NOKUT has, along with the United 
Kingdom National Academic Recognition 
Information Centre, developed a new type 
of faster, cheaper evaluation procedure for 
those without verifiable documentation. 
The new Qualifications Assessment for 
Refugees3 combines an evaluation of 
available documentation and a structured 
interview carried out by an experienced 
NOKUT case officer with the applicant. 
The attempts outlined here are 
examples of positive developments aimed 
at addressing the difficulties of qualification 
recognition. It remains to be seen how these 
programmes will continue to evolve and 
how they can be implemented elsewhere.
Katarina Mozetič 
katarina.mozetic@sosgeo.uio.no   
PhD Research Fellow, Department of Sociology 
and Human Geography, University of Oslo 
www.sv.uio.no/iss/english/people/aca/
katarmo/index.html  
1. http://bit.ly/SwedishGovt-fasttrack  
2. http://bit.ly/NOKUT-UVD-procedure 
3. http://bit.ly/NOKUT-QualPassport-2016 
Refugee livelihoods: new actors, new models
Ziad Ayoubi and Regina Saavedra
The international community is increasingly emphasising the need to bridge the 
humanitarian–development gap. But what does this mean on the ground in terms of 
refugees’ livelihoods and economic inclusion?
In addition to shelter, water, food and 
education, refugees (just like everyone else) 
need productive employment. Generating 
an income to meet one’s basic needs and 
provide for one’s family is essential for 
human dignity, and is a human right 
under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Furthermore, there is growing 
evidence that refugees can contribute to 
economic development in host countries if 
given the chance to participate. Refugees’ 
human capital (skills and experience) can 
bring new products and services to the 
local market, while financial capital such 
as remittances and international aid can 
stimulate economies. However, in most 
countries refugees still lack the right to work. 
From a host country’s perspective, 
governments should recognise, firstly, that a 
legal framework which allows the economic 
inclusion of refugees can generate benefits 
for host countries and, secondly, that it is 
preferable for work rights to be granted as 
early as possible in order not to prevent or 
delay the potential contribution of refugees 
to economies. Restrictive work rights 
encourage informal economic activities and 
deprive host countries of an economically 
active population who could otherwise 
pay taxes and consume, produce and sell 
goods and services. It is neither desirable 
nor logical to postpone work rights until 
refugees become legally integrated (for 
example, through naturalisation), which 
can take a long time; people will still 
work but will be excluded from formal, 
decent employment opportunities. Good 
practice (in Norway, Sweden, Denmark 
and Germany, among others) shows that 
supporting early labour market insertion 
– for example, through skills certification, 
apprenticeships and job matching schemes 
– allows refugees to become contributing 
members of host communities. This is 
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naturally more easily accomplished in 
countries where local economies can 
absorb a labour influx and where resources 
and infrastructure exist to efficiently link 
refugees to appropriate opportunities. 
However, 84% of the world’s refugees 
are hosted by developing countries, many 
of which suffer high rates of poverty and 
unemployment. In such contexts, policy 
development and programme design 
promoting refugees’ livelihoods must speak 
to the concerns of host countries. This is 
where development actors can help. One 
significant example is the World Bank’s 
Global Concessional Financing Facility which 
provides concessional loans to middle-income 
countries hosting refugees in order to expand 
labour opportunities and improve local 
infrastructure, benefiting host and refugee 
populations. Meanwhile, the International 
Labour Organization’s ‘Guiding principles 
on the access of refugees and other forcibly 
displaced persons to the labour market’1 speak 
to the need for proper governance frameworks 
as well as the importance of the private sector 
in generating decent, productive employment.
Economic inclusion is of course impossible 
without the engagement of employers, 
investors, service providers and other 
private sector actors. However, identifying 
opportunities that can achieve real impact 
for refugees and host communities can be 
a painful and lengthy process, particularly 
when discussions between humanitarian 
and private sectors are conducted only at 
the global level, far from local reality.
Improving ways of working
The humanitarian community is increasingly 
aware of the need to change its usual ways 
of working. The UN Refugee Agency, 
UNHCR, has made many strategic changes 
recently such as in cash-based interventions 
and biometric identification, in developing 
multi-year, multi-partner strategies, and in 
livelihoods programming. Traditionally, 
many livelihoods interventions focused 
on skills development and subsidies, and 
were implemented without real analysis of 
refugee needs and capacities. They lacked the 
potential to generate real, sustainable impact 
for refugees, let alone for host communities. 
UNHCR, along with many of its partners 
and other humanitarian organisations, is 
now moving towards more targeted, market-
based and results-oriented programming.
The most important aspect of this is the 
emphasis on understanding market dynamics 
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Two Eritrean refugees involved in IKEA Switzerland’s six-month internship programme. On completing, refugees can apply for a permanent 
position. By September 2017, 13 of the 36 interns who had completed the internship programme had been employed by IKEA.
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when programming for livelihoods. In order 
to support this, UNHCR has issued Minimum 
Criteria for Livelihoods Programming2 and 
(in partnership with the International Labour 
Organization, ILO) guidance on the need 
to identify and prioritise specific sectors, 
and then to analyse the opportunities for 
refugee inclusion within the ‘value chains’ 
of each sector3 based on potential for growth, 
relevance to refugee capacities and feasibility 
of intervention. The sector selection takes 
into account economic trends but also the 
political, legal and socio-cultural context, 
including rules, regulations and norms; 
available supporting services; and the profile 
of the refugee and host communities. This 
analysis allows practitioners to identify 
opportunities and interventions that might 
increase refugee participation without 
exacerbating tensions between refugees 
and the host community. Some examples of 
such sectors include food services in Egypt, 
maize, cassava and groundnuts in Zambia, 
and food and beverage in Costa Rica. In 
Egypt, joint ILO–UNHCR analysis found 
that entrepreneurial training and start-up 
grants could help Syrian refugees to capitalise 
on the popularity of Syrian cuisine, and 
programmes were designed accordingly. 
At the global level, UNHCR and other 
organisations are linking refugee artisans 
to global markets through the MADE51 
(Market Access, Design and Empowerment) 
initiative4 which aims to build the technical 
capacity of local, ethical social enterprises 
to manage unique collections produced by 
refugees and to support them in branding 
and marketing products internationally. 
The overall aim of this way of working 
is to work within existing market dynamics 
to promote sustainable economic inclusion 
for refugees. In doing so, UNHCR and 
humanitarian agencies need to avoid 
becoming market players. Historically, 
this has been challenging. There are many 
examples of humanitarian-implemented 
livelihoods trainings where refugees 
produced goods that were later sold 
directly to the humanitarian agencies; the 
moment the humanitarian agency runs 
out of funding, the activity ceases and 
there is no genuine economic participation 
of refugees nor long-term benefit for the 
host community. The role of humanitarian 
agencies is facilitation: ensuring access of 
refugees and vulnerable host community 
members to market opportunities, without 
agencies becoming direct producers, vendors 
or consumers. Agencies can, however, 
add value by developing models that 
prove that refugees have the potential to 
contribute positively to the local economy; 
these models should later be handed over 
to be led by development partners, private 
sector actors and/or governments.
The Graduation Approach
An example of such a model is the Graduation 
Approach, which UNHCR and partners 
have piloted in various contexts since 
2013, including in Burkina Faso, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador and Egypt. Graduation is 
an approach to lifting households out of 
poverty through providing – within certain 
time limits – short-term humanitarian 
assistance, livelihoods training, employment 
or self-employment support and a strong 
coaching component. Coaches identify a 
household’s protection and other needs and 
link participants to existing national and 
local services. A mid-term evaluation of the 
graduation pilot in Santo Domingo, Ecuador, 
shows that the approach is promising. After 
less than one year of implementation (and 
during a year of financial crisis and a natural 
disaster in Ecuador), 57% of households had 
a regular source of income (compared with 
49% prior to the start of the programme); 
the average monthly household income 
increased from US$269 to $282; 34.6% of 
households earned an income above the 
national poverty line (28.3% previously); 
and 78% of households were able to eat 
three meals a day (60.4% previously).
The Graduation Approach is increasingly 
being used by governments and development 
actors in a variety of non-refugee contexts as 
a social protection tool, and these actors are 
now beginning to engage with UNHCR and 
humanitarian agencies about incorporating 
displaced populations into their plans. USAID 
is investing in a $37 million graduation 
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pilot in Uganda that will target both host 
communities and refugees; in Ecuador, the 
Ministry of Social and Economic Inclusion is 
interested in collaborating on the Graduation 
Approach in order to expand its own social 
protection programme; and returnees 
and IDPs in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
are included in Graduation Approach 
programmes run by microfinance institutions. 
Financial inclusion
Access to financial services is another area 
where major innovation has been required, 
as traditional approaches to microfinance 
initiatives by humanitarian agencies have 
in many cases proved unsustainable. Rather 
than managing revolving funds directly, 
UNHCR and partners are beginning to take 
a facilitative approach to ensure access to 
financial services for refugees. UNHCR is 
working with the Swedish Development 
Agency to establish a credit guarantee facility 
for financial service agencies providing 
loans to refugees and host populations. The 
guarantee scheme will help finance three to 
four financially viable and socially oriented 
financial service providers, and is meant to 
encourage lending to refugees and to build 
evidence that microfinance for this segment of 
the population can be viable. The UN Capital 
Development Fund has also committed to 
supporting refugees’ access to financial 
services in several countries in Africa by 
providing financial and technical support to 
service providers who provide refugee access. 
What’s next?
More models need to be tested and more 
development funding should be invested; 
some models will work better than others, 
and some interventions that work for some 
populations may not work for others. Failures 
should be expected as the international 
community learns how to meet the needs 
of this vulnerable population while 
also achieving positive results for host 
communities. Continuous monitoring – and, 
therefore, investment in evaluation – will 
be needed in order to identify lessons and 
enable good practices to be replicated.
Ziad Ayoubi ayoubi@unhcr.org 
Senior Livelihoods Officer, UNHCR Geneva
Regina María Saavedra saavedra@unhcr.org 
Associate Durable Solutions Officer, UNHCR 
Mexico 
www.unhcr.org 
1. http://bit.ly/ILO-guiding-principles-refugees 
2. www.unhcr.org/54fd6cbe9.pdf 
3. www.unhcr.org/594b7d7f7.pdf 
The macro-economic impacts of Syrian refugee aid
Tobias Schillings
A new study on the effects of humanitarian assistance in response to the Syria crisis finds 
significant positive impacts for regional economic growth and job creation.
With currently 5.6 million registered Syrian 
refugees being hosted by neighbouring 
countries and over six million internally 
displaced within Syria, creating economic 
opportunities has become a central 
component of the resilience approach in 
response to the crisis. Acknowledging 
the destructive impact of the conflict on 
livelihoods and economic resources, the 
international community committed to 
creating 1.1 million jobs for refugees and 
host communities by the end of 2018. This 
ambitious goal, announced at the London 
Conference for Supporting Syria and the 
Region in February 2016, is complemented 
by commitments from the affected national 
governments neighbouring Syria (to open 
up their labour markets and improve 
their regulatory environment), the 
international community (to strengthen 
job creation through access to concessional 
financing and external markets) and the 
private sector (to foster economic growth 
by providing new investments).   
The core response of the international 
community is the Regional Refugee and 
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Resilience Plan (3RP)1 which is based on 
plans developed under the leadership of the 
relevant national authorities – namely, Egypt, 
Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The 3RP 
combines humanitarian and development 
elements, spans eight different sectors, 
including livelihoods, and is supported by 
a total annual funding appeal of US$5.6 
billion for 2018. A recent study of the macro-
economic impacts of the 3RP (undertaken 
in cooperation with the UN Development 
Programme’s Sub-Regional Response 
Facility for the Syria Crisis)2 demonstrates 
its noticeable contribution to economic 
growth and job creation in the region – a 
contribution that has mostly been overlooked 
in public discourse yet offers a powerful 
narrative for policymakers in fostering 
social cohesion among host communities. 
The qualitative evidence
In many host communities, the economic 
impact of Syrian refugees and humanitarian 
assistance has been the subject of significant 
debate. The Syrian crisis has clearly had 
an overall negative impact on many 
neighbouring countries’ economies by 
affecting trade flows, GDP and growth, and 
could threaten regional stability. However, 
as over 90% of refugees live outside camps, 
they have become important customers 
for local goods and services, paid for with 
savings, labour income, remittances and 
humanitarian assistance. Local businesses 
also benefit from humanitarian assistance 
programmes as they get contracted 
as suppliers for non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and humanitarian 
agencies. Furthermore, the arrival of Syrian 
refugees’ private capital and expertise has 
accelerated business growth in countries 
such as Egypt, Jordan and Turkey.3 Syrian 
businesses have become an important 
engine for refugee job creation and represent 
a premier example of the ‘growing the 
pie’ approach in host communities. 
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Syrian refugees sell soaps and detergents in their shop in Alexandria, Egypt. UNHCR supported this and other job creation projects in Egypt. 
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The quantitative evidence
To further support these qualitative 
statements, the new study uses an economic 
framework to estimate fiscal stimulus and 
employment effects of the 3RP. As a first step, 
we estimate the potential GDP impact based 
on ‘fiscal multipliers’. Public investments 
generate higher economic effects than their 
initial value, as the economy benefits from 
spillover effects. For example, building a 
refugee camp creates income not only for 
the construction company but also for the 
suppliers of materials and labour. This 
income is then spent on other goods and 
services which in turn create additional 
economic effects. Fiscal multipliers capture 
these spillover effects. In a 2015 study of 
Lebanon, UNDP and the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) found that each dollar 
spent of their US$800 million refugee aid 
package generated an additional 0.6 dollars 
of revenue, making the multiplier 1.6.4 
The second step of the analysis is to 
quantify the potential for job creation. By 
using historic data (including data that 
captures recent national developments) 
to quantify the relationship between 
changes in unemployment and output at 
the macro-economic level for each country, 
it is possible to translate the national GDP 
impact into expected job creation.5 
It is important to note that the study’s 
final estimate is a projection for the general 
job creation potential in each country. It does 
not distinguish between refugees and host 
nationals, nor does it claim the kinds of jobs 
that are created. This micro-level impact will 
depend on 3RP programme implementation, 
targeting and national economic policies. 
Especially with regard to refugees, labour 
market barriers must be taken into account. 
Refugees experience much stronger economic, 
legal and social restrictions to employment 
than do citizens of host countries. As long 
as these barriers exist, refugees will not 
be able to benefit fully from the estimated 
expansion of economic opportunities. 
It is therefore up to the international 
community and host governments to target 
their programmes and policies in such a 
way as to promote inclusive growth.
The study’s results indicate the potentially 
significant impact of the 3RP programming 
on host countries. With a total spending 
over 2017 and 2018 of about $9 billion, the 
response plan creates a much larger fiscal 
stimulus. The short-term effects account for a 
projected GDP impact of about $17–25 billion, 
while the associated job creation impact adds 
up to an estimated 75,000–110,000 jobs.6 
The relative effect for each country 
depends mostly on the size of its economy 
and the amount of funding received, 
with Lebanon and Jordan being the 
largest recipients. With a relatively small 
market, these countries are expected to 
experience a much stronger momentum in 
economic growth due to the large inflow of 
humanitarian assistance. However, even large 
economies such as Turkey and Egypt are 
expected to contribute between 12,000 and 
23,000 jobs to the London target. Emphasising 
the positive economic impacts of refugee aid, 
this research advocates a fully funded 3RP. 
Although the job target seems unlikely to be 
achieved by the resilience response alone, 
the 3RP represents a significant contribution 
to expanding economic opportunities for 
refugees and supports long-term growth by 
fostering resilience in host communities.  
Tobias Schillings tobiasschillings@gmail.com  
MPhil in Economics candidate, University of 
Oxford, and Economic Consultant, UNDP Sub-
Regional Response Facility for the Syria Crisis 
www.economics.ox.ac.uk/graduate-students/
tobias-schillings 
1. 3RP (2018) Regional Refugee and Response Plan 2018-2019: Regional 
Strategic Overview http://bit.ly/3RPStrategicOverview2018-19
2. Schillings T (2018) ‘Jobs Make the Difference – Estimating job 
creation potential of the 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan’, 
Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs 
Working Paper No. 44, American University of Beirut  
http://bit.ly/Schillings-3RP-2018
3. See for example Ucak S, Holt J and Raman K (2017) ‘Another 
Side to the Story: A Market Assessment of Syrian Businesses in 
Turkey’, Building Markets http://anothersidetothestory.org/ 
4. UNDP/UNHCR (2015) Impact of humanitarian aid on the Lebanese 
economy http://bit.ly/UNDP-UNHCR-Aid-Impact-Lebanon-2015 
5. The full explanation of the framework and results is available at 
http://bit.ly/Schillings-3RP-2018
6. This projection assumes that the 3RP is fully funded. Given the 
significant funding gap in recent years, especially with regards to 
the livelihoods sector, achieving these results will require further 
financial support by donors. 
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Quality of work for Syrian refugees in Jordan
Maha Kattaa and Meredith Byrne
Work permits have been at the centre of the policy debate on the hosting of Syrian refugees 
in Jordan. This approach needs also to involve ensuring decent working conditions for all.
The issuing of over 100,000 work permits 
to Syrian refugees in Jordan as of May 
2018 – following a joint commitment 
by the Government of Jordan and the 
international community – is in itself an 
important achievement. However, work 
permits can also be a deceptive indicator 
because they measure the legalisation 
and formalisation of employment but not 
necessarily actual job creation nor the 
quality of work. Evidence from a 2017 
International Labour Organization (ILO) 
rapid impact assessment1 suggests that 
obtaining a work permit is only the first step 
towards formalising Syrian workers. Policies 
must also improve working conditions. 
Social protection and decent work 
With few exceptions, employers in Jordan are 
required to enrol their employees in social 
security, irrespective of nationality, and must 
do so for new employees soon after their work 
permits are issued. In the agriculture sector, 
however, Syrian workers are permitted to 
obtain work permits through cooperatives. 
This de-links them from a sponsor and 
thereby also bypasses the requirement for 
employers to register Syrians in the social 
security system. Similarly, in the construction 
sector, Syrians may obtain a work permit 
through the General Federation of Jordanian 
Trade Unions (GFJTU). Under the GFJTU 
scheme, workers are not required to register 
with the national social security system but 
must instead obtain an insurance policy, 
costing approximately 45 Jordanian dinar 
(US$65) annually. 
The implications of protecting a large 
number of Syrian workers through work 
injury insurance schemes are not yet clear, 
although insurance schemes do not provide 
minimum social protection coverage as 
defined by ILO’s Social Security Convention 
No. 102.2 Furthermore, while social security 
systems deduct contributions from workers’ 
wages to contribute to national social security 
funds, insurance schemes do not operate 
in the same way. Protecting Syrian workers 
through social security is important not 
only for securing equality of treatment but 
also for extending social protection coverage 
to unemployed and retired Jordanians – 
because unregistered workers increase 
the supply of unprotected labour, while 
decreasing the share of workers making 
contributions to social security funds.
Only 20% of interviewed Syrian workers 
who had work permits reported being 
covered by social security; 13% did not 
know whether they were covered, nor what 
benefits social security provided. Many 
Jordanian employers interviewed during 
the rapid impact assessment did not believe 
that they were required to register Syrian 
workers in social security, even in sectors 
where they were in fact required to do so. 
Since the adoption of non-employer and 
non-profession specific work permits, the 
responsibility of insuring against injury 
at work has shifted to the permit holders. 
Early focus group discussions held with 
Syrian construction workers who had 
obtained employment via ILO Employment 
Service Centres across Jordan indicate 
a generally positive reaction to having 
insurance (and that they do not consider the 
cost prohibitive) but that there is a lack of 
awareness of the provisions and benefits of 
insurance. It is also unclear whether Syrian 
workers who are young and in good health 
will want to invest in insurance policies as 
they may not perceive the risk of illness, 
injury or death as being relevant to them. 
Labour inspection
Our research suggests that labour inspectors 
appear to prioritise verifying that all foreign 
workers, including Syrian workers, have the 
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required permits but pay less attention to 
decent work conditions. Of those interviewed 
Syrian workers who had permits, only 8% 
reported that their working conditions, as 
well as work permits, were checked during 
labour inspections. It would seem therefore 
that not all indicators of decent work have 
improved with formalisation. Overall, 
Syrians with work permits do report an 
increased likelihood of having written work 
contracts; however, hourly wages, safety 
provisions and relations with employers 
are not necessarily any better. Our evidence 
suggests that Syrians with permits are 
actually working in excess of the standard 
40-hour work week, although none reported 
receiving overtime compensation. Focus 
group discussions, however, showed a 
more complex picture. Some Syrian workers 
wanted to work more hours so that they 
could increase their income, even though 
they knew they might not be compensated 
for the additional work. Despite having been 
briefed on occupational safety and health 
(OSH) procedures, others preferred not to 
wear protective gear, finding that it got in the 
way of their work. Employers reported that 
fines for non-compliance were not substantial 
or evenly applied, that OSH provisions were 
not usually checked during inspections, and 
that there was a general lack of consistency 
in the enforcement of labour laws. 
Finding the right balance
By facilitating the employment of Syrian 
workers, the Government of Jordan has 
taken proactive steps to turn the arrival 
of Syrian refugees into a development 
opportunity. Government policies must 
continue to promote decent work conditions 
which should include mechanisms that 
gradually bring workers into national social 
protection systems. In some sectors, clear 
information on the benefits of social security 
coverage or employment insurance, as well 
as workers’ entitlements, may be of use. 
Clear communication is also needed around 
the social security system as a whole and its 
reliance on workers’ contributions. Labour 
inspection could also play a more prominent 
role in promoting decent work if inspectors 
were better equipped to provide relevant 
recommendations to employers and workers 
to help them comply with regulations and 
standards, rather than only playing an 
enforcement role. Reasonable and well-
regulated penalties can, when necessary, 
play a part in encouraging compliance.
A comprehensive review of work permits’ 
accordance with applicable international 
labour standards3 could be of use for workers, 
employers and government representatives. 
More work needs to be done to identify the 
challenges Syrians face in obtaining work 
permits but of equal importance is to support 
the Jordanian government to find the right 
balance of incentives and sanctions that 
serve the interests of employers, Jordanian 
citizens and Syrian workers alike. 
Maha Kattaa kattaa@ilo.org 
Syria Response Coordinator in Amman
Meredith Byrne byrne@ilo.org 
Technical Officer in Labour Migration
International Labour Organization www.ilo.org 
1. International Labour Organization (2017) Work permits and 
employment of Syrian refugees in Jordan: toward formalising the work of 
Syrian refugees http://bit.ly/ILO-permits-Syria-Jordan-2017  
This assessment was based on questionnaires completed by 450 
Syrian workers (half of whom had work permits and half of whom 
did not) in the service, agriculture and construction sectors, and 
on two focus groups. 
2. http://bit.ly/ILO-Convention-102
3. ILO (2016) Guiding principles on the access of refugees and 
other forcibly displaced persons to the labour market. Principle 14 
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The gig economy in complex refugee situations
Abigail Hunt, Emma Samman, Dina Mansour-Ille and Henrieke Max
Research with Syrian women refugees in Jordan suggests that, despite significant 
challenges, the gig economy has some potential to help refugees participate in host 
communities and to bolster their economic participation.
As elsewhere in the world, the gig economy 
– in which companies develop mobile 
platforms which bring together workers 
and the purchasers of their services – is fast 
taking root in Jordan. These platforms enable 
businesses to order timed and monetised 
tasks from an available worker, with a fee or 
commission commonly charged to the worker 
or client by the platform. Workers take on 
particular ‘gigs’ without any guarantee of 
further work and are typically classified as 
self-employed or independent contractors 
by gig economy companies. The operating 
model of gig economy platforms can be 
divided into ‘crowd work’ and ‘on-demand’ 
work. Crowd work refers to tasks which are 
commissioned and carried out via the internet 
using suitably skilled ‘crowd workers’ located 
anywhere in the world. On-demand tasks are 
carried out locally, assuming close physical 
proximity of service purchaser and provider. 
A 2017 study commissioned by the 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) and 
carried out by the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) explored the potential of 
the gig economy to provide economic 
opportunities to Syrian women refugees 
currently living in Jordan.1 Although the 
sector is still in its infancy, international 
companies (such as Uber and Careem) and 
home-grown companies (such as Bilforon 
and Mrayti) have already established 
operations in the country. To understand the 
implications for humanitarian practitioners 
of this fast-developing form of paid work in 
complex refugee situations, we examined 
the potential and challenges of including the 
gig economy in livelihoods programming.2
Challenges 
The gig economy remains indisputably 
small. Worldwide, it involves a very modest 
share of the active workforce, the most 
generous recent estimate being 1.5%.3 
Our research in Jordan suggests that gig 
work may involve a few hundred Syrian 
refugee women at most. On this basis 
alone, it could be argued that engagement 
with gig work is not a good use of scarce 
development and humanitarian resources. 
The gig economy does not – as it 
currently stands – offer decent work 
as defined by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). Therefore, a wider 
focus on improving access to livelihoods in 
sectors which offer opportunities for a more 
stable income, coupled with better working 
conditions, may be more appropriate.
Furthermore, structural constraints – both 
practical and political – to accessing gig work 
present a barrier to entry for marginalised 
communities. For example, for many 
refugees in Jordan, internet connectivity 
is limited or non-existent. Women face 
further constraints to digital connectivity, 
sometimes requiring permission to use 
the internet or due to access restrictions 
imposed by limited digital literacy. 
The legal implications of involvement 
in gig work may also be of concern to 
practitioners. It remains unclear whether 
non-Jordanian gig economy workers are 
entitled to work permits. Expanding gig 
work may therefore appear to be supporting 
workers to access  informal work, bearing 
potential risks for both practitioners and 
workers themselves. Crowd-work platforms 
complicate matters further because of their 
transnational character: workers can be 
based in one country and undertake tasks 
for clients based in a second, via platforms 
located in a third – leaving it unclear which 
is the legally responsible jurisdiction. 
Finally, gig workers in general confront 
many challenging working conditions, 
including a lack of social protection and 
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bargaining power. Refugee gig workers 
in particular face yet greater difficulties, 
such as heightened apprehensions around 
the submission of private information 
online that might put them at risk.
Opportunities 
Notwithstanding the challenges, the gig 
economy does present some opportunities for 
livelihoods programming. Early engagement 
with the expanding gig economy offers an 
opportunity to understand its positive and 
negative implications (for gig workers and 
the labour market more broadly), and to 
address them proactively while there is time 
to shape these technologies and their impacts. 
Although the gig economy may, in some 
ways, be little different from other forms of 
casual, informal work available to refugees, 
gig workers appear to value some features 
of platform apps – such as their independent 
log of hours worked, which alleviates the 
risk of wage theft and facilitates prompt 
payment on task completion.4 The gig 
economy also makes it possible for refugees 
to undertake crowd work, which is not tied 
to a particular location. This could present 
new economic opportunities for suitably 
skilled and equipped workers, although it 
introduces challenges around the governance 
and the precariousness of such work.
The gig economy also has potential 
to help overcome the barriers that restrict 
the mobility – and therefore participation 
– of Syrian women refugees in the labour 
force. Some focus group members reported 
how home-based gig work could open up 
opportunities for women’s livelihoods. 
Moreover, on-demand work could expand 
possibilities for engagement in sectors 
in which these women may already be 
skilled, such as catering or tailoring. 
Avenues for gig economy livelihoods 
programming
We believe there is a case for livelihoods 
programming in Jordan to include 
opportunities in the gig economy, if integrated 
alongside robust protection measures and 
other employment options. Potential avenues 
for such livelihoods support include:
Engaging in dialogue with government: 
Given the lack of clarity around the 
applicability and enforcement of existing 
labour regulation in relation to the gig 
economy, practitioners need to engage with 
the legal implications and potential risks of 
supporting gig work. One approach could 
be to engage in dialogue with the Jordanian 
government to clarify what engagement 
the government is willing to permit. At 
the same time, it would 
be valuable to undertake 
a range of advocacy 
activities, including 
calling for government-led 
social dialogue around 
opportunities and conditions 
in the gig economy and 
policies to promote digital 
inclusion and permit 
freedom of association. 
Supporting refugee 
engagement in navigating 
gig work: Practitioners 
should monitor the policy 
environment relating to 
refugee engagement in gig 
work. They should provide 
timely, ongoing information 
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Syrian refugees and Jordanian citizens take part in crowd work, outsourced from Western Union. 
Why have we pixellated their faces? See www.fmreview.org/photo-policy
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to refugees seeking or involved in gig work 
about the relevant regulations and the 
associated opportunities and risks, as well 
as specific support such as digital literacy 
training and legal advice. Considering the 
challenges that gig work poses, this support 
should include building transferable skills 
that would enable refugees to seek alternative 
economic opportunities if they wish.
Encouraging responsible company 
engagement: Practitioners may be well-
placed to encourage companies to pay serious 
attention to workers’ concerns, including 
around privacy. In addition, practitioners 
might initiate connections with those 
crowd-work companies which operate on a 
more ethical and inclusive model in order 
to explore their interest in working with 
vulnerable communities, such as Syrian 
women refugees. Central to this should 
be ensuring that companies consider the 
specific needs of these groups (for example, 
for robust digital literacy training) and that 
the work offered is decent and desirable. 
Facilitating refugee association: Even in 
contexts in which refugee association is 
prohibited, refugees are usually permitted 
to come together for training led by non-
governmental organisations. This could 
provide a very good opportunity to link 
with (registered) women’s groups to train 
and support women, and to enable them to 
advance collective action in different areas of 
their lives, including by developing economies 
of scale in small businesses.5 Practitioners 
could also facilitate links between refugees 
engaging in gig work and labour unions. 
This would raise unions’ awareness of the 
experiences of workers as the gig economy 
emerges, so that they can amplify gig 
workers’ voices and advocate on their behalf. 
Exploring cooperative models: In a recent 
precedent, the Jordanian government has 
permitted agricultural cooperatives to apply 
for Syrian refugee work permits, acting as the 
‘employer’ and handling their paperwork. 
These cooperatives have also supported the 
Ministry of Labour by providing information 
to refugees on the work permit process and 
their rights and entitlement under labour 
laws. Developing platform cooperative models 
with existing women-inclusive cooperatives 
in Jordan and technology company leaders 
could provide an opportunity to harness 
digital technology to expand workers’ 
access to paid work and markets, while 
mitigating some of the challenges posed 
to workers by gig economy models.
Finally, we recommend that practitioners 
support the collection of evidence 
about gig worker experiences in order 
to inform programming (to support 
women’s economic empowerment) and 
advocacy (to raise awareness about worker 
experiences and needs). Taken together, 
these steps could help increase the 
individual capacity of workers to engage 
within the gig economy and – critically – 
improve the conditions of work itself.
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The power of markets: lessons from Uganda
Alison Hemberger, Sasha Muench and Chelsea Purvis
Market-based approaches in northern Uganda demonstrate the benefits of supporting local 
markets instead of distributing in-kind aid.
Markets help crisis-affected populations 
access goods, services and economic 
opportunities that are critical to meeting 
their basic needs and supporting their 
livelihoods. Nevertheless, many aid 
organisations continue to provide in-kind 
assistance in areas where markets are 
functional. This may help in the short term 
but it sidesteps, and often undermines, 
markets’ short- and long-term roles in 
coping and recovery. This is particularly 
relevant in protracted refugee crises.  
Northern Uganda is one such context, 
where nearly one million refugees who 
have fled South Sudan’s conflict currently 
live. Refugee settlements have developed 
in this area previously, and the most 
recently arrived refugees are expected to 
remain in the West Nile region for many 
years. Recognising this, the Government 
of Uganda and the UN Refugee Agency, 
UNHCR, have called for aid actors to promote 
sustainable livelihoods for the refugees. 
The vast majority of host communities in 
West Nile have historically been reliant on 
subsistence agriculture and, as a result, the 
supporting markets necessary to produce 
and expand commercial agriculture (such as 
of supplies of seed and fertiliser, technical 
advice and sales channels) have remained 
underdeveloped. Yet spending and investment 
by South Sudanese refugees is helping to fuel 
new growth in this underdeveloped economy. 
Refugee investment is also likely to continue 
as refugees begin to establish themselves in 
the settlements. There is thus real potential 
for continued economic growth in ways that 
provide longer-term livelihoods opportunities 
for both refugees and host communities. 
However, while aid organisations and 
donors have made commitments to transition 
to an increasingly cash-based response, 
nearly all households in West Nile’s Bidi 
Bidi and Palorinya settlements still receive 
in-kind food assistance (such as cereals, 
beans and cooking oil). Households sell the 
excess to buy goods they need more in local 
marketplaces, undermining the market’s 
ability to provide food to local populations 
and reducing farmers’ incentive to grow 
crops for sale. One trader in Yumbe (the 
nearest town to Bidi Bidi settlement) notes 
that, prior to the refugee response, 10 large 
traders used to bring in cereals to the local 
market. Since aid distributions have started 
only one of them remains, while the others 
have shifted to other types of businesses. 
By providing seeds and tools, aid 
organisations also undercut the availability 
of agriculture inputs in local markets. To 
date very few input sellers exist in the West 
Nile settlements; agro-dealers in nearby 
towns say that free distribution of in-kind 
inputs prevents them from expanding 
their sales in the refugee settlements.
Promoting market-driven activities
Cash programming fuels spending and 
investment in West Nile without undercutting 
critical markets but more cash transfers 
alone cannot be a long-term strategy for 
refugee support. Aid organisations need 
to support market-driven activities that 
help households earn an income in the 
longer term. Mercy Corps, Palladium and 
DanChurchAid are working together in West 
Nile to strengthen agricultural markets and 
improve refugees’ participation in them.1 
Their ReHope project2 comprises several 
components. The first involves partnering 
with agro-dealers to help them access 
improved seeds and expand their sales 
networks into settlements, and providing 
marketing support to agro-dealers for the first 
growing season; rather than handing out free 
agricultural inputs to farmers directly, the 
project funded a coupon-based promotion for 
purchase of agro-dealers’ inputs. The second 
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component involves working directly with 
refugee populations to provide advice on 
production and to support land sharing with 
host communities. Finally, the project works 
to attract output buyers and strengthen their 
networks, with the goal of helping refugees to 
increase incomes from the crops they harvest. 
Donors and implementing partners 
can draw several lessons from the early, 
encouraging results of the ReHope project, 
including the need to:
  reduce in-kind food distributions in favour 
of cash transfers where possible, scaling up 
cash transfers gradually, accompanied by 
transparent investments in market analysis 
and learning 
  reduce in-kind distribution of agriculture 
inputs in favour of gradually reduced 
subsidies 
  move to joint funding across humanitarian 
and development portfolios and increase 
project timeframes, in order to enable 
aid organisations to more effectively 
strengthen market opportunities for 
refugees facing multi-year displacement 
  encourage investments that strengthen the 
capacity of local market actors on whom 
refugees and host communities rely for 
their livelihoods 
  capture learning about market systems 
for current and future refugee responses 
in West Nile and provide feedback on the 
successes and challenges of market-driven 
approaches and the inter-related impacts 
on refugees and host communities. 
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1. See Mercy Corps (2017) Refugee Markets Brief: The power of 
markets to support refugee economic opportunities in West Nile, Uganda 
http://bit.ly/MercyCorps-RefugeeMarkets2017 
2. Funded by the UK government.
Livelihoods programming and its influence on 
secondary migration
Richard Mallett, Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Clare Cummings and Nassim Majidi
Improving access to work, as well as livelihoods programming itself, is required if the lives 
and livelihoods of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia are to improve. 
In search of greater freedoms and 
opportunities, thousands of Eritreans have 
fled their country in recent years – many 
directly across the border to Ethiopia. 
One estimate by the UN Refugee Agency, 
UNHCR, in 2016 put the number of registered 
Eritrean refugees residing in Ethiopia at 
nearly 800,000. But for many the journey 
does not stop there. Secondary migration 
of Eritreans from Ethiopia is considerable, 
with some evidence suggesting that as much 
as two thirds of the Eritrean population 
in Ethiopia moved onwards in 2015.1 
Humanitarian organisations have long 
been delivering livelihoods programming 
in Ethiopia’s refugee camps, providing 
capital to help participants establish 
micro-enterprises or equipping them 
with vocational skills in a particular 
sector, such as tailoring or computing, 
and/or basic educational skills such as 
numeracy. Although such interventions 
attempt to achieve humanitarian and 
developmental outcomes (by generating 
improvements in participants’ well-being), 
they are also increasingly justified in the 
name of migration control – and more 
specifically the prevention of onward 
movement. Through 63 interviews with 
Eritreans across three different sites 
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in Ethiopia we examined the extent to 
which these measures actually influence 
the way people plan for their futures.2 
The logics and limits of livelihoods 
programming
Livelihoods programming is an example 
of a policy measure designed to steer 
migration decision making at the individual 
level. Part of the objective of livelihoods 
programming is to prevent movement before 
it occurs, based on the assumption that by 
providing greater economic opportunity 
and security to people living in ‘sending’ 
countries, it is possible to create a viable 
alternative to (primarily irregular) migration. 
It is hoped that the option of migration is 
then seen as relatively less attractive.
With the caveat that our research 
looked only at a sample of certain types of 
programming (mainly lending initiatives 
and vocational training), our evidence 
suggests that while such interventions are 
capable of helping people to meet basic 
needs, there appears to be little meaningful 
effect on more transformative change in 
people’s livelihoods or migration plans.
A number of respondents in Adi Harush 
camp in the north of the country described 
how they had received financial support 
from non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), which they used to start up their 
own micro-enterprises such as small shops 
within the camp or buying and raising 
livestock. Many welcomed this support: 
one man, for example, was now running 
a successful horse and carriage transport 
service, having received an initial loan; 
a single mother told us that her NGO-
funded chicken farm was doing well. 
However, many interviewees also 
discussed the limitations of these 
programmes. Although one woman had 
used her loan to establish a small shop 
within the camp, her main problem was one 
of marketplace saturation, which made it 
hard to make a profit and expand. The point 
here is that although camps form their own 
economies, it is evident that the markets 
within them are often limited, creating little 
opportunity to accumulate reasonable profits. 
We observed a similar pattern for skills 
and vocational training: while respondents 
often expressed gratitude for, and satisfaction 
with, the experience, they reported little 
significant or long-term impact. Our research 
points to refugees being unable to put 
newly acquired skills to use in their wider 
environment, primarily as a result of existing 
legislation. One man described how he had 
planned to get a driving licence and start 
working as a taxi driver, before hearing 
from the Administration for Refugees and 
Returnee Affairs and from fellow Eritreans 
that he – as a refugee barred from engaging 
in the formal economy – would not be 
allowed to do this. For others, the range of 
training programmes currently available 
are simply not relevant to their interests and 
aspirations, which deters take-up altogether. 
Ultimately, these forms of livelihoods 
support are addressing the symptoms 
rather than the underlying structures of 
poverty and economic marginalisation 
facing Eritrean refugees – which are likely 
to be driving the desire among so many for 
secondary migration. In particular, these 
underlying factors include refugees’ lack 
of rights to formal, better paid and higher 
skilled employment. One woman told us: 
“In the Netherlands you can get a job with 
better wages. My husband tells me that 
it is also much better to access the basic 
infrastructure services in the Netherlands 
than in Ethiopia. […] I know it is possible 
to travel to the Netherlands.” Another 
man illustrated what might prevent him 
making a similar onward move: “If I am 
not working, I will run out of patience 
and I may attempt the dangerous move to 
Europe but I hope I can get a job and will 
not need to risk this.” Without meaningful 
improvements in refugees’ access to decent 
work – work that is reliable, adequately paid, 
and makes use of their skills – the support 
provided by livelihoods programming simply 
cannot be expected to reduce secondary 
migration in any significant sense. 
Improving livelihoods programming
To better align livelihoods interventions with 
both the intended beneficiaries’ needs and 
53
FM
R
 5
8
June 2018 www.fmreview.org/economies
Economies
the dynamics of the local context, efforts 
should be made to (re)evaluate the local 
relevance of the training that is offered and to 
expand the types of work in which refugees 
can participate. Further to this, more could 
be done to provide ongoing mentoring and 
supervision for those refugees who have 
received loans and training, to help them 
maximise their potential gains. At the 
same time, however, NGO programme staff 
told us that administering effective long-
term programming is difficult precisely 
because of the nature of the implementing 
environment. In a context of high secondary 
migration, interventions are intentionally 
designed to be quick and simple, purely to 
encourage enrolment; this limits innovation 
space and encourages inflexibility, thus 
placing obvious constraints on those 
responsible for design and implementation.
Putting questions of programming 
to one side, refugees’ ability to build 
successful, dignified lives will largely 
hinge on their capacity to access decent 
work. This is fundamental, underpinning 
both the challenge of survival in Ethiopia, 
as well as the resolve (formed by many) to 
move on. Although there are no guarantees 
that livelihood security automatically 
follows from moving into the formal labour 
market (particularly in urban contexts 
of generalised high unemployment), our 
findings suggest that people may become 
more inclined to remain as a result of 
improved access to better forms of work.  
Government steps
Recent policy developments suggest that 
Ethiopia is shifting its stance on the right to 
work. In September 2016, the government 
announced nine pledges to improve the 
rights of, and services available to, refugees 
in the country. These pledges have now 
been developed into a national ‘roadmap’ 
with six thematic priorities; one of these is 
work and livelihoods, which will include 
work permits for refugees, an increase in 
livelihoods programming and the creation 
of industrial parks. These parks are a key 
element of the Ethiopian Jobs Compact 
which was officially rolled out in December 
2017 – a US$500 million agreement between 
the Ethiopian government and external 
donors to create 100,000 new jobs (roughly 
one-third of which will be allocated 
to refugees).3 Such initiatives, already 
implemented in some major refugee-hosting 
countries such as Jordan, are designed to 
improve access to work for both refugees 
and members of the host community. 
Based on our research, this seems 
a positive step in the right direction. 
However, much of the success of both the 
roadmap and the compact will ultimately 
depend on the detail of their design and 
implementation. To that end, we offer 
five suggestions to policymakers:
First, information about any initiative 
must be transparent, clear and accessible 
in order for refugees to make informed 
decisions about their options. Not only 
should potential participants be made 
fully aware of eligibility criteria but they 
should also be provided with information 
about what to expect regarding the terms, 
nature and returns of the work on offer. 
Second, some refugees may reject jobs in 
industrial parks because the jobs either do not 
align with their backgrounds and interests 
or for reasons of location: recent analysis of 
work provided in special economic zones 
in Jordan, for example, shows that low take-
up among Syrian refugees is often related 
to factory location, with people reluctant to 
take on long journeys or be separated from 
family.4 Take-up will also be influenced by 
the way in which these jobs are perceived 
by those at whom they are targeted: are they 
seen to offer ‘decent’ work, or is the activity 
considered demeaning or exploitative?
Third, the politics of job allocation 
must be anticipated and taken into account. 
Urban unemployment in Ethiopia remains 
high across all groups in society, and 
economic growth has slowed in recent 
years. In a context where significant 
numbers of Ethiopians are also affected 
by poverty and vulnerability, the way in 
which allocation procedures are framed, 
conveyed and implemented is likely to 
affect the nature of social relations between 
‘host’ and ‘refugee’ communities.
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The shortcomings of employment as a durable 
solution 
Nora Bardelli 
The refugee assistance regime that prevails today seems to insist that the best, or only, 
solution to protracted refugee situations is firmly rooted in improving access to employment. 
This approach, however, inevitably favours some and excludes others, while also ignoring the 
deeper political and social issues at stake.
Labour and capital investment are 
increasingly seen as the solution to 
protracted refugee situations. Aid agencies 
expect forced migrants to be good 
entrepreneurs and to become self-reliant 
by finding jobs and/or starting businesses. 
This puts the responsibility of ‘succeeding’ 
firmly on the refugees’ shoulders. While 
this is not an official durable solution 
(yet), local integration (which is) is 
increasingly understood to mean being 
able to participate in economic activity.  
I am not questioning the desires and 
aspirations of refugees to become self-
sufficient, nor the need to support refugees to 
access job opportunities, but I am concerned 
by the deeper implications of this change in 
attitude. The “need for individuals to help 
themselves rather than relying on the State”1 
is promoted by two principal tendencies in 
contemporary humanitarianism: first, by the 
increasing emphasis that the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) and other agencies put 
on economic livelihoods programmes and 
economic self-reliance and, second, by 
the growth of public-private partnerships 
in refugee assistance programmes. 
This imposes on refugees the 
responsibility to create their own durable 
solution through employment. Within this 
framework, the official durable solutions 
– which are all based on the idea of re-
creating someone’s link with the State and 
the possibility of citizenship – become 
out-dated. The solution to displacement 
is now re-defined in developmental 
Fourth, refugee policies should be 
consistent with the realities of local labour 
markets. With widespread informal 
employment in Ethiopia, attempts to 
formalise refugee employment might be 
challenging. The feasibility and future 
sustainability of industrial parks thus need 
to be carefully considered in light of the 
country’s broader economic environment.
Finally, rather than focusing exclusively 
on quotas and number of work permits 
issued, pledges and related monitoring 
mechanisms should consider the extent to 
which policies and interventions – such as the 
Jobs Compact – are actually improving the 
lives and livelihoods of refugees and hosts.
Richard Mallett r.mallett@odi.org   
Research Associate
Jessica Hagen-Zanker j.hagen-zanker@odi.org 
Senior Research Fellow
Clare Cummings c.cummings@odi.org 
Research Fellow 
Overseas Development Institute www.odi.org 
Nassim Majidi nassim.majidi@samuelhall.org 
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1. Amnesty International (2016) Tackling the global refugee crisis: 
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www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol40/4905/2016/en/ 
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Sturge G, Schaefer K and Vidal P (2017) Journeys on hold: How 
policy influences the migration decisions of Eritreans in Ethiopia ODI 
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55
FM
R
 5
8
June 2018 www.fmreview.org/economies
Economies
terms and made into an economic issue 
rather than a political and social one. 
This approach to refugee assistance and 
protection also ends up homogenising people 
and excluding those who cannot fulfil the 
‘entry requirements’. Of course, cash-based 
interventions and support to enter the job 
market (although most jobs in the informal 
market are not classified as employment by 
international agencies) seem more dignifying 
ways of providing aid than delivering 
purely material assistance in that they give 
refugees a choice, but this only helps some 
of the many. A wide variety of reasons – 
whether linked to personal situations and 
experiences or structural unemployment 
– can prevent a person from working. 
Depoliticising refugee protection
The shift of responsibility in ‘succeeding’ 
in one’s refugeehood is already perceptible 
in Burkina Faso, where I have conducted 
ethnographic research with Malian 
urban refugees in Bobo-Dioulasso. 
Aminata, a Malian refugee of around 80 
years of age, who had physical disabilities and 
was in frail health, shared her house with her 
granddaughter. Aminata was categorised as 
a vulnerable refugee by UNHCR, as was her 
granddaughter, being a minor living with 
an old and ill grandmother. They received 
food and cash assistance nearly every month 
for three and half years but in January 2016 
the assistance stopped. UNHCR and WFP 
Burkina Faso, who provided this assistance, 
cited lack of funding and the fact that 
assistance does not need to be provided for 
urban refugees but can be provided if there 
is sufficient funding and willingness. When 
the decision to stop the assistance was taken, 
agency representatives promised that it would 
still be provided to those refugees categorised 
as vulnerable. Despite this promise, Aminata 
and her granddaughter did not receive any 
further support. At her age and with her 
caring responsibilities, how was she supposed 
to take advantage of “all the opportunities 
refugees have in cities” (a widely held view, 
repeated to me by various humanitarian 
actors when discussing the help that never 
came)? It is generally thought that urban 
refugees, even those qualified as vulnerable, 
are surrounded by job opportunities – 
especially in a place like Burkina Faso where 
Malians have the right to work – or that they 
have someone in their close network who will 
have a job and thus be able to support them.
Many studies exist that discuss why an 
idea of development as economic growth, 
in all its forms, cannot work, particularly 
in the long term, serving rather to favour 
some and exclude and marginalise others.2 
The ‘refugee problem’ has become a matter 
of access to the job market rather than 
a political question about inequalities, 
exclusion, conflict, exploitation, asymmetrical 
power relations, and so on. The human, 
social and political issues are replaced by 
market solutions. This depoliticised vision 
constructs refugees’ hardships as being 
due to a lack of access to jobs and does not 
in any way address how and why people 
have become refugees in the first place. 
For well over two decades, forced 
migration and refugee studies have 
questioned the ‘refugee’ category and how 
those thus labelled are represented and 
portrayed, in order to highlight the impact 
on refugees’ lives of labels, representations 
and language – and the practices and policies 
that derive from such discourses. Today, there 
is a tendency for many researchers to focus 
on showing how refugees have economic 
agency, or on providing data on how to 
support them in their economic livelihoods. 
What seems to be seen as less important 
now – and yet what is surely still vital – is 
what this means in terms of protection and 
what impact such neoliberal discourses 
and practices have on refugees’ lives.
Nora Bardelli nora.bardelli@qeh.ox.ac.uk 
DPhil candidate,3 Oxford Department of 
International Development, University of Oxford 
www.qeh.ox.ac.uk 
1. Scott-Smith T (2016) ‘Humanitarian neophilia: the ‘innovation 
turn’ and its implications’, Third World Quarterly 37(12), p2238 
http://tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2016.1176856 
2. See for example Rist G (2014) The History of Development: From 
Western Origins to Global Faith  
http://bit.ly/Rist-G-Development-2014 
3. Doc.Mobility fellow, Swiss National Science Foundation.
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Refugee-led social protection: reconceiving refugee 
assistance
Evan Easton-Calabria and Kate Pincock
The help and assistance that refugees offer each other is central to the lives of many 
displaced people. Recognising this allows support for displaced people to be reconceived in 
more sustaining and empowering ways.
‘Social protection’ commonly refers to 
programmes and policies that aim to reduce 
the poverty, vulnerability and risks that 
populations can face. These were traditionally 
state-led initiatives. The term, however, has 
also recently become common in international 
development where international actors strive 
to alleviate poverty both in collaboration 
with and in the absence of States. 
Social protection for refugees also includes 
refugee communities’ own efforts to support 
themselves. Our research in Uganda and 
Kenya1 reveals the ways in which refugees are 
working to support, protect, advocate for and 
transform the prospects of their communities. 
This assistance, which we term ‘refugee-
led social protection’, includes activities to 
address vulnerability, such as providing 
food, shelter, education and health care, but 
also involves advocacy and the resulting 
transformation of local and international 
structures, such as laws and humanitarian 
systems, which may hinder rather than 
enable refugees’ access to such provisions.
Refugee-led social protection 
Humanitarian actors usually assume social 
protection in both Kenya and Uganda to 
fall entirely under the remit of government 
initiatives, social enterprises and civil 
society actors. This assumption is deeply 
problematic and driven by a now debunked 
perception of refugees as passive recipients 
of assistance. Despite the increasing 
emphasis in refugee research and policy 
making on recognition and affirmation 
of refugee agency, refugee-led social 
protection remains inadequately explored by 
academics, policymakers and practitioners.  
Refugees in urban areas are not provided 
with basic necessities such as food and shelter 
and instead must find ways to become self-
reliant. However, competition within local 
economies, discrimination, a lack of access 
to work permits and limited or non-existent 
recognition of foreign qualifications can 
make the pursuit of an individualised form of 
‘self-reliance’ extremely challenging. Formal 
and informal groups and organisations, led 
by refugees, offer ways for fellow refugees 
to draw upon and contribute to networks 
of assistance beyond the limited means 
of UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency) and 
and its partners. Our research in Kenya 
and Uganda has found that these support 
systems may be organised along tribal, 
ethnic or national lines of solidarity, 
as shown by organisations such as the 
Community of Banyamulenge in Nairobi 
and the Somali Community Association in 
Kampala, or can be religious in origin, with 
mosques and churches across both cities 
holding collections for refugee families. 
In addition to less structured religious 
and cultural support are formal and informal 
community-based organisations established 
by refugees. These organisations take a 
variety of forms, and some are interlinked 
with the informal religious and cultural 
support networks described above. In 
Nairobi, refugee-led social businesses such 
as L’Afrikana train both refugees and locals 
in arts and tailoring, and reinvest profits 
from sales of their products into projects 
to support vulnerable children from both 
local and refugee communities with school 
fees. URISE in Kampala similarly provides 
training for young people, including in 
graphic design, t-shirt printing, music, 
videography and computer literacy, with 
the aim of equipping them with the skills 
to support themselves and build a better 
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future. Other groups such as RefugeeCare 
in Nairobi focus on distributing food and 
clothing to refugees in need. Others still, like 
Kobciye in Nairobi and Hope for Refugees 
in Action in Kampala, operate savings and 
loan cooperatives and business training 
programmes to enable members to start 
their own income-generating schemes. 
Groups such as Tawakal and Save World 
Trust in Nairobi provide counselling and 
trauma services to refugees, for whom 
overcoming trauma and coping with 
mental health issues is a huge challenge. 
Other work focuses on political activism; 
displaced South Sudanese activists work 
across Kampala and Nairobi to coordinate 
peace-building activities back in their home 
country, and the Federation of Congolese 
Abroad seeks to change the image of the 
country and advocate for an end to war. 
These activities constitute social protection 
beyond the individual scale, as improving 
the security of countries of origin enables 
refugees to repatriate, and peacebuilding and 
advocacy efforts often focus on the building 
or rebuilding of national social services. 
Even within camps and settlements (where 
formal assistance is more readily available 
and more easily accessible), refugees also find 
their own ways of supporting themselves 
and their communities. One community 
organisation in Nakivale settlement draws 
on the professional skills of a doctor and a 
lawyer, both refugees, and treats lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) 
individuals in their own homes at night to 
help them avoid stigmatisation at the camp 
clinic. As homosexuality is illegal in Uganda 
and the camp clinic is staffed by Ugandans, 
LGBTI people risk discrimination and 
even persecution if they are identified; this 
community organisation therefore fills an 
important gap in assistance to a marginalised 
refugee group. Wakati Foundation trains 
otherwise inactive young men in construction 
to assist with building homes for vulnerable 
families who would otherwise have to sleep 
under plastic sheets. And informal Somali 
women’s groups welcome new arrivals and 
offer food, shelter and kindness to those who 
arrive when UNHCR’s offices are closed.
Many refugees told us that official 
providers of assistance are usually their 
last port of call when they need help. Both 
in Kenya and Uganda, agencies’ huge 
caseloads deter refugees from seeking 
officially provided services; refugees also 
have concerns about corruption. The 
impersonality and lack of real investment in 
refugee futures that respondents associated 
with these services were also described as 
major factors influencing their preference 
for smaller, local groups. There refugees 
receive help from people they know, 
which often fosters a relationship that goes 
beyond that of benefactor and recipient. 
Improving support for refugee-led social 
protection
Some refugee-led social protection efforts 
are backed by funding from international 
actors; since 2009, for example, UNHCR has 
used its Social Protection Fund to offer small 
grants to projects that refugees conceive and 
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These young Burundian refugees in Kashojwa village, Uganda, belong to the Talented Orphan Refugees’ Association. “We learn English, 
we make baskets and hats, we sing together, we play sports together, we’re a family now. We sell what we make and share the money 
with everyone. In Kirundi, there is a proverb that says ‘If we work together, we can improve all our lives.’”
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implement themselves – so-called refugee 
self-help projects. Non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) working with refugee 
communities have often been criticised for 
having a simplistic understanding of these 
communities that is divorced from wider 
historical, regional and national contexts. 
By better understanding the contexts within 
which refugee-led social protection takes 
place, the conditions under which external 
actors can most effectively support or partner 
with refugees themselves become clearer. 
A major challenge reported by many of 
the groups described here is their lack of 
access to partnerships with more powerful 
actors, whose funding and training can offer 
the groups opportunities to grow, increase 
impact and become more sustainable. 
Forming partnerships rather than inviting 
refugees to participate as implementers or 
mobilisers for pre-defined programmes 
means refugee-led social protection actors can 
retain those characteristics that make them 
better positioned to reach poor communities. 
As well as understanding when and 
where partnership is likely to be empowering, 
it is important to note that establishing a 
transformative social protection agenda 
– that is, one that not only goes beyond 
protecting people against the risks associated 
with being poor but also addresses the 
structural causes of poverty – requires 
cohesive action. This need for solidarity can 
be seen through the building of consortia 
of refugee-led organisations. Together 
they can work for common causes and, in 
principle, networks can be a way to share 
expertise and knowledge and ‘raise up’ less 
established organisations. Strengthening 
networks can make refugee-led organisations 
more visible and formalised, and can create 
avenues for advocacy. However, while such 
efforts to promote solidarity in Kampala and 
Nairobi are underway, strategic cohesion 
is difficult in part because of distrust. 
UNHCR’s implementing and operational 
partners are suspected by refugees of co-
opting the ideas of refugee-led organisations, 
which can do little to stop it. This makes 
refugee-led organisations less inclined 
to reach out to national and international 
organisations from which they in theory 
might receive funding or other assistance. 
In addition to contributing to the silos in 
which refugee-led organisations often work, 
this distrust precludes opportunities for 
awareness-raising about the existence of 
this important type of social protection.
There is also a risk that international 
organisations see refugee-led social protection 
activities as a means of economising by 
shifting work onto other organisations (even 
those that are under-resourced), with the 
resulting risk that the quality of assistance 
declines. International organisations 
and local partners must remain aware of 
the inequalities between different forms 
of organisational assistance and take 
steps to ensure that refugees’ vital work 
is properly supported and valued. 
Our research challenges the idea that 
refugee-led organisations are fringe actors; 
rather, they are central to the lives of many 
displaced people. The role of refugees in 
providing not only community-based safety 
nets but also genuine opportunities for change 
in the positioning of refugee communities 
as assistance actors cannot be understated. 
However, the effectiveness of refugee-led 
social protection is only assured if it continues 
to be driven by refugees themselves, given 
that they are best placed to understand these 
needs. Those looking to partner with refugee-
led organisations must preserve and value 
refugees’ proximity to those they seek to help, 
or else risk losing what makes them such 
important actors within the international 
humanitarian system in the first place.
Evan Easton-Calabria 
evan.easton-calabria@qeh.ox.ac.uk  
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Kate Pincock kate.pincock@qeh.ox.ac.uk 
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International Development, University of Oxford 
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1. ‘The Global Governed? Refugees as Providers of Protection and 
Assistance’ is a two-year ESRC-AHRC funded project which aims 
to document and understand the activities of over 60 refugee-led 
initiatives across urban areas (Nairobi and Kampala), settlements 
(Nakivale) and camps (Kakuma). The project is led by Principal 
Investigator Professor Alexander Betts.
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Refugee paralegals
Musenga Tshimankinda Christian  
Refugees in Kenya face multiple barriers to accessing their rights. The work of paralegals who 
are themselves refugees and who support and facilitate refugees’ access to justice offers a 
vital service that many NGOs, whose scope and budgets are limited, insufficiently provide.
Refugees in Kenya face multiple challenges. 
In addition to the long process of recognition 
or rejection of refugee status, these challenges 
include lack of access to documentation and 
services – including refugee registration 
processes, business and work permits, 
student pass, bank accounts, social security 
numbers, travel documentation and mobile 
communication. Refugees also experience 
difficulties relating to police harassment, 
a general lack of knowledge of refugee 
issues, negative and discriminatory attitudes 
from local populations and barriers to 
foreign qualifications recognition. 
In order to address this, some refugees 
in Nairobi have been trained by the non-
governmental organisation (NGO) Kituo 
Cha Sheria, supported by the UN Refugee 
Agency (UNHCR) and the UN Migration 
Agency (IOM), as paralegals to support fellow 
refugees. A paralegal is someone who has 
either a basic legal training or more extensive 
practical legal experience, who provides legal 
assistance to facilitate access to rights and 
justice. Their work is generally supervised by 
a lawyer, law office or any legal institution.
Refugee paralegals sensitise refugee 
groups and public authorities on refugee 
rights through forums, workshops, training 
and conferences and also contribute to the 
capacity building programme of authorities 
to appropriately handle refugee cases, 
including how they conduct, stop, arrest and 
detain forced migrants and on how refugee 
documents should be issued and verified. 
They also contribute to awareness-raising 
activities for government representatives to 
improve their knowledge of refugee issues.
Refugee paralegals also work to empower 
the refugee community by providing 
guidance on their rights and obligations, 
including how to react when stopped, 
arrested or detained and how to approach 
authorities on matters of documentation. 
They provide refugees and asylum seekers 
with information regarding their asylum 
application and their refugee status, offering 
advice on their cases, making referrals and 
following up on cases. They advocate for 
the release of arrested refugees, asylum 
seekers and other forced migrants at police 
stations, prisons and places of detention, and 
accompany refugees on visits to organisations 
and institutions to seek assistance on 
various social issues (for example, to police 
stations in order to report crimes).
As a lawyer, I have a legal background 
and therefore have an obligation to help my 
community, so I became a refugee paralegal. 
Refugee paralegals are able to undertake 
work that large international NGOs have 
difficulty with or do not undertake due to 
their budget limitations and the scope of their 
work. For example, I am able to intervene 
in refugee cases (especially arrest and 
harassment cases) at any time of the day or 
night, including on weekends and holidays; 
large organisations only intervene during 
their hours and days of work. We also advise, 
refer and follow up on cases, giving feedback 
to refugees, which means they do not have 
to pay the costs of transportation to these 
NGOs, whose offices are all far from where 
refugees live. Importantly, refugee paralegals 
are based where refugees live. We deal with 
refugees on a daily basis as the majority 
of us are also refugees and live as part of 
the refugee community. In the community 
where I live and work we have established 
a forum where refugees can share their 
own ideas on legal and livelihoods issues.  
In the course of my work as a refugee 
paralegal I have assisted many refugees. 
One Congolese refugee, who was conducting 
business without a business permit, was 
arrested for being in Nairobi unlawfully. 
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Kobciye: empowering Somali refugees in Nairobi
Afrah Hassan
Established by a resettled Somali refugee and now under the leadership of his children, 
Kobciye resource centre works to empower Somali refugees in Eastleigh, Nairobi.
In the early 1990s my father was one of 
millions of refugees fleeing the civil conflict 
engulfing Somalia. Relative to many others 
he was lucky – he was educated and able to 
secure scholarship opportunities in the United 
States, where he was resettled. From there he 
worked to bring over his still young family 
and to eventually settle in Toronto, Canada. 
Escaping a violent conflict and settling into a 
new community sparked my father’s passion 
to help his native community. It began in 
1993, when he helped the new wave of Somali 
refugees who were arriving in Toronto having 
escaped war, and it continues today with 
Kobciye, a community resource centre in the 
Eastleigh neighbourhood of Nairobi, Kenya, 
which he established. In the intervening 
years, and in spite of the challenges of 
keeping the organisation going, Kobciye has 
continued to grow. Its success is built on its 
engagement with the community and ability 
to gain legitimacy and trust within Eastleigh.
Kobciye, which means ‘empowerment’ 
in Somali, is a resource centre that 
assists vulnerable individuals (including 
undocumented refugees) within the Eastleigh 
community, and provides skills trainings 
such as basic computer literacy, sewing and 
tailoring and other programmes. Kobciye 
aims to equip individuals with relevant 
skills that will build their capacities and lead 
to further opportunities. The organisation 
identifies the needs of the community 
through broad consultations with community 
stakeholders; this includes organising 
sustained engagement events and working 
with established community partners. 
After my father’s death in 2012, my sister 
and I returned to Nairobi to try to carry 
on his legacy. Having settled in Canada as 
He had previously been refused a business 
permit by the local authorities because 
they felt he lacked adequate identification. 
I advocated for his release by proving 
that his registration papers (from both the 
government and UNHCR) were issued to him 
in Nairobi, thereby giving him the right to live 
there. Following his release I also assisted him 
to obtain a business permit so that he could 
continue to do business lawfully in Nairobi. 
I also helped a Somali refugee who was 
living in Dadaab refugee camp by advocating 
on her behalf with the Refugee Affairs 
Secretariat (RAS) in Nairobi when she was 
dealing with logistically complex demands for 
paperwork during the process of preparing to 
join her mother, who had been resettled in the 
United States. My intervention on her behalf, 
which included accompanying her to the RAS 
office, helped to avoid a delay in the process.   
There are still important steps that need 
to be taken to make life legally secure for 
refugees in Nairobi. Refugee paralegals 
are currently lobbying the Government 
of Kenya to apply all the provisions of the 
Refugee Act 2006 to ensure refugees receive 
full protection in Kenya. We must also 
advocate for the government to facilitate local 
integration, opening doors to make refugees 
feel welcomed and safe, since many cannot 
return to their countries and their chances 
of resettlement are low. One way of doing 
this would be by establishing a permanent 
awareness-raising programme for police 
and other public administration officers 
in order to build their capacity to handle 
refugee cases. Both refugees and government 
authorities must know refugees’ rights and 
have the power and knowledge to advocate 
for them. Refugee paralegals in Nairobi 
are working to make sure this happens.
Musenga Tshimankinda Christian 
laface.musenga07@gmail.com 
Refugee paralegal, Nairobi
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refugees when very young, we had grown up 
in a completely different country, culture and 
community and we were initially taken aback 
by the sheer demand and impact that Kobciye 
was generating in Eastleigh. Although we 
were always aware of the challenges facing 
Somali refugees, particularly those in Kenya, 
truly understanding the circumstances of 
urban refugees was a profound learning 
process. Learning how to effectively create 
programming that accounts for and responds 
to the needs of the diverse local refugee 
population was a large part of this learning 
process. Eastleigh is a dynamic community 
of individuals of varying backgrounds, all 
tightly packed within a dense urban area. 
Adapting to the needs of the community and 
personally building trust and legitimacy 
while building on the legacy of our father  
was all part of learning on the job.
Integrating ourselves into the community 
and acquainting ourselves with the issues that 
individuals care about has helped Kobciye to 
continue to develop. Our own experiences as 
part of a family of first-generation immigrants 
gave us a unique insight into how we can 
cultivate new programming and community 
engagement. Some of the transitional 
challenges that refugees face in Canada 
are comparable to those faced by refugees 
in Eastleigh, whether that be accessing 
resources or navigating the legal frameworks 
that govern their existence. Drawing these 
parallels between our experiences and those 
of refugees in Eastleigh has 
helped us focus both our 
programmes and how we 
position ourselves within 
the overall community. 
Appropriate programming
Alongside being a 
renowned regional 
business hub, Eastleigh 
is also the destination of 
thousands of refugees 
who are looking for a long-
term home or to relocate 
to other (particularly 
Western) countries. Many 
individuals have set up 
thriving businesses and integrated fairly well 
within the local community; others struggle, 
particularly outside the infrastructure of a 
formal refugee camp. Understanding these 
factors has helped us create a framework 
where we understand vulnerabilities and 
respond by targeting individuals who will 
benefit most from our programmes.  
With formal education rates lower in 
Eastleigh than in neighbouring communities, 
we focus on equipping our members with 
tangible and applicable skills, including in 
computer literacy, sewing and tailoring and 
basic financial literacy. For example, our 
computer literacy programme aims to give 
students a basic knowledge of computer 
functions, on which they can build with 
further training. We also provide a sewing 
and tailoring programme that complements 
Eastleigh’s thriving textiles business, and 
which can be a transition point for potential 
employment opportunities within the local 
community. Over the course of the last eight 
years of reliable and consistent programming, 
Kobciye has provided vocational skills 
training to hundreds of Somalis.
There has long been a negative perception 
of the Somali refugee population in Eastleigh,1 
and in 2014 tension peaked with the police 
crackdown known as Usalama Watch. This 
presented a significant challenge to our 
organisation. We responded by moving 
from empowerment and skills training to 
advocacy and awareness raising in order 
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Weekly seminar, run by Kobciye.
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to create a dialogue to combat some of the 
negative perceptions and stereotypes created 
by the police and security offensive. We 
held forums where discussions were held 
with local authorities and political offices, 
arranged rallies condemning police brutality 
and promoting cohesion, and organised 
cultural exhibitions that highlighted the 
contributions of each community within 
our immediate region. We also produced 
literature that aimed to counter some of the 
negative narratives that have surrounded 
the urban refugee population, particularly 
Somalis. Although today the tension has 
largely receded, there remains social stigma 
around the urban refugee population that 
is still being contested and negotiated 
within the Eastleigh community. 
Kobciye’s impact in the community has 
continued to grow, with my father’s vision 
serving as a roadmap for our progress 
and evolution. I am immensely proud and 
fortunate to be able to lead this organisation, 
helping the community from which I came 
and enjoying the continued support of 
the community which Kobciye serves. 
Afrah Hassan afrah.abdullahih@gmail.com 
Director, Kobciye www.kobciye.org 
1. See Carrier N (2017) ‘What Can We Learn From the “Little 
Mogadishu” Migrant Hub?’ Refugees Deeply  
http://bit.ly/Carrier-RefDeeply-Eastleigh 
Syrian refugee-led organisations in Berlin
Jennifer Wood, Evan Easton-Calabria and Yahya Alaous 
Many of the approximately 50,000 Syrian refugees living in Berlin continue to depend largely 
on State assistance; some refugees have also created and found additional support in 
active, vibrant community initiatives.
Refugees in Germany receive considerable 
State support. Those whose asylum 
applications are accepted are assigned to a 
local city or town, gain temporary residency 
and begin the integration process. Although 
new arrivals in 2015 were initially housed 
in school gyms and other emergency 
shelters, there are now longer-term refugee 
hostels and continuing efforts to help 
refugees find apartments of their own. 
Once residency has been established or 
looks likely, refugees attend an integration 
course to learn the language and culture, and 
have their first meeting at a job centre to learn 
about employment prospects. Unemployed 
refugees receive a monthly sum to cover living 
costs. Refugees receive support from the 
municipality with local orientation, logistics 
such as transportation and medical resources, 
and access to organisations and clubs. 
However, finding a job without recognised 
qualifications or German language skills is 
difficult; so too is finding decent housing 
– already an acute problem in Berlin for 
low-income earners, even before taking into 
consideration the needs of refugee families.
Despite the wide-ranging support 
provided by State agencies, gaps in services 
exist and, in many cases, unmet needs are 
addressed by grassroots initiatives found 
across the country. Hundreds of projects, 
networks and organisations exist, almost 
all of which have formed since 2015.
Initially, grassroots support by Syrians 
in Berlin mainly took the form of helping 
refugees to access emergency assistance and 
navigate Germany’s asylum and registration 
bureaucracy. In the early days of high 
numbers of refugee arrivals, for instance, 
groups of Syrian refugees – often recent 
arrivals themselves – positioned themselves 
at main train stations in Germany, equipping 
newcomers with maps, directions and advice 
about registering and finding shelter. 
However, in the last three years there has 
been a shift from providing logistical and 
day-to-day assistance to offering cultural, 
community and creative support that 
meets refugees’ psychological, emotional 
and personal needs. In many cases, these 
refugee-led efforts are now registered German 
organisations. Over 75 Syrian assistance 
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organisations exist in Germany,1 and our 
research2 identified 10 in Berlin alone. 
The Salaam Culture and Sport Club 
(Salaamkulturklub) is one such example. 
The club was founded by four Syrians – an 
academic, judge, journalist and interpreter 
– who recognised that Syrian refugees 
desperately needed translation and other 
logistical support in order to register as 
refugees, apply for jobs and learn about 
Germany’s complex administrative and 
educational systems. The club also offered 
free overnight accommodation at the height 
of refugee arrivals in 2015 so that people 
could join the long queue at the nearby 
registration office the following morning.
Over the last few years, Salaam’s 
assistance activities have both formalised 
and broadened. Advice is provided in the 
form of weekly presentations on different 
themes, such as how to search for and apply 
for a job, or how to register children in 
school. There is also a monthly presentation 
highlighting ‘success stories’ by refugees who 
have accomplished something in Berlin, be it 
securing employment or achieving a higher 
German language level. The club also now 
offers a café to promote intercultural exchange 
and a range of other support, including 
language practice, sport and leisure activities 
(including for refugees with disabilities) 
and intercultural and creative projects. 
Differing aims
One of the most established Syrian cultural 
organisations in Berlin is Mada,3 housed in 
the cultural community centre Ulme 35 in a 
quiet part of former West Berlin. The cultural 
centre provides office and event space and the 
opportunity for collaborations with German 
artists and activists. Mada was founded by 
Safi, a Syrian refugee, and focuses on dialogue, 
art, culture and community by offering a 
cultural programme of lectures, theatre, 
films, readings and art exhibitions. There are 
events almost every day, including German 
language training and events for children and 
families, and many activities are intended for 
both Syrian and non-Syrian participants. 
The idea behind establishing Mada arose 
in reaction to other Syrian cultural groups 
in Berlin which were more conservative, as 
Safi felt that Syrian culture as he understood 
it was not being adequately represented or 
experienced through them. This reveals 
a division that is more widely evident 
among Syrian refugee-led organisations in 
Berlin: some aim to reinforce conservative 
forms of Syrian culture, religion and law 
while others aim to use Syrian culture to 
promote Syrian integration and the social 
cohesion of Syrians and Germans.
Another significant refugee-led 
cultural initiative is Berlin’s first Arabic 
library: Baynetna, meaning ‘between us’.4 
Staffed by a team of committed volunteers, 
the library offers Arabic books to local 
readers, and promotes learning for Germans 
and ‘Westerners’ about Arabic culture and 
literature. Maher, a publisher and refugee from 
Syria, and Baynetna’s co-founder, first had 
the idea to create a library in 2016, prompted 
by the lack of Arabic books in Berlin. He 
started the project in rooms at a German 
refugee housing facility which was used 
for learning and community gathering, and 
slowly gathered donated books. The project 
also hosts regular literary events – often 
featuring both Syrian and German performers 
– and strives to use these as opportunities 
for intercultural exchange and learning. In 
this way, it is “not just a library but a literary 
salon”, according to Dana, another co-founder. 
In February 2018, Berlin’s public library 
offered Baynetna shared space to house the 
library, which is now open to the public four 
days per week. However, books, shelves and 
furniture need to be packed and unpacked 
weekly because the main library still uses the 
space on the other days – a regular reminder 
that this home, too, may be temporary. 
Maher, like many refugees seeking to create 
meaning in their new lives, comes to the 
library every day because it reminds him 
of his former publishing work in Syria. For 
him, books are a powerful tool for facilitating 
the integration of Syrians into Germany.
The success of refugee-led organisations 
and initiatives in Berlin in addressing the 
different needs of refugees stems in part from 
their flexible and adaptable structure. Many 
organisations have over time adjusted their 
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activities based on the skills of volunteers 
and the changing needs and interests of 
participants. While Berlin was once thought 
of as a place of temporary refuge, it has now 
become the beginning of a new life and 
identity for many. Yet the majority of Syrian 
refugee-led organisations in Berlin do not yet 
consider themselves sustainable, as they are 
run largely by volunteers and are dependent 
on donations and other ad hoc sources of 
funding. While this reveals a need for reliable 
funding that will allow them to continue their 
work in the long term, in many ways such 
constraints are inevitable. These refugee-led 
organisations are still new, and the story of 
Syrians in Berlin is still only at the beginning.
Jennifer Wood jenn.m.wood@gmail.com  
Educational consultant and mindfulness trainer, 
Berlin
Evan Easton-Calabria 
Researcher, Refugee Studies Centre and DPhil 
Candidate, Oxford Department of International 
Development, University of Oxford 
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/people/evan-easton-calabria-1
Yahya Alaous yalous@gmail.com 
Independent journalist and columnist, 
Sueddeutsche Zeitung 
1. www.citizensforsyria.org 
2. This research was generously funded by a two-year grant from 
the Toyota Foundation.
3. http://bit.ly/Ulme35 
4. www.baynetna.de 
Refugee-led education in Indonesia 
Thomas Brown
Refugee-led education initiatives in West Java, Indonesia, show how refugee communities 
can work with supporters to overcome service gaps faced in host countries, demonstrating a 
community-led approach to refugee assistance that is empowering and sustainable.  
Indonesia allows asylum seekers and 
refugees to live in the country until they 
can be resettled through the UN Refugee 
Agency, UNHCR, but does not offer any 
legal pathways for them to naturalise, 
and also prohibits them from working 
during their stay. Consequently some 
14,000 asylum seekers and refugees live 
for years in a state of limbo in Indonesia 
while awaiting resettlement, with a lack of 
formal rights and limited access to services 
like education. Faced with the prospect 
of children missing years of schooling 
at a critical stage of their development, 
groups of Afghan Hazara refugees living 
in the Indonesian province of West Java 
have independently initiated a number of 
education centres to serve their community. 
There are more initiatives like this in 
refugee communities across the globe than 
we realise. Providing capacity building and 
guidance to refugee-led initiatives to address 
challenges themselves, rather than simply 
doing it for them, is an approach which 
serves to empower refugees by making 
use of their skills and experiences, while 
also delivering badly needed services in a 
responsive and cost-effective way. After all, 
it is refugees who know best the needs of 
their community and in most cases have the 
skills and experience required to serve them.
Cisarua, a small mountain town in West 
Java, just a few hours drive from Jakarta, has 
in recent years become the home of some 
2,500 asylum seekers and refugees, mostly 
ethnic Hazaras from Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and Iran. Unlike other refugees in Indonesia, 
who are often supported by international 
or local assistance groups, refugees in this 
area live independently in the community, 
largely relying on savings or remittances.
The movement of refugee-led education 
initiatives in Indonesia started in this small 
township with the Cisarua Refugee Learning 
Centre (CRLC), established in August 2014 by 
four Hazara men with media and business 
backgrounds. The project quickly attracted 
the attention of outside supporters from 
Australia, who founded Cisarua Learning 
Limited (CLL), a non-profit group that 
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supports the centre. Following the success of 
the CRLC, two further refugee-led education 
hubs were opened in 2015 by different 
groups of Hazara refugees – the Refugee 
Learning Nest (RLN) and the Refugee 
Learning Centre (RLC). There are now five 
such education centres operating in the area, 
which are independent but all follow the 
same basic model established by CRLC. 
Between them, the five learning centres 
serve approximately 300 children aged 5–16, 
as well as providing English education for 
adult refugees. Each centre is run by refugee 
volunteers, who fulfil administration, 
management and teaching roles. Modest 
fees charged to parents are supplemented by 
donations from benefactor groups or private 
individuals, usually from abroad or from 
expatriate communities living in Indonesia. 
Some of the centres have also formed strong 
relationships with international schools and 
civil society groups in Indonesia. Members 
of the community are often called upon 
to support the schools by lending their 
skills, whether in cleaning, maintenance or 
construction, and community members are 
heavily involved in decision making within 
the schools through regular meetings. 
The curriculum has a distinct focus on 
English since refugees are hopeful they will 
be eventually resettled in an English-speaking 
country or one where it is a 
common lingua franca. Having a 
strong command of English will 
not only enable faster integration 
with a new host community but 
is also perceived to strengthen 
their chances of being accepted 
for resettlement. The use of 
English is also important for 
inclusivity; while most of the 
children, like their teachers, 
are ethnic Hazaras, there are 
also a number of students from 
Iraq, Myanmar and Sudan.
In addition to providing 
vital education for children, 
these centres also support a 
range of additional activities 
that benefit the wider refugee 
community. Depending on 
the skills that refugee volunteers can offer, 
the centres support English classes for 
adults, sports programmes, community-
based health workshops, vocational 
skills-sharing programmes, and arts and 
handicraft classes for women refugees. 
One of the most popular activities in the 
learning centres is football, which is hugely 
popular with both students and teachers. Each 
centre has a coach who runs training sessions 
and matches, which are open to women and 
girls as well as men and boys. These activities 
act as community gatherings for both 
participants and spectators, and the benefit 
of such activities on the mental well-being of 
those involved should not be underestimated.
Besides the learning centres, there are a 
number of other notable refugee-led initiatives 
operating in the Cisarua area. The Refugee 
Women Support Group Indonesia is run 
by a young Hazara woman, and focuses on 
textiles and jewellery making. The group also 
conducts workshops on health (including 
reproductive health) and hygiene, sexual and 
gender-based violence, and family planning. 
The group sells their textile products in 
stalls in Jakarta and Australia through a 
Melbourne-based non-profit organisation. 
Through such refugee-led initiatives 
volunteers are able to put their skills to use 
and make an impact on their community, 
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A young refugee volunteer teaches her students in the Refugee Learning Centre in 
Cisarua, Indonesia.
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while gaining experience that may prove 
useful in securing employment once 
resettled. The learning centres also serve as 
community hubs, acting as much-needed 
places for socialisation and community 
activities. They give structure and hope 
to refugees’ lives, offering social and 
mental health benefits to those living in 
uncertain and difficult circumstances. 
Following these examples in 
Cisarua, in late 2017 a number of similar 
education centres emerged in Jakarta, 
a major urban hub for refugees living 
in the community in Indonesia. 
Supporting grassroots initiatives
The extent of external support provided to 
each of the refugee education centres varies, 
with some receiving ad hoc financial support 
from private donors, and others having more 
structured support that extends to mentoring, 
guidance and capacity development. 
As well as providing financing through 
fundraising efforts, the CLL benefactor 
group supports CRLC by connecting the 
centre’s teachers with trainers and mentors 
via video link and field visits, and has 
provided them with cameras and media 
training, allowing them to document their 
activities and maintain an active social 
media presence. Leaders in the CRLC have 
also been highly effective at engaging local 
and international (in particular, Australian) 
media, and have a high profile in expatriate 
circles in Indonesia, Australia and elsewhere. 
Same Skies, the Swiss-Australian non-
governmental organisation (NGO) that 
supports RLN and RLC, provided start-up 
financing for the centres but now concentrates 
its efforts on building the capacity of refugee 
volunteers to develop the projects so they 
become largely self-sufficient. Same Skies 
volunteers conduct capacity-building 
workshops for school staff, on topics 
including teacher training, child protection, 
financial management, conflict resolution 
and first aid. This has helped the two schools 
improve their overall educational and 
managerial capacity, leading to the provision 
of better services, while also building the 
skills and confidence of the volunteers. 
Same Skies also provides remote 
‘coaching’ through regular video-link 
meetings to identify needs in the centres and 
provide appropriate guidance and support 
to the volunteer team. Providing guidance 
remotely is both cost-effective and a strategic 
choice – it avoids creating a permanent 
physical presence in the community and 
the dependency that can follow. Like CRLC, 
refugee volunteers at RLN and RLC make 
effective use of digital communications 
to engage with other refugees as well as 
foreign audiences. Same Skies has supported 
this by providing capacity development 
and guidance on digital marketing and 
fundraising strategies in order to enhance 
the centres’ independent sustainability. As 
a result, RLC and RLN have been able to 
build an extensive international following 
and leverage it to attract donations through 
online crowd-funding campaigns. 
Multilateral institutions such as UNHCR 
are also getting behind refugee-led models 
of assistance. UNHCR Malaysia’s Social 
Protection Fund initiative supports a range 
of small-scale self-help projects which are 
developed and implemented by refugee 
groups. The fund has supported 320 
projects, including income-generation 
projects, skills-training programmes 
and community service initiatives like 
community centres, sports and recreation 
halls, and day-care and shelters services. 
Refugees who are involved in community 
initiatives like these demonstrate significant 
agency in their ability to come together to 
overcome obstacles they face, challenging 
the perception that they are helpless or in 
need of outside assistance. The refugee-
led education initiatives of West Java, and 
the manner in which non-profit benefactor 
groups support them, show just how effective 
a model of refugee assistance this can be – 
one that empowers and builds resilience by 
utilising and developing the human capital 
that exists within the refugee community. 
Thomas Brown 
Thomas.brown@student.adelaide.edu.au  
Researcher and Indonesia Country Director, 
Same Skies www.sameskies.org
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Lessons from LGBTIQ refugee-led community-based 
organisations
Hester K V Moore
The work of community-based organisations led by and in support of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
trans*, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) refugees in Nairobi, Kenya, provides important insights 
into how humanitarian agencies can form effective partnerships that help to ensure access 
to services for all.
Refugee-led community-based organisations 
(CBOs) have emerged across countries 
of asylum to address various issues 
affecting refugee populations. In Nairobi, 
organisations led by and working on behalf 
of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans*, intersex 
and queer (LGBTIQ)1 refugees are proving 
to be resourceful and promising providers 
of community-based protection. Their 
contributions complement the broader work 
of humanitarian agencies and, at a time of 
financial uncertainty for UNHCR (the UN 
Refugee Agency), they are also avenues of 
alternative, private sector-funded assistance 
for refugee communities. By emphasising 
overall community development, these CBOs 
combine economic activities with pertinent 
legal, psychosocial and medical issues, 
thereby promoting the overall well-being of 
refugee communities and ensuring a holistic 
response to the question of self-reliance. 
Humanitarian agencies can encourage 
and support CBOs’ development through 
external advocacy, building their capacity by 
developing and guiding their organisational 
strategies and the strengthening of financial 
accountability mechanisms, and cultivating 
networks and connections with potential 
partner organisations (including other 
refugee-led CBOs). At the same time, agencies 
should remain conscious of the need to 
encourage a broad network of CBOs that 
takes account of the diversity of refugee 
communities. Failure to pay attention to 
divisions that already exist between different 
communities could result in agencies 
reinforcing negative power structures, 
and pushing already marginalised voices 
further away. The nature and extent of any 
agency’s partnership with a refugee-led 
CBO must also be clearly defined. Will it, 
for example, involve the CBO becoming 
an implementing partner, or will it mean 
working together to achieve mutual strategic 
goals? Precedence, transparency and 
sustainability – all key to establishing and 
maintaining healthy relationships – must 
all be taken into sufficient consideration.
LGBTIQ refugee-led CBOs in Nairobi 
run multiple diverse programmes to 
address the specific needs of LGBTIQ 
people. These programmes include:
Community health: One CBO has harnessed 
the pre-existing medical skills and training 
of community members to provide refugee-
led health training to groups of LGBTIQ 
clients, whose access to health services can be 
limited because of discrimination. Refugee 
community health workers subsequently lead 
targeted outreach to sections of the wider 
refugee community on various issues such 
as sexual health awareness (for persons at 
risk of or engaging in survival sex work); 
information about communicable diseases 
(for those living in communal housing); 
and prenatal and maternal health care (for 
lesbian, bisexual and queer – LBQ – women). 
Leaders of these programmes also identify 
appropriate health-care partners and 
establish and strengthen referral systems. 
Psychosocial support: One CBO in Nairobi 
runs a monthly group counselling session 
for refugees who are living with HIV. 
The CBO has created partnerships with 
national counsellors who have experience 
of working with LGBTIQ individuals. These 
counsellors both facilitate sessions and train 
members of the CBO in order to promote 
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programme sustainability. Another CBO 
seeks to mitigate the negative effects of 
social isolation among LGBTIQ refugees 
and encourage community development 
through a coaching programme that 
cultivates their sporting and artistic skills. 
   
Legal protection: Given that physical 
security is an important issue for all 
LGBTIQ refugees, one CBO has partnered 
with a local community-based paralegal 
organisation that offers legal assistance to 
refugees in the form of accompaniment 
to police stations, paralegal training and 
emergency shelter and relocation.   
Livelihoods initiatives: Empowering 
LGBTIQ refugees with livelihoods skills 
is a crucial part of a holistic protection 
strategy. Several CBOs are running 
livelihoods courses for LGBTIQ refugees, 
including in barbering, electronics 
and phone repairs, tailoring, bead and 
craft making and poultry farming.
Crucially, these initiatives draw upon 
LGBTIQ refugees’ pre-existing skills and 
talents, sending a potent message to refugees 
that they are able to engage with agencies 
on their own terms, and take ownership of 
their issues. One refugee spoke of the effect: 
“If you build the capacity of the community to 
engage in these projects, they won’t worry [as 
much] because they are receiving services from 
places other than humanitarian agencies.”
Humanitarian agencies: supporting 
LGBTIQ refugee-led CBOs
One leader of a refugee-led LGBTIQ 
organisation suggested how agencies can 
better support these organisations:
“The first step is acknowledging we are here. Why 
doesn’t UNHCR act as a bridge between all CBOs 
– not only sexual orientation and gender identity 
[SOGI] groups but non-SOGI groups also? We 
expect more from agencies, in terms of support 
for our projects. Right now, what we want from 
UNHCR is not money but guidance. What we need 
is networks.” 
The leader went on to suggest that 
UNHCR needs to formulate a long-term 
support strategy which should facilitate 
avenues between refugee communities 
and third parties – such as donor 
organisations – who support LGBTIQ 
initiatives. UNHCR’s eventual role 
would be one of capacity building and 
overall mentorship of emerging CBOs.
In response to a survey about outstanding 
needs, three refugee-led LGBTIQ CBOs in 
Nairobi noted the need to develop longer-
term strategies, including succession plans 
to ensure continuity of leadership. They also 
stated a need to develop overarching financial 
frameworks to guide programmes, business 
initiatives and projects, as well as to develop 
financial management procedures. Other 
needs were identified, including for: the 
development of monitoring and evaluation 
procedures for projects (procedures that are 
consistent with standards applied by other 
professional organisations); connecting 
and sharing best practices with other 
CBOs and humanitarian agencies; and 
guidance on reporting and grant writing.
Including refugee-led CBOs in 
professional networks is key for the 
development of these internal capacities. By 
drawing on and learning from the experiences 
of other established organisations, refugee-led 
CBOs can grow, be supported and potentially 
emerge as partners in the provision of 
services to refugee communities. UNHCR 
should balance the positive outcomes of 
this development with the need to preserve 
refugees’ autonomy over their own initiatives. 
It should also consider carefully the question 
of financial support – particularly the 
potentially divisive effects of supporting 
some CBOs over others. The selection 
process for such financial support must be 
accessible and transparent, and take into 
account refugee communities’ particular 
vulnerabilities. CBO leaders also require 
non-financial support, such as training and 
mentorship, to develop their potential.
Some LGBTIQ refugees believe that CBOs 
could also act as a bridge between their own 
marginalised communities and the wider 
refugee community: “Why don’t we interact 
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with other groups? I don’t want to stay 
[working with my own CBO], all about sexual 
orientation and gender identity (SOGI). We 
need to be refugees as a whole community.” 
In developing professional networks, the 
CBO leaders liaise with a broad group of 
non-LGBTIQ refugees, including other CBO 
leaders. As well as potentially providing 
avenues for employment of LGBTIQ refugees, 
there is scope for such professional networks 
to become forums for social dialogue, and 
potent tools for advancing LGBTIQ rights.   
Networks and diversity
In Nairobi, many LGBTIQ CBO leadership 
structures are dominated by men who 
have sex with men (MSM). LBQ women 
refugees have expressed concern at not 
being represented in these organisations 
or in forums where decision making that 
affects their communities takes place: 
“If you’re not masculine, you can’t talk. 
Even in meetings, the boys dominate. 
We need to empower the lesbians.”
As CBO structures grow in influence, 
space for members of marginalised 
communities to assert themselves in 
decision making can decrease. Further, as 
CBOs increasingly become interlocutors 
between UNHCR and other refugees, risks 
arise that include the monopolisation of 
leadership structures, missed identification 
of vulnerable cases, mistrust between 
community members, and questions 
surrounding the presence and extent of 
agencies’ support. Refugee communities 
can become polarised – and politicised – by 
power dynamics inherent in the relations 
between humanitarian agencies, private 
sector partners and CBOs, particularly where 
financial support is involved. To counter this, 
agencies (including private sector actors) 
must remain aware of the potentially divisive 
effects of their engagement with CBOs, and 
seek to promote diverse refugee leadership 
structures, as well as remain sensitive of 
the intricate social dynamics of refugee 
communities. It must be acknowledged that 
MSM are proportionately greater in number 
than other communities (including LBQ, 
trans* and intersex), are empowered by a 
strong network of organisations working 
with MSM, and are generally more vocal 
than members from other communities.  
These issues also raise more probing 
questions surrounding how far humanitarian 
agencies are willing to extend partnerships 
with refugee-led CBOs. The social effects of 
the funding of community-based initiatives 
by humanitarian agencies have not yet been 
comprehensively researched. These effects 
could be felt in relationships, power dynamics 
and risks of gender-based violence, including 
sexual exploitation linked to the unequal 
distribution of financial capital among refugee 
communities. Agencies should consider 
carefully the effects of providing financial and 
other support to CBOs and in particular the 
potential effects upon already marginalised 
individuals and groups. How will that 
support affect relationships between refugees, 
and between refugees and service providers? 
And is that support likely to increase the 
overall self-reliance of a community, or 
will it instead promote unrepresentative 
leadership structures, hindering the 
empowerment of marginalised groups? 
The growth of CBOs and the increasing 
roles they are playing in refugee protection 
make greater interaction between key actors 
– which include the CBOs themselves – 
necessary. Agencies must assess how best 
to harness the positive efforts of CBOs, 
while avoiding potentially negative effects 
of partnership. Private sector partners and 
donors must remain aware of their influence, 
strive to understand issues and facilitate 
access to funding for marginalised groups. 
The opportunity to work more closely with 
refugees carries a duty of care to ensure 
that support does not polarise vulnerable 
communities, nor promote some issues 
over others that are equally as important.    
Hester K V Moore moore@refugepoint.org  
Consultant for RefugePoint2 www.refugepoint.org 
and Assistant Resettlement Officer, UNHCR 
N’Djamena www.unhcr.org
1. ‘Trans*’/‘trans asterisk’ is a term used to denote all transgender, 
non-binary and gender non-conforming identities.
2. This article is based on ‘Disaggregating LGBTIQ protection 
concerns: experiences of displaced communities in Nairobi’, 
written for RefugePoint by the same author.
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Humans and animals in refugee camps
Benjamin Thomas White
More research is needed, across disciplines, to better understand the important and varied 
roles that animals play in the lives of people in refugee camps. 
Animals play an important role in human 
experiences of forced displacement and 
this is particularly visible in settings of 
encampment. Camps are often shaped by 
the need to accommodate animals as well as 
humans: ‘goat barns’ and animal markets are 
a distinctive architectural feature of Sahrawi 
camps in Algeria, for example.1 Domesticated 
animals can play a range of economic and 
cultural roles in the life of a camp, as camels 
do in Dadaab, Kenya.2 Displaced people’s 
interactions with wild animals can create 
dangers for both – for example, the semi-
formal settlements of Rohingya refugees 
in Bangladesh have literally put refugees 
in the path of elephants.3 Animals may 
figure in representations of camps, as when 
journalists mention rats as a shorthand for 
squalid conditions, and refugees themselves 
may say they are being treated ‘like animals’. 
Research in this area remains limited, 
however. In the Oxford Handbook of Refugee and 
Forced Migration Studies there are only a few 
passing references to animals, while in Forced 
Migration Review only one short article has 
specifically focused on the human–animal 
relationship.4 Practitioner literature highlights 
the importance of animals to refugees’ well-
being but focuses mostly on livestock.5
This special FMR feature has two aims. 
First, to highlight for practitioners and 
policymakers the variety and importance 
of human–animal interactions in camps, 
drawing on the experiences of an international 
team of contributors. Second, to spur 
further research on the topic, and suggest 
some of the directions it might take. The 
feature emerges from a series of meetings, 
funded by the Wellcome Trust,6 between 
practitioners from organisations including 
UNHCR (the UN Refugee Agency), Vets 
Without Borders, Art Refuge and researchers 
from disciplines including architecture, 
history and geography, as well as the 
veterinary and medical sciences. A second 
strand of meetings, with a refugee reference 
group, is taking place in collaboration 
with the Scottish Refugee Council.
The project has grown out of my own 
research on a historical case study: a camp 
at Baquba, near Baghdad, where occupying 
British forces at the end of the First World War 
accommodated nearly 50,000 refugees from 
Anatolia.7 The refugees were accompanied 
by thousands of animals: large (horses, 
mules, cattle), smaller (sheep and goats) and 
tiny (lice). The camp’s medical regime for 
humans started, as they arrived, with the 
elimination of lice; like the veterinary regime 
for animals, it also involved close observation, 
with isolation and treatment of the sick. The 
animals that arrived with the refugees affected 
the siting and shape of the camp. British 
attempts to promote economic activity among 
the refugees were built around animals, 
from commercial dairy production with the 
refugees’ own flocks to hiring out teams 
of human and animal labour – numbering 
as many as 2,500 men and 1,000 oxen – for 
waged work outside the camp. Competition 
over grazing became a key source of friction 
between refugees and the host population. 
British plans to close the camp, meanwhile, 
involved assembling and caring for still 
more pack and draught animals, both for 
transporting its human inhabitants and for 
resettling them more durably elsewhere. 
Many of these issues recur in more 
contemporary cases, as the pieces here show. 
But they are only a starting point. For a fuller 
understanding of the roles animals play in 
the lives of people in refugee camps, research 
is needed at different scales (from micro to 
macro) and across many different themes. 
Veterinary and medical approaches are an 
obvious place to begin as human health and 
animal health are intertwined, for example 
through zoonotic disease (disease which can 
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The role of livestock in refugee–host community 
relations 
Charles Hoots
In South Sudan, tensions arose when refugees arrived with their livestock, disrupting the 
existing relationships between the local population and nomadic peoples. Understanding the 
relations between all three groups of people and their livestock was key to finding solutions.
The Republic of South Sudan became 
the world’s newest country in July 2011, 
separating from Sudan after decades of civil 
war. However, the status of border regions 
in Sudan’s Blue Nile and South Kordofan 
states was not fully clarified in the peace 
agreement that opened the way for South 
Sudan’s independence, and both regions 
saw hostilities rekindled in September 
2011. Aerial bombardment and ground 
offensives drove nearly 125,000 people, 
along with tens of thousands of cattle, sheep 
and goats, from Blue Nile state to seek 
refuge across the border in South Sudan. 
Living in four camps in Maban County 
in Upper Nile state, the refugees’ relations 
with the heavily outnumbered local 
community have sometimes been difficult, 
be transmitted from animals to humans). But 
those connections are not simply biomedical. 
The art therapy work done in camps in Calais 
and Nepal by a clinical psychotherapist in 
our network illustrates how much animals 
matter in the psychological and emotional 
health of humans. Precisely how they matter 
will vary: in some places people believe 
that ‘a home without a dog is just a house’, 
while in others a dog in the home would 
be not just unwelcome but an outrage. The 
cultural significance of different animals 
will influence the psychological impact they 
have – and it will also affect, and be affected 
by, their role in refugees’ social and economic 
lives. This in turn will inform the ways in 
which refugees organise (or reorganise) 
spaces around the needs of their animals, 
from their own shelters or nearby enclosures 
to the camp itself and its surrounding 
landscape. And camps, even urban ones, are 
always dynamically situated within larger 
natural environments. As the article by 
Derek Robertson shows, the environmental 
factors that contribute to human and animal 
migration, and shape the experience of 
migration, are closely connected. This 
piece, by an artist who has also taken part 
in scientific studies of migration, indicates 
the range of different disciplines that can 
contribute to our understanding of the subject. 
We would welcome responses to this initial 
stage of our own project from practitioners 
and researchers in any of the many and 
diverse fields which are of relevance.
Benjamin Thomas White 
benjaminthomas.white@glasgow.ac.uk 
University of Glasgow 
www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/ 
1. Herz M (Ed) (2012) From Camp to City: Refugee Camps of the 
Western Sahara, Lars Müller Publishers 302–303, 340–347
2. Rawlence B (2016) City of Thorns: Nine Lives in the World’s Largest 
Refugee Camp, Portobello Books
3. International Union for the Conservation of Nature (2018) 
Survey Report on Elephant Movement, Human-Elephant Conflict 
Situation, and Possible Intervention Sites in and around Kutupalong 
Camp, Cox’s Bazar www.unhcr.org/5a9946a34
4. Fiddian-Qasmiyeh E, Loescher G, Long K and Sigona N (Eds) 
(2014) The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, 
OUP; Beirne P and Kelty-Huber C (2015) ‘Animals and forced 
migration’, Forced Migration Review issue 49: 97–98  
www.fmreview.org/climatechange-disasters/beirne-keltyhuber 
5. See for example LEGS (2014) Livestock Emergency Guidelines and 
Standards (2nd edition) Practical Action Publishing  
www.livestock-emergency.net/resources/download-legs; UNHCR/
IUCN (2005) Livestock-Keeping and Animal Husbandry in Refugee and 
Returnee Situations: A Practical Handbook for Improved Management 
http://bit.ly/UNHCR-Livestock-handbook-2005
6. ‘Humans and animals in refugee camps’, Wellcome Trust Seed 
Award in Humanities and Social Science 2016 [award reference 
205708/Z/16/Z].  
7. White B T (2018) ‘Humans and animals in a refugee camp: 
Baquba, Iraq, 1918–20’, Journal of Refugee Studies  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fey024
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with livestock playing an important role 
in the conflicts. Through efforts involving 
State and local government and both 
refugee and local communities, however, 
United Nations (UN) agencies and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) 
were able to forge agreements between 
the various groups to reduce tensions. 
The people and their animals
The Maban people – the host community in 
this area – number approximately 45,000.1 
They live in small groups of mud and thatch 
homesteads, with each group connected 
loosely to a number of others, forming what 
are often referred to as villages. Nearly all 
Maban families keep some livestock, typically 
one to four cattle, up to six pigs, up to eight 
sheep and goats, and up to ten chickens, while 
about two thirds of Maban households own 
at least one cow. All these animals are free to 
graze and scavenge during the day. Although 
livestock and their products are consumed 
only minimally by the Maban people, their 
animals play other important roles. They can 
be sold for cash or bartered in an emergency, 
and are an important component in the 
payment by the groom’s family to the family 
of his prospective wife. Livestock, in addition 
to cash, may also be given as compensation in 
the event of injury, murder or accidental death 
of a community member. The Maban people 
also grow a variety of crops on small plots 
which are located 
half a kilometre or 
more from their 
dwellings in order 
to prevent damage 
by the livestock 
living in and around 
the villages.
By mid-2012, 
refugees from 
Sudan’s Blue Nile 
state were estimated 
to have brought 
around 100,000 
cattle and 150,000 
sheep and goats 
to Maban County, 
although by the 
end of that year up to half of the refugee 
livestock is thought to have perished, 
stressed from the long trek and unused 
to the wetter conditions of Maban. While 
the refugees in Maban County come from 
numerous linguistic groups from Sudan’s 
Blue Nile state, the largest single group – 
and the only people to bring large numbers 
of livestock with them – is the Ingessana. 
At home, the Ingessana depend on their 
animals for use in agriculture and transport, 
for milk and for meat on special occasions, 
and as a source of cash in emergencies, a 
means of securing a wife, compensation for 
damages, injury or death inflicted on third 
parties, and a symbol of social prestige.
The Mbororo nomads – a subset of 
Sudan’s Fulfulde-speaking population – 
follow an entirely nomadic lifestyle, moving 
between Blue Nile state, South Sudan and 
neighbouring Ethiopia in search of grazing. 
The Mbororo arrive in Maban County with 
their cattle, sheep and goats at the onset of 
the dry season in November, returning north 
in May as their cattle do not tolerate the 
heavy rains that begin then. The Mbororo 
use their livestock in similar ways to those of 
the Maban and Ingessena people but depend 
almost exclusively on their livestock for 
survival. With the uncertain political situation 
following South Sudan’s independence in 
2011, perhaps only a few hundred Mbororo 
entered South Sudan between November and 
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December 2013, many fewer than normal, 
but their cattle still far outnumbered those 
of the local Maban and were comparable in 
number to those owned by the refugees.
In March 2014, Vétérinaires sans Frontìeres 
(VSF) Germany estimated livestock numbers 
owned by local Maban people at 20,000 cattle, 
40,000 sheep and goats and 20,000 pigs; by 
Blue Nile refugees at 50,000 cattle and 80,000 
sheep and goats; and by Mbororo nomads 
at 50,000 cattle and 50,000 sheep and goats.
Sources of solidarity
The indigenous peoples of Blue Nile state in 
Sudan and Maban County in South Sudan, 
although linguistically and culturally 
diverse, have a cultural affinity, and the 
solidarity between these communities has 
been reinforced by their mutual suffering 
during the long Sudanese civil war. The 
general attitude of the Maban people towards 
the Mbororo nomads is best described as 
‘cautious’. The Mbororo keep to themselves, 
often speak no other local languages and 
move about freely, exciting admiration 
but also rumours about their lifestyles.2
The Mbororo are an important source 
of milk for the Maban population, however, 
whose own cattle produce little or none 
during the dry months. The Mbororo 
sell the milk in local markets and use the 
cash to purchase those few necessities 
their animals cannot provide, as well as 
additional cattle. The nomads also pay 
local government and communities for 
grazing rights in the areas they traverse.3
Sources of conflict
Maban host community and the Mbororo: 
Grazing arrangements between the Mbororo 
and local Maban communities are well 
regulated by long-standing arrangements. 
The animals of the highly mobile nomads 
are robust but, like all animals, are capable 
of spreading infectious diseases between 
the communities through which they pass. 
However, the local Maban population 
recognises that the Mbororo generally 
are more proactive in the care of their 
livestock – notably by keeping them up to 
date on vaccinations – than are the local 
Maban and the refugee communities, and 
the local people are therefore relatively 
unconcerned about the risk of disease.4 
More ominous for the Mbororo are the 
political implications of South Sudan’s 
independence. South Sudanese officials 
have occasionally spoken of forbidding the 
crossing of Mbororo from Sudan into South 
Sudan, questioning their political loyalty 
and citing them as a security risk. Up to at 
least late 2014, however, the grazing rights 
paid by the Mbororo in South Sudan were 
considered too important to lose and so their 
movement continued relatively unhindered.
Maban host community and the refugees: 
Despite the general empathy felt by the Maban 
population towards the Blue Nile refugees, the 
latter’s large human and animal populations 
inevitably created tensions. The most serious 
and immediate problem proved to be the 
damage caused by the refugees’ livestock 
to the crops of the Maban communities. 
The subsistence nature of farming in the 
area meant that the loss of these crops 
posed a serious risk of food shortages. The 
degradation of common livestock grazing 
areas and water sources in Maban was 
another source of discontent, which increased 
in step with the number of refugee animals. 
The lopping of branches from trees to use 
as feed and the cutting down of trees for 
fuel further aggravated the problem. Theft 
of local livestock also increased and the 
refugees were invariably blamed for it.
My own project, funded by VSF Canada 
and implemented by VSF Germany, focused 
on refugees’ livestock in acknowledgement 
of the fact that the loss of these animals to 
disease would make it impossible for the 
refugees to resume their way of life once 
the war was over.5 However, resentment by 
the local population, much of it legitimate, 
motivated us – and most other agencies – to 
include the much smaller local population 
as beneficiaries alongside the refugees. This 
was done in various ways, for example by 
establishing village-level boreholes, medical 
clinics and animal vaccination and treatment 
programmes. VSF also purchased and 
slaughtered sheep and goats to decrease the 
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population pressure from these and then 
distributed the meat, focusing on the most 
vulnerable among the local population.
Nevertheless, tensions flared and local 
communities began imposing hefty fines on 
refugees whose animals damaged crops.6 As 
many as 20 human deaths were attributed 
to fighting related to crop damage. As a 
result, by mid-2013 by mutual agreement the 
refugees moved their herds to a few sparsely 
populated grazing areas located as far as 
60km from the refugee camps. The system 
worked well overall. The animals were giving 
very little, if any, milk so the refugee families 
did not miss this, and having the animals 
away from the camps, in an area designated 
for them by agreement with the local 
Maban communities, significantly reduced 
tensions. Conflict resolution protocols were 
put in place in these areas. In the village 
of New Guffa, for example, when crops 
were damaged, a fine was imposed on the 
animal owner. Specific times were set aside 
for local animals and then refugee animals 
to water at the few watering points. The 
positive outcomes suggest that negotiating 
such an arrangement in other refugee/
livestock situations should be given higher 
priority in the early stages of a crisis.
Refugees and the Mbororo: Relations 
between the refugees and the Mbororo 
nomads are characterised by mistrust. 
Khartoum’s use of local militia to quell 
rebellions in various parts of Sudan has 
led the refugees to suspect Mbororo 
irregular military units of fighting in Blue 
Nile state. To avoid problems, in 2013 the 
South Sudanese authorities instructed the 
Mbororo to pass well west of the refugee 
camps when moving into South Sudan. The 
Mbororo thus maintained their access, while 
the government and local communities still 
benefited from payments for grazing rights 
and trade with the nomads but occasions for 
conflict with the refugees were minimised.
Conclusion
Unfortunately, such relations are highly 
vulnerable to shifts in the political and 
military environment. When civil war 
broke out in South Sudan in December 2013, 
renewed rivalries and uncertainties soon 
drew refugees and host communities in 
Maban County into unlooked-for conflict. 
Food aid to the camps was suspended 
for weeks at a time, triggering increased 
theft of food and animals by refugees, 
subsequent retaliation by locals, and 
the deaths of several livestock herders. 
Soldiers fighting in Blue Nile state 
returned to the refugee camps to protect 
their families, while local communities 
formed a militia to protect theirs.
Refugee interactions with host 
communities are complex, and adding 
livestock to the equation makes them 
doubly so. While tensions and conflict are 
inevitable, and finding a new equilibrium 
under very difficult conditions is fraught with 
challenge, well-considered arrangements 
and compromises can be found to mitigate 
them. The rapidity with which solutions 
were found and effectively implemented 
in South Sudan in 2013–14 offers hope that 
this could be achieved again in Maban 
County, and could also be possible in similar 
situations elsewhere. Knowledge of the 
cultures involved, including an informed 
awareness of the relationship between the 
people and their animals, will always be key 
to understanding the potential for conflict 
and the appropriateness of possible solutions.
Charles Hoots hootsca@yahoo.com   
Livestock Technical Lead, Cultivating New 
Frontiers in Agriculture www.cnfa.org 
1. According to South Sudan’s 2008 census. 
2. For example, the Mbororo are widely reputed to be skilled 
sorcerers.
3. This reportedly totalled the equivalent of US$5,000 across 
Maban County in the 2012–13 dry season. 
4. The nomads purchase vaccines mostly in Sudan and vaccinate 
their own animals; being so dependent on their cattle, this is a 
good insurance policy for them. Local Maban populations in 
normal times are cut off from supplies for half of the year and 
have little to no refrigeration capacity to store vaccines; as a result, 
they are not in the habit of vaccinating.
5. The author worked in Maban County from June 2013 until May 
2014; the programme ended in August 2014. For more information 
about the Maban refugee situation, see author’s blog at   
http://bit.ly/animalspeoplepathogens02082016
6. Fines amounted to the equivalent of over US$1,000 per offence 
around Yusif Batil camp.
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Working equids in refugee camps 
Patrick J Pollock 
Refugee camps offer good opportunities for cooperation between humanitarian and animal 
welfare organisations for the benefit of displaced people and their working animals.
It is estimated that there are over 100 
million working equids – horses, donkeys 
and mules – in parts of the world that are 
underserved by veterinary care: 55 million 
horses (84% of the world population), 41 
million donkeys (98%) and 13 million mules 
(96%). These working horses, donkeys and 
mules provide transport and agricultural 
energy and in many cases are the sole means 
of generating income for their owners, many 
of whom live in poverty. It is estimated that 
a remarkable 50% of the world’s population 
is reliant on animal power as its main source 
of energy for agriculture and transport. 
There are many groups, non-governmental 
organisations and individuals working to 
improve the health and welfare of working 
equids across the globe. This work includes 
the provision of veterinary care and training 
for local veterinary surgeons and equid 
owners. However, to date little is known 
about the numbers of working equids 
associated with displaced people and in 
refugee camps. The ‘Humans and animals 
in refugee camps’ project is seeking, among 
other things, to determine the numbers of 
working equids travelling with displaced 
people and to quantify the needs of these 
animals and the challenges they face.
While healthy, well-managed equids 
are assets, many owners are too poor to 
access information about animal care and 
often live far from any form of veterinary 
care. This may be particularly the case 
where people have been displaced, whether 
to refugee camps, informal settlements 
or other locations, where their access to 
veterinary care may be poor or non-existent.
In 2003, approximately 14,000 donkeys 
carried families displaced by war and natural 
disaster into the Abu Shouk refugee camp in 
Darfur, Sudan. Eighteen months later, only 
around 2,300 were reported to have survived. 
The Society for the Protection of Animals 
Abroad (SPANA) estimated that 84% had 
died through lack of access to feed. To date 
few, if any, specific guidelines or protocols 
have been published to better manage 
situations such as that reported in Sudan.
In resource-limited settings, animals 
take second place to humans, which is 
perhaps how it ought to be. But at Abu 
Shouk, as veterinarian Tess Sprayson noted, 
“For want of better collaboration between 
humanitarian aid and animal welfare 
agencies, the donkeys died an unnecessary 
and miserable death, while their owners lost 
what, in many cases, was their sole means 
of transport or of earning a living”1 – and a 
critical lifeline to a future outside the camp. 
In Darfur, SPANA intervened to provide 
fodder and basic veterinary care, and the 
remaining animals in the Abu Shouk camp 
survived. However, very little data exist 
on the numbers of working equids used 
either to travel to or from refugee camps 
anywhere in the world. Furthermore, little 
is known about the fate of working equids 
after their owners have reached a camp. 
Since it is recognised that once refugees 
lose their livestock they are less likely to 
return home,2 it is time to undertake work to 
determine the scale of animal displacement 
in order to understand the fate of these 
animals and to develop frameworks for 
responding to the presence of working 
equids. Humanitarian and animal welfare 
organisations are well suited to working 
together; they have similar needs, often 
use similar equipment and have a common 
interest in ‘one health’3 (the collaborative 
effort of multiple disciplines – working  
locally, nationally and globally – to attain 
optimal health for people, animals and 
the environment). To date there are very 
few examples of this;4,5 however, refugee 
camps represent a great opportunity for 
veterinary and animal welfare agencies 
FM
R
 5
8
76 Humans and animals in refugee camps
June 2018www.fmreview.org/economies
Sheltering animals in refugee camps
Lara Alshawawreh
Animals play an important role in many people’s lives in displacement. Camp planners and 
managers need to take animals’ needs into greater account in order for displaced people to 
continue to benefit from this interaction.
One of the key challenges in emergency 
response is planning long-term support. 
Animals in refugee camps, however, 
suffer not only from a lack of long-term 
support but in most cases are also neglected 
during the initial response. The welfare 
of humans is of course the priority – but 
animals contribute to that welfare. 
In most emergencies, refugees will bring 
their animals with them to the camps or 
will start buying and trading animals soon 
after settling into their new shelters.1 In the 
initial stages of emergencies, refugees may 
have to rely heavily on support organisations 
but in time people start searching for ways 
of making a living. Animals provide a 
significant contribution to human livelihoods, 
whether for pastoralists, those who sell 
animals or animal products or provide 
feed and other services, people who use 
animals for transportation, security and 
cultural activities, or simply families who 
are dependent on animals for food or 
income. Animals are even used as a way 
of storing financial capital in the absence 
of access to banks.  Cooperation between 
refugees, the host community, the host 
government and support organisations 
is very important to provide the care 
that animals need. A number of aspects 
relating to the camp or settlement need to 
be considered to ensure its appropriateness 
for sheltering animals – aspects such as 
access to water points and grazing land, 
and the veterinary support that is essential 
for both their health and human health.
Key considerations
Refugees understand the importance of 
animals in establishing their new life in 
camps. Examples of refugees sacrificing 
the materials they are given for their 
to make a difference for the long-term 
benefit of displaced people and their 
animals. Co-operation might extend to the 
development, integration and evaluation of 
screening tools, shared diagnostic methods, 
medicines, vaccines, surveillance systems 
and policies for the prevention, management 
and control of zoonotic diseases. 
With an unprecedented number of 
displaced people in the world today, it 
seems logical to assume that the number 
of affected animals has also increased. The 
Field Information and Coordination Support 
Section of the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, 
tracks the number of people forced to flee each 
year and since equids are readily identifiable, 
recording their presence and number should 
be relatively simple. The development of 
simple screening tools that would allow non-
veterinary personnel to flag the presence 
of equids and other animals in need of 
veterinary intervention has the potential to 
offer considerable welfare benefits for this 
forgotten population of animals, and for 
the people that rely so heavily upon them.
Patrick J Pollock Patrick.Pollock@ed.ac.uk  
Senior Lecturer in Equine Surgery, University of 
Edinburgh www.ed.ac.uk 
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own shelters to build animal shelters 
– to provide protection from extreme 
weather, predators and theft – include 
refugees in Kenya’s Dadaab camp, Afghan 
returnees in 2009, and Bangladeshis 
displaced in 2009 by Cyclone Aila.
Land rights are a frequent concern. 
Refugees and internally displaced people 
no longer have control over the land they 
and their animals occupy. Pre-planning, 
good management and establishing 
avenues for good cooperation with all 
stakeholders are important elements 
in securing practical solutions.
Another aspect to consider is refugees’ 
cultural norms regarding their interaction 
with their animals. Some prefer to keep 
their animals inside their household plots, 
while others do not; some communities have 
specific rules and taboos in dealing with 
certain animal species. This information is 
crucial for creating successful settlements, 
taking into consideration owners’ preferences 
regarding the location of their animals.
It is also important to consider the 
gender, age and health status of those family 
members who are responsible for taking 
care of the animals. If these family members 
are individuals usually considered more 
‘vulnerable’, then the animal shelters should 
be close to the human shelters for the sake 
of secure and easy access. This should be 
balanced against the potential risks to human 
health of the close proximity of animals to 
human shelters – risks such as transmission 
of disease from animal to human. 
Climate conditions affect the design 
decisions for sheltering the animals. In 
hot climates, good ventilation and shade 
are essential, while well-sealed structures 
should be used in areas with cold climates. 
The safety of the animals is also affected 
by their structures’ location; lockable 
shelter doors may be necessary in areas 
where animal safety is a concern.
One of the few examples of livestock 
shelters provided by an external organisation 
comes from the Pakistan emergency response 
following the 2005 earthquake. The surviving 
livestock were put in communal shelters after 
being vaccinated to prevent spread of disease. 
and a new programme was established to 
introduce ‘cob’ – a mixture of clay, sand 
and straw – as an earthquake-resistant 
construction technique for livestock shelters. 
Za’atari camp in Jordan provides a recent 
example of how refugees bring different 
species of animal into their living space. For 
many residents, caged birds bought at the 
camp’s market provide a sense of home, as 
many of the residents used to keep birds 
back in Syria. Chickens are kept for food 
and income, and perhaps companionship. 
Donkeys and horses are used for transporting 
people and goods. Residents have built animal 
shelters adjacent or close to their own shelters 
using corrugated sheets and/or canvas – two 
of the few available and affordable materials.
Za’atari camp, whose structure and 
layout have altered over time as the camp 
has grown, allows residents to have animals 
and to build shelters for them. In purpose-
built Azraq camp, the next largest camp for 
Syrian refugees in Jordan, residents are not 
allowed to build additional constructions; 
there, birds are the only animals allowed 
in the camp, since they do not require 
additional spaces within shelters.
Recommendations
The Livestock Emergency Guidelines and 
Standards (LEGS) project has published 
standards and guidelines for designing, 
implementing and evaluating livestock 
interventions.2 Unfortunately, these are 
not used widely in emergencies, whether 
from lack of awareness of their existence, 
shortage of funding and/or time, or a 
combination of factors. There needs to be 
La
ra
 A
ls
ha
w
aw
re
h
Donkey shelter built by Za’atari camp residents.
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a more concerted effort to introduce the 
guidelines and standards to organisations, 
aid workers and stakeholders, at the same 
time consulting the end users on how to 
enhance the practical application of LEGS.
The best way to provide appropriate 
aid to humans and animals after disasters 
is to consult the people themselves – they 
are the users of the space and the owners 
of the animals. They know the materials 
needed to build appropriate shelters 
for their own animals, as well as the 
preferred design, and many will already 
have the necessary construction skills. 
Constructing appropriate animal shelters 
will reduce the possibility of health problems 
within settlements. The level of  
pre-planning that can be done for animals’ 
shelter requirements in displacement will 
depend on the nature of the emergency 
and cooperation with the host community. 
However, raising owners’ awareness of 
all issues relating to their animals’ health 
and shelter needs will help displaced 
people in refugee camps to co-exist with 
their animals in safety while continuing 
to benefit from interacting with them.  
Lara Alshawawreh l.alshawawreh@napier.ac.uk 
PhD candidate, School of Engineering and the 
Built Environment, Edinburgh Napier University 
www.napier.ac.uk 
1. The author’s research focuses primarily on human shelters but 
evidence about the need for animal shelters has tended to emerge 
alongside the human needs.
2. www.livestock-emergency.net
Understanding risk in human–animal interactions 
Sara Owczarczak-Garstecka 
There needs to be better understanding not only of the importance of animals in the lives of 
displaced people but also of the potential risks incurred by human–animal interactions and 
how best to mitigate these risks.
Animals in refugee camps can improve 
people’s health and well-being. They are a 
source of food and a commodity which can be 
sold or exchanged or kept as an investment. 
Animals can also be a source of psychological 
comfort,1 can potentially help refugees to 
preserve cultural identity and can serve as 
a marker of normal life. For example, Syrian 
refugees in camps in Jordan are prepared 
to spend a substantial part of their monthly 
income on a singing bird because such a bird – 
in Syrian culture – is what turns a house into 
a home. However, close proximity of animals 
and humans can be a source of risk, and 
understanding of the risks posed by animals 
within refugee camps is generally poor.
A public health model published in 
1991 by Dahlgren and Whitehead offers 
one approach to mapping the potential 
sources of hazards associated with animals 
in refugee camps.2 The model shows how 
health inequities are shaped by a combination 
of cultural, political, environmental and 
social factors as well as by individuals’ 
attributes. These factors influence both 
the risks to an individual who is in 
contact with animals and also how they 
experience an illness and their ability to 
access the resources needed for recovery. 
Political/organisational environment: 
At the widest level in this scenario is 
the international and national political 
climate – the wars and fighting that dictate 
the global movement of people and their 
animals (including who is displaced and 
where the camps are built) – and the policies 
of the organisations that run and support 
camps. All these aspects will have an impact 
on human and animal health, and the 
effectiveness of the management of human–
animal interactions will depend on which 
agencies are on the ground and the degree 
of expertise that they have in this area. For 
example, vaccination alone may not suffice 
in entirely preventing outbreaks of diseases 
within herds (as the success of a vaccination 
programme depends also on aspects such as 
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the coverage and timing of the vaccination 
programme) but it can reduce risk. 
Physical environment: The environment 
through which people travel and the setting 
of the camp itself can contribute to the 
burden of risk. For instance, Afghan refugee 
camps established in early 1990 on the 
western boarder of Pakistan were situated 
on marginal waterlogged terrain, which 
encourages malaria. As Afghanistan had 
run a successful malaria control programme 
prior to the Soviet-Afghan war, the refugees 
arriving in Pakistan had no immunity to the 
disease. Families who arrived with animals, 
and camps with more livestock, experienced 
greater prevalence of malaria as the livestock 
provided mosquitos with an easy source 
of blood, which boosted the mosquito 
population.3 More broadly speaking, animals 
that flee with their owners may be exposed to 
new diseases to which they have no immunity 
or may themselves carry diseases to which 
local animal populations are susceptible. 
The built environment can also have an 
impact on the level of risk in human–animal 
interactions. The presence of animals is 
seldom factored into the design of refugee 
camps. In Za’atari refugee camp in Jordan, for 
example, people developed their own ways 
of keeping poultry, often by transforming 
human accommodation. Lack of suitable, 
designated spaces for animals may result 
in poor sanitation, increasing the risk of 
diseases to the animal population and 
transmission of certain diseases to people. 
Social environment: Social factors shape 
a person’s exposure to risk. For example, 
culture, tradition and religion influence 
how animals are killed and by whom, and 
how their meat is prepared and consumed. 
This in turn could alter the risk of a range of 
infectious diseases and the risk of physical 
injury linked to handling animals. 
Attitudes and beliefs about practices 
around animals, such as perception of 
efficacy of vaccinations, are also influenced 
by the immediate community and family, 
and could shape how likely a person is to 
engage in behaviours which could reduce 
risk. In addition, a person may need to 
rely on their social networks (for finance, 
information, contacts and so on) in order to 
access resources – such as veterinary care – 
which could help to reduce risk. Individuals 
living in a camp with an extended family 
may therefore be able to access help more 
readily than someone who is isolated or 
who only arrived recently. Social support 
could also reduce the impact of the loss 
of an animal and improve recovery from 
an injury or illness caused by animals. 
Individual attributes: Stress linked with 
evacuation and the camp environment 
is likely to compromise the immunity of 
animals and people. Under prolonged periods 
of stress, humans and animals may be more 
susceptible to certain diseases carried by 
cattle (like brucellosis or tuberculosis) which 
in normal circumstances may not pose the 
same risk. The profile of risk is dependent on 
the range of animals kept in the camp; where 
dogs and livestock are kept in close proximity 
to each other and to humans, for example, 
certain types of tapeworm may become a risk 
for humans. Presence of cows adds to the risk 
of injury due to crushing or being kicked, 
and dogs may bite. An individual animal’s 
temperament, species/breed and habituation 
to handling will also contribute to the risk 
that this animal poses. Meanwhile, a person’s 
gender, age, personality, health and so on 
are likely to modify their risk. For instance, 
in many cultures, women and girls are more 
likely to be responsible for small ruminants 
(such as sheep and goats) and poultry 
whereas men tend to care for livestock. 
The model outlined above could be used to 
systematically map risks (and benefits) of 
human–animal interactions in the context 
of forced migration and to determine how 
these risks could be mitigated, whether at 
the level of decision making about location 
of camps, at the camp design, construction 
and management level, or at the individual 
level. Although there are existing policies on 
how to assess such risk, Livestock Emergency 
Guidelines and Standards (LEGS) provides 
comprehensive guidelines, checklists and 
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‘decision trees’ related to protecting livestock 
during different stages of an emergency 
response.4 The UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, 
has also developed a handbook on livestock 
keeping and animal husbandry which covers 
similar areas, again focusing primarily on 
livestock and poultry.5 UNHCR’s Camp 
Planning Standards do not offer explicit 
guidelines for provision of space for animals 
but suggest that planned sites should a) avoid 
areas where the environment may increase the 
risk of animal-borne diseases like malaria and 
b) provide space for small-scale cultivation.6
Surveillance of animals that live in 
and near refugee camps is the first step in 
risk management. Counting and health 
assessments for animals could include local 
veterinarian professionals, international 
veterinary non-governmental organisations 
and local animal-keeping communities 
trained in disease detection. While assessing 
risk in keeping livestock is crucial, the 
models need to include identifying risks 
in interactions with other animals that 
live in camps as well (such as dogs, cats 
or birds which may live nearby). More 
broadly, the involvement of veterinary 
professionals in planning, setting up and 
running refugee settlements could help with 
assessing basic needs and coordinating local 
responses, which may include education 
and the provision of food, water, shelter 
and basic medical care for the animals. 
Sara Owczarczak-Garstecka 
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Animal and human health in the Sahrawi refugee 
camps 
Giorgia Angeloni and Jennifer Carr 
Health challenges in the Sahrawi refugee camps in the Algerian desert are faced by both 
human and animal populations, and therefore responses must benefit both.
The Sahrawi refugee camps are situated 
close to the Algerian settlement of Tindouf 
and have grown from camps to de facto 
cities since mass displacement of the 
Sahrawis in 1975. Following conflict in 
the former Spanish Western Sahara, 
thousands of people crossed the border 
into Algeria, settling in refugee camps. 
Forty years later, the UN Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR) estimates the camp population 
at approximately 173,600 refugees.1 
Each case of mass forced displacement 
has a unique set of circumstances and 
resulting health challenges. However, 
from the perspective of the international 
humanitarian community, at the time of 
crisis the humanitarian concerns are namely 
that – human concerns. The needs of people 
in acute distress shape the form of the 
response; food, water, shelter, protection, 
sanitation and medical care are provided – 
for humans. The presence of animals is not 
ignored; indeed it is often noted in official 
reports and needs assessments conducted 
by humanitarian agencies. A League of Red 
Cross Societies mission in June 1977, for 
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example, reported an increase in the numbers 
of animals in the Sahrawi camps over the 
previous year – an increase that enabled 
the occasional addition of meat to diets. 
Alice Wilson’s research suggests that 
most Sahrawi refugees in exile were familiar 
(from childhood or more recent experience) 
with life in a nomadic encampment, with 
sedentarisation being a fairly new process 
in the mid-1970s and early 1980s.2 However, 
during the initial mass displacement, few 
animals were transported by the refugees 
and by the 2000s opportunities for mobile 
pastoralist 
practices remained 
constrained, 
not least by the 
inhospitable 
environment. 
Life in a 
refugee camp in 
the middle of the 
desert deprives 
the population of 
the hope of food 
self-sufficiency, 
leaving them 
largely dependent 
on international 
aid. In fact, non-
supported survival 
in the desert is 
guaranteed only 
by nomadic practices and any enforced 
sedentarism of the refugee camp disrupts and 
constrains these practices. However, it also 
provides opportunities for the creation of new 
responses led by the refugees themselves.
The role of animals in human nutrition
Recent studies of the Sahrawi population 
have suggested that the chronic emergency 
status in the camps, reflected in a food 
basket based mainly on calories than on 
a diversification of diet, is struggling to 
counter widespread nutritional problems. 
The camps were intended to be temporary by 
the refugees and international agencies alike, 
so mechanisms to produce higher quality 
food systems were not established. One of 
the main problems present in the camps 
today is the increasing prevalence of anaemia 
in women of childbearing age. UNHCR is 
leading interventions to reduce numbers 
of children with severe acute malnutrition, 
and the World Food Programme (WFP) is 
working to improve prevention and treatment 
of anaemia, and to reduce stunting and 
moderate acute malnutrition among children 
under five years of age and pregnant and 
nursing women. With anaemia rates in the 
camps as high as 39% among children and 
45% among women of reproductive age, 
these are pressing challenges, not helped by 
insecure funding 
which can lead 
to diminished 
rations and 
inadequate 
supplies of 
interventions 
such as High 
Energy Biscuits.3 
Furthermore, 
the results of 
UNHCR’s March 
2018 assessment, 
which found there 
to be a population 
of over 170,000 – 
far higher than 
the 90,000 given 
in official statistics 
– also suggests that 
the population has been long underserved. 
Despite the Sahrawis’ overall dependence 
on food aid, their livestock has for centuries 
enabled their survival in the Western Sahara 
and continues to be a hallmark of their 
cultural identity. Animal breeding by refugees 
increases the availability of animal proteins 
and can help address the nutritional problems 
of the camps. About 80,000 goats and sheep 
and 80,000 camels are present in the camps. 
Goats and sheep are fed almost exclusively 
with domestic organic waste, while camels 
spend part of their life in pasturelands close 
to the refugee camps. A lack of suitable 
pasture means there are limited opportunities 
to raise large numbers of camels for sale, 
so the importance of livestock (camels, but 
also goats and sheep) in refugee camps lies 
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A veterinary clinical visit, Sahrawi refugee camp.
FM
R
 5
8
82 Humans and animals in refugee camps
June 2018www.fmreview.org/economies
predominantly in its potential contribution 
to increase opportunities for self-sufficiency. 
Attempts to establish projects for improved 
animal feeding to support livestock production 
(which is currently insufficient) and livestock-
derived diets in the camps should require 
little or low technology, and refugees can 
take the skills they learn with them if they 
leave the camps. The creation of plantations 
of the tree Moringa oleifera is one such project. 
More high-tech projects such as hydroponics 
may provide a provisional increase in food 
production but they require higher levels 
of investment and non-sustainable energy 
sources from outside the camps. These systems 
are not easily transportable, are susceptible 
to deterioration and need maintenance 
which is difficult in the local context since 
the systems are not part of local culture. 
The Sahrawi refugees are renowned 
for their resilience, religious tolerance 
and organisational skills, and the refugee 
population is far from passive. Several 
refugee-initiated projects take place. The 
above-mentioned Moringa oleifera plantations 
in the Hammada desert is one example, 
supported by several non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) including Vétérinaires 
Sans Frontières (VSF) Italy and Africa ’70. 
This leguminous source, able to grow in 
extremely dry conditions, has wide-ranging 
benefits for both human and animal nutrition, 
being very rich in proteins, vitamin C, 
iron and other macro and micronutrients, 
and offers a sustainable solution for 
diet diversification and enrichment. 
The presence of a large number of animals 
needs a local veterinary system to ensure the 
best possible animal and human health. Since 
1996, a Veterinary Directorate, now composed 
of 24 Saharawi operators in the camps, has 
been supervising slaughter procedures, 
surveying the dominant zoonoses,4 giving 
clinical assistance to smallholders, raising 
awareness of good animal management 
practices and working on the prevention of 
infectious diseases. Resources may be limited 
but the desire among NGOs and refugees 
alike to stretch capacities and maximise 
resources is strong. Brucellosis, tuberculosis, 
Rift Valley fever, echinoccosis, rabies and 
toxoplasmosis are some of the major zoonoses, 
which must be addressed in a collaborative 
effort by veterinarians and medical NGOs 
providing health care. Alongside the 
veterinary infrastructure, a hospital and 
dispensary infrastructure with six health 
centres supports the human population of 
the refugee camps. Disease associated with 
animals is not limited to livestock; pets can 
also be a source of infection, although these 
animals are mainly free-roaming cats and 
dogs rather than fully domesticated animals. 
Recent studies conducted with Sahrawi people 
and cats have shown high incidences of 
antibodies specific to the parasite that causes 
toxoplasmosis, in both people and cats. 
Approaches such as Moringa production 
benefit both human and animal populations 
and offer a holistic response to exceptional 
circumstances such as those of the Sahrawi 
refugee camps. A review of the food basket 
needs to take livestock challenges into 
consideration, and the camp health systems 
need to accommodate both human and animal 
health, in order to maximise limited resources 
and stimulate effective collaboration between 
different NGOs, as well as between the NGOs 
and refugees themselves. The Sahrawi refugee 
camps are an exceptional case, and the roles 
of humans and animals within refugee camps 
as a broader topic merits further research.
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A field study of migration and adversity
Derek Robertson 
The migratory journeys of birds can reflect the same complexity of issues that trigger and 
affect human displacement.
I am privileged to spend my days in wild 
and beautiful places painting birds. I am 
fascinated by them: by their abstract shapes, 
their song, their behaviour, their migrations. 
I have sketched them and helped in 
scientific studies of their migratory journeys 
from the Arctic right down into Africa. 
In 2015 I watched reports from beaches 
on Mediterranean islands as desperate 
people came ashore, and I recognised these 
islands as the same places where I had 
watched and sketched migratory birds. 
Here now were people seeking refuge in 
order to survive, taking the same lines 
of flight as the birds that I had drawn. 
Subsequently, over the course of a year, 
I travelled through the UK and Europe, 
through the Mediterranean to the Middle 
East. On my travels I spoke to refugees, to 
locals and to volunteers and I sketched what I 
saw: the people, the places and the birds. One 
of the interests that ecologists have in birds 
is that they are important environmental 
indicators. If the populations or migration 
of the birds change, this points to changes 
in the environment that could be of grave 
concern. The issues are complex but academic 
studies draw a link between climate change, 
conflict and large movements of refugees 
– all of which in turn cause further social 
and environmental stress. In these complex 
systems, ecologists look to the birds to 
indicate what might be happening to our 
world. How we address the intertwined 
issues of climate change and displacement 
will define who we are and what societies 
we will live in for generations to come.
During my travels, I taught art classes in 
refugee schools in Jordan [see image overleaf], 
organised art activities for families at refugee-
welcoming events in the UK and held art 
engagement events for unaccompanied 
children in ‘the Jungle’ camp in Calais. Each 
had a different character and focus. In Jordan, 
I tried to show the possibilities for personal 
development and identity, especially for 
women and girls in a very patriarchal society; 
in the UK, I wanted to help provide a sense 
of engagement and welcome where paintings 
on a wall could indicate a sense of ‘home’ and 
belonging; and in Calais I held events that 
helped engage very distrustful youngsters in 
conversation with the charity volunteers to 
see what clothes, help or services they needed.
There is a degree to which birdwatchers 
(and bird artists) are always birdwatching 
so when I sat down to draw in and around 
the camps, I looked out for birds – and drew 
them. It was poignant to see migrating birds 
flying over the fences that constrained their 
human, migratory counterparts but in their 
crossing of seas and borders, there were other 
comparisons, including the ensnarement of 
unfortunate individuals and the predation by 
birds of prey of smaller, exhausted birds. Both 
birds and people often travelled according 
to geography: the shortest crossing, skirting 
the edge of mountains, travelling through 
cover or from established provisioning 
points. Both found that a tended and man-
made landscape offered little room for them 
and when I was sitting in unofficial camps 
pitched on waste ground, park edges or 
marginal ground between roads, I found 
people and birds brought together in 
scrubby edgelands where they could shelter 
and from which try to move onwards.
In a world where we are challenged by 
topics that can be hard to think about, people 
often close their minds. Art can bring together 
ideas in a way that makes people look at the 
ordinary afresh. And it can appeal directly 
to people’s emotions, helping to provoke an 
appreciation of a shared humanity and of the 
shared challenges that we need to address.
Derek Robertson derekart@btinternet.com 
Wildlife artist 
www.creativepastures.com/migrations  
Enhancing dissemination and impact: opportunities to collaborate with FMR
In addition to the main feature on Economies, this  
issue of FMR includes two ‘mini-features’. In both  
cases we have worked with researchers to support  
and enhance the dissemination of research findings 
relating to a specific project. We have had fruitful  
similar collaborations with UN, government and  
NGO partners.
If your organisation is applying (or is part of a 
consortium applying) for funding on a theme that you 
think is relevant to FMR’s readership, please consider 
including FMR in your proposal narrative and budget. 
There are various options for doing so – whether 
through mini-features like the ones in this issue or 
indeed through a full feature theme of FMR.
www.fmreview.org/economiesFOR FREE DISTRIBUTION ONLY
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What Colour Are The Wheatears?
Wildlife artist Derek Robertson visited and interviewed Syrian, Palestinian and Iraqi refugee families who had settled 
in Jordan. He held a series of art classes for Syrian schoolchildren at a refugee school where he talked about his 
artwork and the links between artwork, environment, animals and the people who live and work in the landscape. 
“The children called out the names of the colours for me in Arabic – which are scribbled into the sketches. Later that 
day, we drove through the desert and I sketched migratory and resident species of wheatears.”
The population of Jordan has doubled in recent years and over-extraction of water has led to oasis towns reverting 
to desert. The effect has been measured immediately in a dramatic change in breeding bird populations and the 
consequences on migrating birds which now have to try to cross larger areas of arid ground.
See Derek Robertson’s article about the links between birds’ migratory journeys and refugee journeys on page 83 of 
this issue (as part of a mini-feature on humans and animals in refugee camps).
We would welcome the opportunity to discuss this. Please contact the Editors at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk.
